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THE FUTURE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS [1]

BY

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LONDON

The occasion on which we are met together, and the auspicious date chosen for our meeting, constitute eventful moments in the history of psycho-analysis. They are therefore the concern not of the Vienna Society alone but of the whole International Psycho-Analytical Association. This is suitably marked by my presence here in an official capacity and by the presence of distinguished analysts from other countries, from America, France, Czecho-Slovakia, Holland and Palestine.

This is not the first time that the Vienna Society has come together in the Berggasse. I must be one of the very few present who had the honour of taking part in more than one scientific meeting in the first home, not only of the Vienna Society, but of psycho-analysis altogether. It was our Master who then presided in person, as he still does in spirit, with the orderliness and simplicity so characteristic of him. Of the old guard that constituted the audience I think there are only four—Federn, Friedjung, Hitschmann and Steiner—still in your midst. Since those days the Vienna Society has suffered considerable losses in its membership. I will mention only the loss by death of Krauss, Silberer, Tausk; the loss by perhaps equally natural, though more unexpected, means of Adler, Rank, Stekel, Sadger; the loss by emigration of Helene Deutsch, Jekels, Sachs, Wittels. But greatest of all the losses, partial though it has fortunately been, has been the

[1] An address given before the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society, May 5, 1936, at the opening of the new Vienna Institute.

enforced withdrawal of Professor Freud's presence from your meetings. What this means only those of us can bear witness who remember the masterly incisiveness with which he used to guide and stimulate the discussions of the Society. On the other hand, I can also testify, from the evidence derived from my official duties, of the unceasing and extraordinarily minute interest with which he still participates in not only all the concerns of your society, but in every activity of psycho-analysis all over the world. He has imposed a severe tabu on the public celebration of his eightieth birthday, and has taught us what awful consequences follow on the breaking of a tabu, but I will nevertheless not refrain from expressing in the name of the International Association the wish that he may spend a pleasant birthday and our happiness at the thought that the pioneer of psycho-analysis still remains our active leader.

After spending some five years in its cradle the Vienna Society entered on its long *Wanderjahre*. It moved from one café or similar locality to another ' und immer fragte der Seufzer Wo '. It is a worthy sign of the honourable poverty the Vienna Society, the mother of all analytical societies, has endured that it has taken more than thirty years to find a true home of its own. And where could it have a more appropriate one than in its birthplace, in the Berggasse that will for all time be inseparably associated with the name of Freud and of psycho-analysis ? I deem it especially fortunate that this home should house not only the Society with its Library and Institute (including its Clinic), but also the Verlag—that brave international gesture of psycho-analysis. We all know how much we owe here to one of your members, I refer to Dr. Martin Freud. Many years ago, when the currency collapse in Austria made it appear likely that the Verlag at its inception would be nothing but a still-birth, Professor Freud remarked to me that Otto Rank had fought like a lion to save it. The same remark can assuredly be made of the present Director, and we all hope that his efforts will meet with the same success. No one else could save it, and there is no doubt that without Martin Freud's devotion and skill the Verlag would have foundered long since.

This thought leads us from the interesting past to the more speculative theme of *Zukunftsmusik*. Let me here begin with the more objective aspects, first with the Verlag. It is not possible to say anything definite about the material basis of an institution that ekes out a precarious existence in such a magical fashion as does the Verlag, but two general predictions can be made that bear on it. The greater

part of psycho-analytical literature, and the most valuable part, is still in German, though this is not so overwhelmingly so as when the Verlag was founded, seventeen years ago. Nor certainly will it be so in the future, both because of the important emigration to Anglo-Saxon countries and because analytical work has much more favourable opportunities in those countries for extending. This will inevitably in time diminish the importance of the Verlag as an international publishing institution, though what it has accomplished in the past will long remain the fundamental basis of our literary sources. In the second place, the material and political difficulties with which the Verlag has to fight make it highly probable that it will be obliged to restrict and concentrate its activities to an even greater extent in the future. This restriction will perhaps affect authors, whom it costs at least as much to publish a book with the Verlag as with any other firm, less than it will the analytical world at large. The wonderful centralizing function of the Verlag, and its value for purposes of propaganda, would be very difficult indeed to replace, and we have at present in our minds some plans for consolidating and even extending them. When I used the word ' concentrate ' just now I had in mind more especially the official periodicals, which I regard as the real kernel of the Verlag. I can imagine no more severe blow to psycho-analysis than any enforced suspension of these, and I am sure we should all fight to the last to prevent such a calamity. When the general literature is more widely distributed than hitherto, as is bound to happen, then the centralizing function of our periodicals will correspondingly grow and the abstracting and reviewing departments will have to be organized more systematically and thoroughly than ever, so that the Zeitschrift becomes a real Zentralblatt. Again it will not be possible indefinitely to induce the minority of the International Association to subscribe compulsorily to two official organs while the majority have to subscribe to only one. I should myself think it better to replace the present arrangement by one in which the Verlag published an up-to-date Zeitschrift, of course in German, six times a year and in addition a Jahrbuch which could publish longer essays in various languages, and I should like to see subscription to such a Jahrbuch, which would contain the most important contributions, made obligatory for all members of the International Association.

I should like now to say something about the future of psycho-analysis as a profession. The first question here is to what extent we regard it as an independent profession. Experience has shewn that

from whatever source of interest people study psycho-analysis at first hand, whether anthropological, philosophical or educational, the vast majority endeavour to enter on therapeutic practice. However we may regard psycho-analysis, therefore, as a pure science which may be applied for various purposes, in actuality it nearly always proves to be a form of psychiatry—using this word in its etymological sense of the healing aspects of psychopathology. Then comes the dilemma of its relation to the medical profession, one we debated keenly some nine or ten years ago. At that time opinions were so divided that it was hard to predict the future. On the one hand, many were attracted by the vision of creating a completely new profession, one quite independent of the medical profession. In support of this view they could point to the practical success of non-medical analysts and the unquestionably unique nature of the analytical discipline, one which could find few points of contact with the usual medical education. I was myself attracted, if not captured, by this fascinating vision. Other members, however, were dubious of the desirability, or possibility, of separating mind and body so sharply, or of maintaining side by side two professions devoted to pathology and therapeutics. They also pointed to the legal obstacles in the way, and to the undeniable fact that such a plan would vastly increase the difficulty of winning for psycho-analysis the social recognition necessary to its existence. Very long experience in London, where I interview every applicant for training, has amply confirmed the prediction I ventured in the Lay Symposium, that if medical and non-medical candidates were admitted equally without reservation then we should in a few years have a society composed mainly of laity and that we therefore have to choose between developing a profession composed predominantly of medical or one predominantly of non-medical analysts. My own view has consistently been the former, and that our profession, the most special of all the medical specialities, should strive to maintain a close contact with the general medical profession. At the same time I have always been opposed to dogmatic exclusiveness in the matter and have constantly favoured the admittance of non-medical members of special gifts, in special circumstances and with the special regulations about practice proposed by Professor Freud himself. If we review the history of the ten years that have passed since we last debated the matter, I think there can be no doubt that, except perhaps in London and Vienna, opinion has, in spite of Professor Freud's personal influence, definitely hardened in favour of the more medical view concerning the nature of

our profession. When one further studies the factors that have brought this about one can at least say that this line of development appears now more likely to be the future one than it did ten years ago.

Leaving this still debatable question I would express the opinion that the general standing of psycho-analysis as a profession will in the future depend less on distinguished personalities than on the quality of what may be called the rank and file of analytical practitioners. This brings us to the highly important matter of analytical training, and in this field I hope for great advance in the next ten years. Those who have such training at heart—unfortunately not a large number—know that the actual technique of training is a much more complex matter than was at first thought and that special study devoted to it should enable us to make great progress beyond the cruder empirical methods at first used. We have, however, first to overcome a very serious difficulty, one with which Dr. Eitingon is at present acutely faced. With all his enthusiasm and idealism in the matter he has to devote so much energy to the very difficult problems of organization that little opportunity presents itself for getting to the real work itself. And by the real work I do not mean the laying down of rules or even the coordinating of standards in various countries, desirable as all this may be, but the close and detailed discussions of training technique. Dr. Eitingon, perceiving how questions of organization devoured all the time and energy available at general Congress meetings of the International Training Commission, made last year a laudable attempt to arrange a gathering of training analysts in a less distracted atmosphere. He was defeated, not merely by the impediment of long distances, but especially by the lack of sufficient interest. I do not know if he has drawn the conclusion that the various training committees taken as a whole cannot provide the necessary zeal to make such a gathering possible. If so, perhaps he will consider an alternative: namely, to arrange a conference of the few—perhaps only half a dozen people—who have these problems most at heart. The work carried out at such a conference, and any conclusions reached, could then be published in the official periodicals and serve to stimulate the more stay-at-home members of the various Training Committees.

I will venture from my own experience a few suggestions about the directions in which future progress may be attained. The selection of candidates could well be stricter, since a smaller number of suitable analysts would be more effective as a body than a larger number of less satisfactory ones. The duration of the training could be even longer

than at present, and the laudable habit of what may be called post-graduate analyses, which I note is spontaneously becoming customary, might with advantage be put on a more organized basis. In the technique of conducting control analyses and seminars there is a great deal to learn. Here it is a question of zealous teachers pooling and discussing their experiences, and I think it is extremely important that this pooling should not be confined to the teachers of any one country, but should be international. The relation of such work to the didactic analysis is also a special problem in itself. Then I have the impression that candidates and young analysts are too overworked by the large number of lectures, so that they have little time for reading, for reflection and for original work. The fondness for lecturing and for listening to lectures seems to vary in different countries, but I am sure that in all it needs to be discouraged. A lecture should be an outstanding event, a treat carefully prepared and correspondingly enjoyed —not a daily monotonous menu. I want to draw special attention to a lack I observe among some of our younger analysts—their imperfect acquaintance with analytical literature. This I would ascribe partly to the overwork I have just mentioned and partly to their not properly appreciating the importance of the matter. I am myself convinced that to acquire mainly a current knowledge of any mental science, e.g. psychology, sociology, history, etc., without a proper study of its historical evolution gravely diminishes the chance of developing a critical perspective and thus exposes one to numerous fallacies that would otherwise be avoided. To these general considerations, which had I time I could expound more fully, I would add a special one which in the future may prove of great importance. The time is coming, I hope, when we shall be able to specify the exact nature and the various types of deviation from analytic truth which result from unresolved resistances. Now in the past few years I have become aware of an interesting form of resistance, which will surely become more prominent with new discoveries and further progress in analytic work. I refer to the device of opposing the progress by confronting it with an old piece of knowledge, rediscovered for the occasion and paraded perhaps in novel language as a new and improved piece of insight. Evidently such a device would be readily checked by adequate knowledge of the development of psycho-analysis, but without this—and there is certainly less now than there used to be—much trouble, argument and wasteful effort may be anticipated.

I come last to the theme in the future of psycho-analysis that most

interests us, namely, scientific progress in the subject itself. I do not believe that this is a matter our Institutes or any other organization can greatly further. We can only provide the useful accessory material, good libraries, research facilities and a sympathetic audience. For in this matter we shall have to depend on the gifts of fortune in the shape of those personalities who have the happy flair for the significant new or the capacity to elucidate confused data by apprehending what is essential. Both the qualities will be needed. Originality is a two-edged weapon unless it be accompanied by a cool and critical judgement, the rare combination we have seen so wonderfully exhibited by Freud. There is no subject where a critical judgement is more indispensable than in the investigation of the unconscious mind, where will o' the wisps beckon us on every side to treacherous morasses. The commonest risk to the investigator is the temptation to a one-sided exaggeration of whatever elements may have seized his interest. If yielded to, this will in time not only distort the perspective but actually bend and pervert the material in favour of a particular point of view. On the other hand, one should not always assume at once that an investigator opening up a new vein has certainly committed this error. It may well be that his neglect of other elements is only apparent, that he has omitted these in his presentation on the grounds of their being well known and not directly pertinent to the theme under immediate consideration. We can always remind ourselves here of Freud's classical researches into sexuality. When he was concentrating on this subject his critics clamorously asserted that he was not merely neglecting, but apparently denying, the existence of any other mental elements. He could, it is true, always defend himself by pointing to the dualism in his conception of conflict, but his opponents persisted in erroneously concluding from the one-sided concentration of his researches that his own outlook must also be one-sided.

In the field of Technique I shall be surprised if any revolutionary change is vouchsafed to us in the near future by any great discovery. At least I do not see the signs of any such on the horizon. What I look to is rather a steady progress in thoroughness, a greater polish and accuracy leading to far more sureness than we now possess. Special studies are needed on the precise criteria for the trustworthiness of our interpretations, and also on the extraordinarily difficult subject of the correlation between technique and theory in psycho-analysis.

In the field of Theory, on the other hand, I am inclined to anticipate very considerable changes in the course of the next twenty years or so.

The scaffolding, as he modestly called it, that Freud has erected, has stood much rough weather extraordinarily well, though he has had to repair and strengthen it from time to time. But it would be counter to all our knowledge of the history and essential nature of science to suppose that it will not be extensively modified with the passage of time. The preconceptions from the world of contemporary scientific thought with which Freud approached his studies had a visible influence on his theoretical structure, and they necessarily bear the mark of a given period. We must expect that other workers, schooled by different disciplines than his, will be able to effect fresh orientations, to formulate fresh correlations. In spite of our natural piety we must brace ourselves to welcome such changes, fortifying ourselves with the reflection that to face new truth and to hold truth above all other considerations has been Freud's greatest lesson to us and his most precious legacy to psychological science.

It is hard to say how much assistance we may anticipate from allied disciplines in science. I am myself not disposed to expect much help of a direct kind, but the indirect benefit of a wide background of such knowledge can hardly be estimated too highly. I scarcely anticipate much help, for instance, from such fields as anthropology, political economy or sociology, although I would counsel our younger colleagues to keep a watchful eye on any notable progress or change in the currents of thought in those fields. More perhaps may be expected from biochemistry, which should in time influence our theory, and especially from comparative psychology. When this last-named discipline turns its attention to the subject of instincts and the nature of instinctual activity, as such workers as Pictet, Maurice Thomas and Verlaine are beginning to do, we may well receive a useful stimulus to reconsideration of these obscure problems.

As to the main question concerning the future of psycho-analysis, whether its importance will be maintained, will extend or diminish, I take it that no true psycho-analyst can be in doubt. My mind is literally incapable of imagining the mass of our valuable insight and knowledge vanishing from the earth, so long as any sort of civilization endures. Nor can I doubt that in the course of centuries psycho-analysis, the science of the unconscious, will play an increasingly central part in all studies and activities that have to do with the unfolding of man's mind and the determination of his well-being.

I now come back to the occasion of this Address, the providing of the Vienna Society for the first time with a home. To what was an

airy nothing we give a local habitation and a name. From now on the Vienna Society and the Vienna Institute will have a visible abode, with all the conveniences and amenities that betokens. Nor could its premises be more suitably furnished than with the precious possessions of the International Verlag, to whom we all wish a fresh lease of life—one more stable than its adventurous past. It is my privilege to declare these new premises open for occupation, for enjoyment and above all for use.

THE EFFECT OF THE KING'S DEATH UPON PATIENTS UNDER ANALYSIS [1]

BY

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On the occasion of the recent death of King George (January 20, 1936), I could not help being impressed by the effect which this event seemed to produce upon three of my patients undergoing analysis at the time. Whilst it is always informative to study the reactions of analytical patients to current events, the reactions of a group of patients to the same event are of particular interest—especially when the event in question is so significant and, at the same time, so infrequent as the death of a king. In the present instance, therefore, it seems worth placing on record the reactions of the three patients to whom I have referred. The patients in question were all characterized by a pronounced strain of oral sadism and a marked tendency to oral incorporation; and this fact would appear to have been in large measure responsible for the extreme nature of their reaction to King George's death.

One of the patients was a youth of 18, who was sent to me for analysis from a mental hospital about four months before King George died. He had been an only child most of his life—before the birth of a brother six years younger than himself and after the death of this brother six years later. His chief symptoms were:—(1) Inability to tolerate separation from his mother without intense anxiety. (2) A hypochondriacal preoccupation with the idea that his heart was diseased. (3) Recurring attacks of violent palpitation accompanied by an overwhelming fear of death.

While the clinical picture was thus dominated by anxiety symptoms, the general demeanour of the patient was nevertheless suggestive of a schizophrenic background. After analysis began, it very soon became apparent that the youth's reluctance to be parted from his mother was largely due to a need for constant reassurance that his mother had not been destroyed by his oral sadism. On the other hand, his cardiac anxiety resolved itself into anxiety lest his internalized mother, upon whom he had projected a considerable charge of oral sadism, should

[1] Read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society on February 19, 1936.

kill him by gnawing away his heart. This fact was well illustrated by a dream in which he saw his heart lying on a plate, and his mother in the act of lifting it with a spoon. During the course of four months' analysis previous to the King's death, his symptoms became mitigated to a very marked degree. When, however, disquieting bulletins regarding the state of the King's heart began to be issued, there was a marked exacerbation of his symptoms. Every time the wireless was turned on, he went into a panic; his sleep became disturbed; and he began to ring me up on the telephone at all hours in the hope of obtaining reassurance. The patient learned of the King's death on the morning after its occurrence; and during the following night he dreamed that he had shot a man representing his father. The dream pictured him as being in a room with his mother, to whom he explained that his reason for shooting the man was not dislike, but a fear for his own life. He also explained that in taking the man's life he had taken his own, and that he expected to be sent to prison for six years. Next, a young woman appeared; and he then felt that this woman was the person whom he had killed. His mother now left the room; and, as she left, he heard shouts from an adjoining room. These shouts seemed to come from the person whom he had killed; but this person now seemed to be his brother (whose actual death had been a burden upon his conscience for six years—the term of his prospective 'imprisonment' in the dream). Since 'the young woman' turned out to symbolize his mother as a sexual object, the dream represented a wholesale destruction of the entire family; and the fact that this dream was followed by another dream, in which his mother warned him against eating a jelly at the bottom of a staircase upon which she herself stood, shows that the act of destruction was really an act of oral-sadistic incorporation—an act, moreover, involving mortal danger to the patient himself. The anxiety symptoms precipitated by the King's death would thus appear to have been mainly due to the dangerous qualities with which the patient had endowed the internalized object.

The second patient was an unmarried man of 31, who had been undergoing analysis for rather more than two and a half years, when the King's death occurred. The symptom which drove him to seek analytical aid in the first instance was an incessant desire to urinate, which was so compelling as to monopolize his whole waking life. He had, however, lived a semi-invalid existence ever since the age of five, when he had nearly died of an empyema. Until the onset of his

urinary symptoms his life had been largely dominated by anxiety regarding his chest. This anxiety recurred during the course of analysis after his urinary symptoms had abated. Since he was also subject to a fear of food poisoning, it was not surprising to find that, as analysis proceeded, an intense strain of oral sadism became manifest. The emergence of this oral sadism was accompanied by gastric symptoms, which replaced a more or less constant sense of congestion in the chest. In due course the gastric symptoms disappeared; but shortly before the King's death he had become preoccupied with his throat on the basis of a mild tonsillar infection. The King's death had a very depressing effect upon him, reminding him very strongly, as it did, of his own father's death; and he became irritated by the prominence given to the event in the press and on the wireless. His usual interests flagged, his customary concern over his health was intensified and he became subject to a sense of congestion throughout the body from the waist upwards. Above all he became extremely apprehensive about his own safety. He felt as if a war were being waged inside him and sensed the presence of some antagonistic and dangerous force at work within his body. In the light of data, which had already emerged during analysis, it was evident that the war inside him was a war between his own oral-sadistic ego and an internalized father-figure, whom he had endowed with oral-sadistic attributes. The King's death represented a consummation of his oral-sadistic designs against his father, whose incorporation became responsible for his sense of a destructive force within.

This patient's immediate reaction to the King's death had an interesting sequel a fortnight later, when he had a dream about 'the King's cigars'. The dream opened with his discovering that his car had been stolen. After telephoning to the police, he found that his father (who is actually dead) had returned from a long voyage. He was overjoyed by this event and promptly entertained his father to a sumptuous dinner. Suddenly the thief turned up with the car and the patient rushed in fury at his throat. Subsequently he saw an advertisement offering the King's cigars for sale at £147 each.

This dream, of course, introduces the theme of 'the restitution of the object'. It depicts a restitution of the patient's father, whose death had been a gratification to his oral sadism; and it is significant that he celebrates the occasion by a sumptuous meal. The advertisement of the King's cigars, moreover, is tantamount to a restitution of his father's penis as an object of oral gratification.

The theme of restitution reappeared two nights later in a dream in which the patient seemed to be swimming with King George in a flooded area outside Buckingham Palace. The King kept putting his head under water and was eventually drowned, in spite of the patient's efforts to save him. In the next scene a number of trunks were being removed from a state coach by policemen, whose demeanour was such as to befit both a funeral and a court of justice. The patient then found himself in a luxurious Pullman coach with the King, whose apparent restoration to life and health filled him with a sense of intense relief.

The restoration of the King in this dream corresponds, of course, to the restoration of the patient's father in the previous dream ; but in this instance, it will be noted, the death of the father-figure is ascribed to the effects of a flood—a fact which recalls the patient's original symptom of incessant urination. Having restored the object destroyed by his oral sadism in the first dream, he proceeds in the second dream to restore the object destroyed by his urinary sadism.

The third case is that of a patient about whom I read a paper before the British Psycho-Analytical Society on January 21, 1931, and who is still undergoing analysis. This patient is presumed to be a woman, although the presence of a genital defect raises some uncertainty regarding the sex to which she really belongs. Her age is now 50 ; and she is in the ninth year of analysis. A teacher by profession, she had to abandon her calling owing to termly breakdowns characterized by anxiety, depression and suicidal thoughts. The prolongation of her analysis has been due in no small measure to the fact that, after an initial manic phase, she began to exploit the mechanism of projection and to substitute paranoid ideas of self-reference in the presence of men for manic-depressive symptoms. Occasional attacks of depression were interpolated, however, from time to time ; and during these attacks the paranoid symptoms subsided. During the eighth year of analysis the activity of the projection mechanism became considerably reduced, with the result that the foreground of the clinical picture became occupied by occasional attacks of mild depression. The disappearance of paranoid symptoms had followed the analysis of very deeply repressed anal-sadistic urges ; but, in proportion as the projection mechanism weakened, a more basic oral sadism revealed itself as the source from which the attacks of depression arose. It now became possible to establish that these attacks of depression were in all cases precipitated by actual incidents, often of

a trivial character; and the King's death provided the occasion of one such attack.

Just before the patient retired to bed on January 20 (the night of the King's death), she heard a wireless bulletin to the effect that he was sinking fast. She did not actually learn of his death until the next morning, but during the night she dreamed, significantly enough, that her own father was dead. Throughout the day on January 21 she felt extremely disturbed and terribly cross. She missed her appointment with me; but her excuse had a reality basis and she kept her appointment on the following day (January 22). She was still in a very disturbed state of mind; and from this fact she herself inferred that she must be holding herself responsible for the King's death. On January 23 she awoke feeling extremely depressed; but her depression vanished mysteriously at 11.30 a.m. Meanwhile, on the night of January 21–22 she had had a series of distressing dreams, which provided a considerable amount of analytical material.

From this series of dreams the following features may be selected for notice:—The first dream consisted almost exclusively in hideous and terrifying affect. The dreamer just felt possessed by terror, misery and despair. She seemed to be groping about in the dark; but what concerned her was the state of her mind; for she felt utterly and hopelessly mad. She then dreamed that she was gradually turning cold from the feet up, and that, when she became cold through and through, she would be absolutely finished. Later she dreamed that she was living in a beautiful little house of her own, where everything was perfect. She entered one of the rooms with her mother to demonstrate its perfection; but to her horror she saw two enormous weeds growing through a lovely crimson carpet on the floor. She immediately stooped down to tear up the weeds, remarking how difficult they were to eradicate. Her house now seemed to be in a public park; and she was sitting beside the house on a box containing an animal. A woman entered the park with a dog, whereupon a cry arose, 'Put out that dog.' An attempt was made to catch it; but it made its escape in a state of intense excitement and ferocity. The dreamer then heard snarling sounds behind her and realized to her horror that the dog was trying to get at the animal in the box and worry it to death. This thought made her extremely apprehensive regarding her own safety. Later she heard a knock at the door of her house and, on rushing to open it, she discovered two policemen standing in the rain and darkness outside. She invited them to come in; and

they helped her to light the hanging lamp in the hall. She then noticed that the light was red—red for danger. She became extremely alarmed about this visitation and anxiously debated why it was to her door in particular that it had come. The two policemen then turned into three women, who began to explain the nature of their visit. For a long time she could not understand what they said, but eventually she made out that some dreadful disaster had befallen a man named 'David Little'. She awoke wondering who 'David Little' was and what he had to do with her.

'David', of course, is the name by which the new King (King Edward VIII) is known in the royal family circle. 'David Little' is 'Little David'; and the disaster which has befallen 'Little David' is his royal father's death. The visitation of the patient's house by super-ego figures in connection with this disaster implies that it is she herself who has killed the King—an act of patricide, which she disowns in the dream on the grounds that she is ignorant of 'David Little's' identity. The oral-sadistic nature of her crime is represented in the scene in which the ferocious dog is seeking to worry the animal in the box. By sitting on the lid of the box, she is, of course, protecting her internalized father from her oral-sadistic libido at the risk of her own life; but I fancy it would be a more accurate description of the situation to say that she is internalizing her father in order to save him from her oral sadism—which then becomes a menace to her own ego. The theme of internalizing the libidinal object in order to save it from being destroyed by oral-sadistic impulses had already emerged in this patient's analysis. One day not so long before the King's death she experienced intense feelings of annoyance with her father for sitting in a chair which she herself desired to occupy. She stifled her anger at the time; but the result was an attack of depression. On several previous occasions too an attack of depression followed the stifling of feelings of resentment towards me. In all such instances the attack of depression was a substitute for an open display of resentment; and the aim of internalizing the object was to save it from destruction at the price of exposing the ego to the full fury of the sadism released by frustration. The internalization of the object resulting from the King's death falls into rather a different category. It falls into the same category as that which had already occurred on several previous occasions during this patient's analysis: e.g. when her brother was killed by a motor car, when her father was seriously injured in a motor accident, when on two occasions I had a sudden

illness and when one day she saw the daughter of her old schoolmaster dressed in black and presumed (wrongly as it happened) that he was dead. On each of these occasions an attack of depression ensued; but in such instances the onset of depression was promoted not by frustration, but by an unexpected gratification of repressed sadistic urges. This may be illustrated by the fact that, when the patient's brother was killed, a short phase of elation preceded the inevitable attack of depression. The internalization of the object characterizing this class of depressive attack cannot, therefore, have as its aim the safeguarding of the external object. In such instances the damage has already been done before the internalization mechanism is called into action. Under such circumstances the aim of internalization must be to absorb the flood of sadism released, so to speak, 'by the smell of blood'. Perhaps, however, the truth lies in Mrs. Klein's statement [2] that every experience which suggests the loss of the real loved object stimulates the dread of losing the internalized object too.

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[2] *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, Vol. XVI, Pt. 2, p. 150.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CARICATURE [1]

BY

ERNST KRIS

VIENNA

Ever since a scientific body of doctrine relating to the essential processes and manifestations of human mental life—I refer to psycho-analysis—came into existence, psychology has reconstituted its field of enquiry ; since that date the comic has no longer (or no longer exclusively) been a matter of some æsthetic theory, involving the tacit assumption of popular psychological views, but has become an affair of psychology itself.

By way of introduction, let me remind you that the conclusions of psycho-analysis bearing on the psychology of the comic are derived from two different phases in the development of our science. First, there are those essentially concerned with an understanding of topographical and economic relations, which go back to its heroic age, to Freud's *Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious* ; at the time, after *The Interpretation of Dreams* and *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, they signified a third decisive stride forward on that imposing route which was to lead through the knowledge gleaned from pathological phenomena to the construction of a fundamentally new, general psychological outlook. The others represent the results of nearly twenty-five years further study, and relate principally to dynamic and structural problems ; they were developed by Freud (originally for one branch of the comic) in his paper on ' Humour,' and are part of the efforts made to arrive at a clearer view of the ego's position in the mental structure in the light of a system of metapsychological conceptions, efforts which bid fair radically to affect the clinical practice and theories of psycho-analysis in its fourth decade.

A number of investigators have been at pains to correlate and differentiate the two points of view—here more sharply contrasted than is warranted by the actual facts ; I may remind you in this connection of the work of Th. Reik, A. von Winterstein, and recently, of F. Alexander. As an attempt in the same direction is to form the substance of my remarks, I shall therefore frequently have to repeat what you already know.[2] As a point of departure I shall select a

[1] Expanded from a paper delivered before the Thirteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Lucerne, August, 1934.

[2] For this reason, there seems to be no object in making express reference to the fact *every* time I follow Freud's conclusions. Where I have

sub-division of the comic which does not seem to have been evaluated according to its merits either in analytical, or for that matter in extra-analytical, literature : namely, caricature.

The material on which I shall rely is of three kinds : sociological data from the history of caricature, clinical material, and observations made on children. In the present context I shall, of course, be unable to give an account of the material itself ; instead I will try from my point of departure to reach some reflections and suggestions of general significance for the psycho-analytic theory of the comic. In doing so, having regard to the limited time available, it will be impossible to avoid making an almost arbitrary selection from the wide range of problems and proceeding in an admittedly one-sided and crudely schematic fashion.

II

To begin with, there are some preliminary questions which we shall have to consider, the first among them, as is only proper, relating to the source of the pleasure-gain in caricature. We know already what to expect ; a part of the pleasure derives from a saving in mental energy ; another from the relation to infantile life.

If we would try to find our bearings in relation to our theme, we might well choose as our point of departure the verbal designation itself. The Italian ' caricare ' and the French ' charger ' (*charge* = caricature) convey the same idea : to charge or to overcharge ; we would add, with distinctive features. Thus a human countenance may have a single trait accentuated so that the representation is ' overcharged ' with it.[3] What then occurs in our imagination has

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drawn upon ideas put forward by other writers, I think I have always stated the fact, although naturally only when these constitute an advance on Freud's position. It was unfortunately not possible to discuss in the present context the recent literature of general psychology and æsthetics bearing on the problems broached in this paper.

[3] Some Italian verses of the seventeenth century give the following indications to the caricaturist ; he should seize on a physical peculiarity of the person to be portrayed and magnify it ; then the likeness will certainly be repellent, but all the more a likeness for that :

S'egli have membro alcun mal fatto o torto
O che dagli altri sia lontano o presso
Più del dovere, o troppo lungo corto :
Quella sproporzion si cresce : e spesso
Ben che venga pùi brutto assai, diresti
Somiglia piu che'l naturale stesso.'

been described repeatedly, although by none more clearly than by Bergson. In our thoughts, as it were, we cause our model's features to become twisted in a grimace ; in a moment we shall have occasion to enquire into the source of this impulse in itself.

But first we must distinguish between a simple and a complex form of caricature. The former has reference to caricatures that are comic [4] in the strict and narrow sense of the term so penetratingly defined by Freud in his book on wit. These affect us like the circus-clown ; we learn from Freud that the occasion of our pleasure is a comparison ; in caricature this relates to reality as compared with a distorted reproduction of it. It is easy to see that here again, just as with the phenomena of the comic in the (limited) sense of Freud's definition, it is really a matter of a saving in expenditure on thought, and that our pleasure may be regarded as originating in the preconscious.

This point of view, however, can hardly be regarded as very satisfying ; ' comic ' caricatures of this kind are, to say the least, extremely rare, and if one is to take into account as well the graphic representations intended to produce a comical effect, such as the comic illustrations of the nineteenth century, one runs the risk of unduly straining the use of the term. For there can be no doubt that we should be justified in regarding its tendentious character as an essential attribute of caricature ; indeed an overwhelmingly large proportion of all caricatures serves a tendency. They are aimed either at an individual or at a type, whom they portray with single features exaggerated ; the natural harmony of an appearance is destroyed, and this has the result in many cases of revealing a contrast in the personality between looks and character. But this procedure is not specially characteristic of graphic representation. The dissolution of unity in the interests of aggression is familiar to us as a technique whereby it is precisely this incongruity of form and content which is

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Cf. in this connection W. R. Juynboll, *Het komische genre in de italiaansche schilderkunst gedurende de zeventiende en de achttiende eeuw.* Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van de Caricatuur. 1934, p. 148.

[4] Since it is intended here to deal with the various peculiarities and characteristics shared in common by phenomena which language brackets together as ' comic,' I cannot avoid employing the term in two different senses : the one general, following the usage of speech ; the other limited, following Freud's definition.

so often demonstrated ; thus parody devaluates the content, travesty the form.

The aggressive nature of all caricature, which seems to condition its mechanisms, is mentioned in the earliest definitions, which have lately come to light. According to one of these, which originated in the seventeenth century within the circle of the great Giovanni Lorenzo Bernini, caricature seeks to discover a likeness in deformity ; in this way, so runs the theory of the time, it comes nearer to truth than does reality. This settles the nature of its achievement ; it serves the purpose of *unmasking* another person, familiar to us as technique of degradation. To return now to our point of departure : the saving in mental energy which accompanies caricature (of a tendentious kind) is evidently to be regarded as a saving in expenditure on suppression, or as one resulting from a liberation of aggression. But the site of this pleasure must be recognized as in the unconscious. Nevertheless it is clear that some measure of the effect produced by the comic (in its limited sense) is present as an element in all caricature, and that the effect of this is almost invariably determined in part by the pleasurable saving in expenditure on thought resulting from a comparison. We shall later have to refer to the interrelations of these two sources of pleasure.

Needless to say, these reflections have not profited us greatly, since it is obvious that they do not (or do not adequately) take cognizance of the elements specific to caricature as opposed to other allied forms. It would therefore be well, in conjunction with the fleeting references which we have made to topographical and economic problems, to consider a further preliminary question bearing on the formal structure of caricature.

As a basis for this discussion, let us take the scheme of a caricature of which I will try to give you a short description in words. The subject of the caricature is Napoleon and the continental blockade. We see the Emperor before us, in hat and cloak ; he is strikingly small in size, far more so than in reality. He is raised on stilts, and holds out with both hands a pair of seven league boots. Instead of the well-known features of Napoleon, he has the unmistakable appearance of a shopkeeper ; a number of details in his attire are also an allusion to this status.

I shall have to refrain from giving a more detailed account of the relations of the single elements to their theme, the conflict between Napoleon and the unconquerable might of Great Britain. For while

it is true that this period produced a great number of caricatures of a very similar type, the one which I have tried to describe is not a caricature at all. It is taken from the dream of a patient, dreamed at the height of his conflict over castration-anxiety, in which the separate elements are determined with as much, indeed with more, ingenuity than those of a caricature. I will only add that the shopkeeper, a figure from the patient's youth, bore a name rich in associations, that of Kitzler.[5]

The correspondence between dreams and caricature revealed by this example is easily accounted for. It is evidently to be referred to the circumstance that the formal language of caricature, like that of dreams, owes its nature to the operation of the primary process. There is nothing really surprising in this ; for even in his first contribution to the psychology of the comic, Freud proceeded from a similar analogy; I have in mind his demonstration of the parallels existing between wit and dreams, which he was able to derive from the operation of the primary process. But this similarity can be developed further. Caricature is seen to be a graphic form of wit. A banal result, which could easily be elaborated in detail on the basis of a typology of caricature. But before we can try to advance to a more profitable conception, let us obtain some light on the analogies between the two processes by contrasting the ' work of wit ' with ' the work of caricature.' In doing so, it will be best—again following Freud's presentation—to proceed from the negative of wit, from the riddle. The riddle conceals what wit reveals. In wit the matter is known and the manner a secret, in riddles, the manner known and the matter to be discovered. The essence of the relation between wit and the riddle—the features common to both incidentally have their roots deep in mythical thought, as we see when we recall the special position of the riddle in all mythologies—may be illustrated by reference to the behaviour of a patient ; he was incapable of deriving pleasure from a joke, but was under a compulsion to read the first line only and then guess the point. He converted a joke into a riddle.

An analogous form of reaction may be tested experimentally by anyone engaged in studying a caricature. If the connections and allusions forming its content are obscure—this applies to all earlier caricatures, since for reasons which we shall try to indicate later on, achievements in comic expression age specially quickly (posterity

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[5] [*Kitzler* = tickler, also clitoris.—Trans.]

has no crown of laurel for the comic artist)—the hieroglyphic nature of caricature becomes a reality. We are impelled to resolve connections and allusions by guess-work ; the caricature has changed into a rebus.

This attribute of caricature to which our comparison leads reappears in another branch of pictorial art, which we cannot consider further here, the realm of allegory.

III

We have now to elucidate in greater detail the relations of wit and caricature to dreams : in dreams, the ego abandons its supremacy and the primary process obtains control, whereas in wit and in caricature this process remains in the service of the ego. This formulation alone suffices to show that the problem involved is a more general one ; the contrast between an ego overwhelmed by regression and a ' regression in the service of the ego '—*si licet venia verbo*—covers a vast and imposing range of mental experience.

There are numerous conditions, extending from the levels of normal life deep down into the realm of the pathological, in which the ego abandons its supremacy ; besides dreams, we find, not far removed from the norm, states of intoxication, in which the adult again becomes a child, and recovers ' the right to ignore the limitations imposed by the demands of logic and to give free rein to his imagination ' (Freud), or again, the multiplicity of well-known clinical pictures in neurosis and psychosis. The economic aspect of some of these processes suggests a formulation which we will mention here for the sake of its connection with certain considerations later to be adduced : it seems that the ego finds its supremacy curtailed whenever it is overwhelmed by affects, irrespective of whether an excess of affect or its own weakness is to be held responsible for the process.

But the opposite case, where the ego enrols the primary process in its service and makes use of it for its purposes, is also of the widest significance. I will only say in so many words that it is not confined to the sphere of wit and caricature, but extends to the vast domain of æsthetic expression in general and that it applies over the whole field of art and of symbol-formation, preconscious or unconscious, which, beginning with cult and ritual, permeates the whole of human life.

Here it would be well to break off ; for any attempt to proceed from these schematic formulations to clarify concrete phenomena would oblige us to digress considerably from our course. We will return to our point of departure, and have to recognize that our deliberations have done nothing to define the ego's specific achievement in wit and

in caricature. We shall only be able to understand this if we are ready to undertake the investigation of its more important determinants, i.e. to examine them from the point of view of a ' multiple function ' (R. Wälder). Here the process of mastering strong exhibitionistic tendencies seems likely to provide us with a sure foundation.

But before trying to approach this problem from another side, we will first interpolate the remark that the primary process, the operation of which, in Freud's view, conditions the uniform character of primitive modes of expression, is not merely of decisive importance for the thought-processes of primitive peoples, but appears also to determine the evolution of the ' grammar ' and ' syntax ' employed in those of the child. This notion, I believe, enables us to discover points of contact between the views held by psycho-analysts and those of Jean Piaget, the interrelations of which have of late occupied the attention of many analysts—I may mention R. de Saussure and L. Kubie. Once more it will be better not to pursue the thread further. For any attempt to base the view here indicated on a firmer foundation would necessarily take us back to the interpretation of dreams, the old *via regia* of psycho-analysis.

IV

Besides the saving in mental energy, Freud regards their close relation to infantile life as a distinguishing mark of all forms of the comic. Its expression in words, which includes wit, revives modes of expression employed by the child when speech was developing ; for example, the play on words restores to its ancient rights the clang-association of their sounds, as opposed to that of the things they represent. We have to ask ourselves what is the nature of the connection between the child's behaviour and that branch of the comic which employs, not verbal, but pictorial (principally graphic) means of expression. So far as regards caricature, the question is easily answered. Just as wit returns to particular verbal forms of expression, caricature returns to typical elements in the graphic forms of expression (drawings) of the child.[6] Anyone who tries to understand children's drawings often enough finds himself obliged to ' interpret ' them, just as we are accustomed to do with dreams. For the graphic art of the child is to a great extent controlled by the primary process.

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[6] A separate problem, but one capable of a psychological explanation, relates here to the significant interval in time between the corresponding phases in the evolution of verbal and graphic expression in the child.

I shall have to refrain here from adducing more detailed evidence in support of this theorem. Instead I will try to link up these considerations with our previous ones by propounding the following statement: the primary process controls graphic expression in the child, whereas it appears in the pictorial art of the civilized adult as a freely and deliberately chosen technique.[7] It would be well to supplement these reflections of an ontogenetic order by calling to mind a third form of comic expression, the comic of gesture. Here again we will only say in so many words that detailed analysis reveals in all comic gesture essentially a technique of imitation, which seems to owe its character to the reanimation of a particular phase of reaction in the child. I refer to that stage of development in which the acquisition of motor capacities, particularly that of 'representation' by mimo-motor means, receives a decisive impetus by the imitation of the motor activities of adults.

To these hypotheses directed to ontogenetic origins we would append others concerned with phylogenetic early forms. We might well begin with comic expression in gesture, since in the realm of the comic this activity evidently approximates most closely to archaic types of reaction. We are familiar with its effect. Nothing is so sure to hurt our feelings as to see our words or gestures imitated (the imitation of our speech as a 'gesture' may be included here). It is easy to see that the exposure and devaluation are not alone responsible for the wound to our narcissism, but that a deeper signification underlies 'caricature in gesture.' When we are imitated, we feel threatened in our individuality, superseded and dismissed.[8] We realize that in this power which gesture has, something primordial survives: the ancient part played by gesture in cult and magic. The part played by words in wit too leads to this domain, and Th. Reik who considers that comic expression in words developed out of and supplanted comic expression

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[7] I am aware that this formulation is too general in its terms, but here, as in other problems, I unfortunately cannot enter upon a discussion of the circumstances which illustrate or qualify it.

[8] I may here mention the stimulus I owe to a repeated exchange of views with E. Bibring, whose clinical material promises extensively to clarify this very problem which I deal with here only in a cursory way. One of his observations which throws light on the connection between imitation and aggression may be cited here: a patient was only able to imitate certain persons (and then very faithfully) when aggressively disposed towards them.

in gesture, was able to shew that at several points in its technique wit reanimates the old magical significance of words. These observations find some support when we consider the corresponding problems in graphic forms of comic expression with reference to caricature. For it seems that the phylogenetic antecedents of caricature may without difficulty be traced back to the world of effigy-magic. A belief in the identity of a man and his effigy, on which effigy-magic depends, may be regarded as the first æsthetic theory held by man (Ch. Lalo) ; its influence continues even in these days. For when a lover destroys an image of his mistress, or a revolutionary his emperor's, their action is aimed, not at the image itself, but at its original ; when affects have obliged the ego to abandon its supremacy, the way is also open for this regression.[9]

We will confine ourselves to an aphoristic reference on the subject of the transition from this attitude to that of the caricaturist. The distortion of the image here too ' represents ' a distortion of its original. This hypothesis supports the view often held (we introduced it earlier in the form expressed by Bergson) that the pleasure-gain in caricature is due to our imagination, as it were, forcing the features of the person caricatured to assume a grimace, and that we may infer the existence of annihilation tendencies behind comic gestures, ' caricature by gesture.' It seems to be confirmed and substantiated by sociological data : whenever caricature develops to any great extent as a form of artistic expression, which apparently only occurs under quite definite historical conditions, we are invariably able to discover the use of effigy-magic at some point in its development. Of modern caricature it can be stated with certainty that one of its roots reaches back to the insulting and derisive representations on which punishments were carried out (in a real sense *in effigie*) when the culprit had put himself beyond their reach.[10]

V

Once more we will revert to our comparison between wit, caricature and dreams and look for support from an idea of Freud's which contrasts wit as a consummately social product with dreams as a consummately asocial one. We already find an explanation of this contrast

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[9] Cf. in this connection E. Kris and O. Kurz, *Die Legende vom Künstler, ein geschichtlicher Versuch*, Vienna, 1934.

[10] I shall have occasion to adduce corroborative material in support of this view in studies which I have prepared in collaboration with E. Gombrich on the history of caricature.

in the formula to which we are accustomed to when evaluating the process of wit : a preconscious thought is committed *for a moment* to elaboration by the system Ucs . . . for a moment. Whereas in dreams, owing to the operation of the primary process, thoughts undergo distortion until they become quite unrecognizable, the distortion in wit—and, we may add, in caricature—is only carried through by half, and is subject to the ego's control ; a thought is disguised rather than distorted, its distortion is pressed only so far as is consistent with its remaining intelligible to the first-comer. Here of course we have again to think of the objection that we have been describing a process not confined to wit and caricature, but of general validity ;[11] nevertheless, since it relates to the social character of comic phenomena, it acquires a peculiar significance in the present context. For their social character is an essential quality of all forms of the comic : ' a new joke runs through the town like the news of a recent victory '. And to this simile of Freud's we might add : ' a caricature *is* a broadsheet '.

The primary social character of tendentious forms of comic expression appears to be conditioned by two factors ; in the first place, another person's approval is used to justify one's own aggression, and furthermore wit and caricature can easily be recognized as an invitation to that other person to adopt ' a joint policy of aggression and regression '. Accordingly, tendentious forms of comic expression (and with this we bring Freud's line of argument, which our last remarks have followed verbatim, into connection with the discoveries of other workers) assist the ' conquest and seduction of the partner '. Recently an opportunity has presented itself from an unexpected quarter of linking up these tendentious forms (and harmless ones too) with the realm of the infantile. I consider that we are entitled to look upon the social character of the comic as a survival, or better put, as a legacy from an infantile attitude which Dorothy Burlingham, in her clear account of it, calls ' the child's urge to communicate '.[12] The social character of the comic cannot, however, be said to reveal a fixation to a particular aspect of infantile reaction ; it impresses us rather as a magnificent work of elaboration, in virtue of which an impulse active in childhood proves capable of adaptation to adult reality.

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[11] Cf. in this connection, *Lust und Leid in Witz* (also published in *Imago*, XV., 1929). From this position, Reik endeavours to grasp the distinction between wit and art.

[12] *Imago*, Bd. XX., 1934.

These considerations enable us to arrive at a fuller understanding of a fundamental characteristic of comic phenomena relative to their dynamic character. We might well begin with cases in which the comic intention fails of its purpose. This appears as a failure to evoke an appropriate response in the environment. Very often it gives rise to feelings of discomfort instead of pleasure, and this experience may be either painful or uncanny in tone; we can easily tell which of the two alternatives predominates in a given case. Since cases in which the failure of the comic process produces this result are accompanied by a reversal of their normal effect, I propose to speak of a double-edged character of comic phenomena. I have in mind a quality of the comic of quite general validity.

In order the better to understand this, let us present in schematic form a simple case where the comic intention fails of its purpose. The discomfort experienced affects everyone involved in the comic experiment; schematically expressed, the person for whom it is meant and the person who carries it out. Thus in the case of tendentious wit we may suppose that the hearer has recognized the aggression behind its disguise and that his super-ego has called upon him to repudiate it; we may say that he has 'misunderstood' the witty remark, or rather, misunderstood that it is a witty remark. This 'misunderstanding' on the part of the hearer may correspond to a 'mistake' on the part of the speaker; the 'misunderstanding' may be a reaction to the 'mistake'. In explaining this latter, we might (in agreement with Th. Reik) envisage the speaker as dominated by his compulsion to confess; this type of mistake could then be reduced to the distinction between the compulsion to confess and the urge to communicate, which is to be regarded as a 'compulsion to confess' in the service of the pleasure-principle, forming the contribution of instinctual life to the compulsion to confess.[13] We may suppose that the discomfort of the hearer is produced or intensified by the conflict whether to approve or to disapprove of the speaker's aggression, that of the speaker by the hearer's disapproval, which leaves him to deal with his conflict of conscience single-handed, so to speak. The attempt to acquire pleasure by effecting a saving in expenditure on suppression miscarries and fresh cathexes are required.

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[13] Cf. in this connection the similar view expression by R. Wälder. 'The Problem of Freedom in Psycho-Analysis and the Problem of Reality-Testing.' This JOURNAL, Vol. XVII., Pt. 1.

This extremely crude presentation which, moreover, follows directly on the views expressed by Freud and Reik, enables us to appreciate that the comic originates in the conflict between instinctual trends and the super-ego's repudiation of them, and to grasp its position mid-way between pleasure and unpleasure, the roots of its double-edged character. Much the same seems to hold good for man's earliest attempts in comic expression. As its next relation in the household of man's mind we may accept play—first of all the play of adults which, like their comic invention, may be partially understood in terms of a ' holiday from the super-ego '. As its precursors we shall find the play and fun of childhood, which are required at a critical juncture to supply a bridge enabling instinctual satisfaction to take a form adapted to reality. We have come to understand that children's play performs two tasks in the interests at once of acquiring mastery over the environment and warding off unpleasure (mastering ' painful ' experience) ; but besides these, according to the starting-point adopted, one may recognize that the promotion of pleasure in function furnishes an additional motive. We learn how the three interact when we turn our attention to precisely that aspect of play which survives in the comic word-play of adults, the child's play with words. This phenomenon receives a partial explanation when one reflects that the urge to communicate (here again we would refer to Dorothy Burlingham's account) also at times finds expression in the child's play with words, or better put, playful experimentation with words ; although it is evident that at a still earlier stage playing with words is aimed at securing the mastery over them.[14] If then the child's play is to be treated as originating beyond the pleasure-principle, or—if we must make allowance for the hesitation felt in accepting this view of it (K. Bühler)—as incapable of explanation without postulating for it a root beyond the pleasure-principle, we might easily be drawn to contrast it with the child's fun, as representing a form of behaviour in the exclusive service of the pleasure-principle, and something certainly to be understood as in all respects a reaction to the behaviour of adults.[15] But attractive as it

[14] Experience with children in their second year over and over again confirms this point of view, which, besides, also finds support here and there in published compilations of data ; cf. D. and R. Katz, *Gespräche mit Kindern* . . . 1928. The argument here approximates to that developed by Th. Reik, *Nachdenkliche Heiterkeit*, Vienna, 1933.

[15] We cannot here enter upon a discussion of the circumstance that children's fun—in contrast to their play—is a primary social form of

might be to distinguish the principal tasks of play and fun as the mastering of pain and the acquisition of pleasure respectively, there is little to be found in favour of such a division. For no clear line can be drawn between play and fun, and as early as the end of the first year both are expressed and understood. In order to illustrate the close connection between them, we may adduce the findings of a reliable psychological investigation, according to which the child's most ' effective ' means of comic expression consists in his latest discovery, his most recent intellectual acquisition of the moment.[16] But the material which play chooses for its purposes could be described in identical terms. However, it does not require this analogy between play and fun to confirm what daily observation of children tells us, namely, that even in their second year and in fully developed form in their third, fun is over and over again favoured as the chosen means of mastering aggression, or more correctly, ambivalence. I shall have to refrain here from illustrating this assertion by material evidence, and make up my miind, reluctantly enough, on this occasion to give a dogmatic and aphoristic description. Even the attitude expressed by fun plainly shows that it has to perform a task of mastery and defence ; for it is treated—even in the usage of speech—as in every respect the antithesis of ' being serious '. Here again it differs from play, since ' the opposite of play is not being serious, but reality '.[17] But the opposition between fun and seriousness appears in the end to hold good for wide tracts of the comic. Adult comic invention, and certainly the comic in its tendentious forms, helps in obtaining mastery over affects, over libidinal and aggressive tendencies warded off by the super-ego ; the ego acting in the service of the pleasure-principle is able to elude them by taking the path of comic expression. The instinctual trends of the id are given their way, but this does not mean that they are gratified in their true and original form. Instead of a direct action, we have a reproduction, the half-measures characteristic of the comic.

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behaviour promoting contact, nor of the conclusions to be derived therefrom for a differentiation of the functions of play and fun.

[16] Cf. in this connection E. Herzfeld and L. Prager, ' Verständnis für Scherz und Komik beim Kinde,' *Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie*, XXXIV., 1929.

[17] Freud : ' The Relation of the Poet to Day-Dreaming.' *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV.

It would be well once more to describe this process, although in a schematic and abbreviated form, as it applies to the field of caricature. Instead of disfiguring the face of an opponent in reality, the effect of this is merely imagined and is then realized in relation to his effigy. As long as this process continues to be dominated by magical thinking, it cannot yet be said to have attained to the level of caricature. For while it is true that the method of action is changed, the intention remains unchanged; the action is performed in relation to an image which is regarded as identical with the person it represents. But where caricature is concerned, this belief no longer holds good in consciousness or in the preconscious. Caricature indeed also tries to produce an effect, not, however, 'on' the person caricatured, but on the spectator, who is influenced to accomplish a particular effort of imagination.

This evolution of the process from a more lowly (magical) stage to a higher one is accompanied by decisive transformations in the image itself. 'Where the belief in the identity of a man and his image is on the decline, a fresh association occurs so that they may once more be united, namely, the factor of resemblance.'[18] At the stage of magical thinking, the features of the image are of minor importance; at that which corresponds to caricature, this resemblance is a prerequisite of the social function of the image. It is the result of a definite, but not easily determined, measure of concern with the reproduction of reality; resemblance is a prerequisite of caricature.[19] It is the

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[18] Cf. E. Kris and O. Kurz (*loc. cit.*) and the ideas of H. Gomperz summarily mentioned therein. Cf. also the latter author's essay: 'Über einige psychologische Voraussetzungen naturalistischer Kunst', *Beilage zür Münchner allgemeinen Zeitung*, 1906.

[19] This conception could be formulated in more general terms by saying that an activity designed to produce a magical effect is replaced by one concerned with a particular order of values. This formula, 'value, not effect' appears, as we would further suggest, to enjoy a wider validity and to open one approach to the psychology of value in general. We have still to state explicitly that *complete* indifference in regard to the features of the image is not to be found, even among peoples whose thinking is still ruled by magic. In this matter, too, historical description in the widest sense can proceed only on the basis of conceptions worked out by psychology. The development of the child's attitude to pictures and the response of many insane patients to pictorial representations give us a clear notion of the 'ontogenetic model' which psychological experience is in a position

resemblance between a man and his image which really first gives caricature its specific character, namely, the distorted reproduction of a recognizable likeness. The comparison between a person and his caricature of which we spoke at the beginning releases a saving in expenditure on thought, and so produces an effect which in the narrower sense of Freud's definition is comic. But by means of condensation, displacement and allusion, certain elements in the distortion point to the existence of other ideas, the distorting ones, we might say ; these are the elements which betray the *tendency*. We now acquire a deeper insight into a state of affairs to which we made passing reference at the beginning of this account. The comic effect produced by a comparison and the effect of an ingeniously concealed tendency react one upon the other. If in Freud's view the ' comic ' effect of wit can form a façade for the effect produced by its tendency, a very close alliance between the two appears to form the basis of the *specific quality* of caricature.[20]

To sum up : if what we have described as the half-measures characteristic of the comic satisfy instinctual demands, its specific quality protects caricature against a censorship proceeding from two directions, alike from the external world, from which we borrow the term, and from the internal world.[21]

Accordingly if the comic process is to succeed, we may conceive of this as dependent on two factors. The claims of instinctual life are satisfied by its content, the objections of the super-ego by the manner of its disguise. When the ego is able so to master the tension between the two, pleasure can arise from unpleasure. The double-edged character of comic phenomena, however, is seen to be a quality conditioned by

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to offer to the historical social sciences. The view here indicated concerning the relation between effect and value may itself be deduced from the discoveries which we owe to this ' model '.

[20] Once again, we cannot here bring forward material to support, illustrate (or qualify) our argument.

[21] The artistic level of caricature, i.e. its integration in a different scale of values, specific to plastic art, may similarly act as a protection. The Greek painter Ctesicles painted a scandalous picture of the queen, Stratonice, in the embrace of a fisherman. He had this picture exhibited publicly, and was obliged to flee the city. At first, in her anger, the queen wanted to have it destroyed, but later she resolved that it should be carefully looked after and preserved. The work of art was too important to be consigned to destruction merely on account of its content.

the conflict in which they originate ; at times it succeeds in opposing the work devolving upon the ego, so that this impresses us as a failure.

One would be glad to learn the general conditions responsible for such a failure. It is difficult and perhaps impossible to formulate them, and there is only one we would make bold to indicate. Things which simply arouse anxiety or unpleasure cannot be adapted to comic expression—to attempt to do so may produce an uncanny effect—until they have been reduced in intensity and undergone some degree of working-over. A measure of elaboration is a prerequisite of comic expression, and at the same time comic expression accomplishes a measure of elaboration. (This discovery, which owes its origin wholly to the conception held by Freud, was foreshadowed in the ideas of the romantics ; Jean Paul's formula, ' wit brings freedom, freedom wit ' is the prototype of our own). If now (to continue our train of thought) this elaboration is not achieved, the quantity of affect still being too great for working over in terms of the comic to be possible, there ensues a reversal of the effect produced by the comic from pleasure into unpleasure. Some important feature of this process, its frequency and its occurrence at unexpected moments—we can never be certain that the comic process will be proof against failure—are capable of an explanation if we bethink ourselves once more of the social function of all comic expression, and bear in mind the extensive differences and variations in the degree of liking and toleration shewn for comic phenomena. For among the much discussed and most constant qualities of the comic, we may include its dependence on historical and social conditions, which we are in the habit of describing as its ' subjective ' aspect. We know that every period and class of society and quite a number of local communities have their own peculiar forms of the comic, which often differ widely from one another, and are not readily amenable to a change of climate.[22] This peculiar feature of comic phenomena becomes intelligible when we reflect that the comic in its tendentious forms cannot really find a mark where indifference prevails ; the kind of disparagement which it allows us to infer, however, rather suggests that in a similar way it can scarcely make the eternally forbidden its object (if it does, it is wont to produce a painful effect), but that this must be found in something which is even now held in esteem, *is even now represented in the super-ego*. I may express

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[22] Many isolated questions of structure could be discussed with reference to the varying degree in which they can be ' transferred ' or ' translated.'

my meaning in a word by reminding you of the glorious figure of Don Quixote whom we have all learnt within the last few hours to perceive in a new light,[23] and for the rest I will merely indicate that this point of view promises to render more intelligible to us a number of particularly obvious problems. Thus we are all familiar with the irresistibly comic impression created by certain fashion-plates of earlier generations, one which has recently been much exploited in films. But it is remarkable that this holds true only for those of a certain type, for such, namely, as still retain connections with our own memories, with the impressions and experiences of our early years. Beyond this limit, our historical interest begins, and, we would add, the comic effect of such impressions is greatly reduced in scope.[24]

If now we try to summarize these remarks, we find that the comic in its tendentious forms also has its roots in the ambivalence-conflict of adults and can at times represent the outcome of this ; it may be regarded as a means of mastering simultaneously feelings of admiration and aversion, and by converting ' unpleasure ' into pleasure of lessening tension in the psychic apparatus, or speaking quite generally, of reducing psychic expenditure. With this, we have reached Freud's conclusion from which we started, and need only now examine the question how lasting is the success achieved by the comic process. We know its limitations ; the conflict is not always resolved. The melancholic disposition of the typical humorist who either displays a marked preference for this form of outlet or knows of no other, is a clinical fact which is familiar to you all from your own experience and

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[23] Helene Deutsch, ' Don Quichote und Donquichotismus,' *Imago*, Bd. XX, 1934.

[24] Attempted explanations of an analogous kind can often, it seems, be made to some purpose. Thus they enable us to understand the need of the modern theatrical producer to subject comedies of an earlier period to a more thorough adaptation—' modernization '—than other works of dramatic art of the same date. Again, other phenomena can evidently be explained from the immediate argument which declares that the comic for preference takes as its object something *even now* represented in the super-ego ; such, for instance, as the *rôle* of certain typical figures of fun in general, and in particular one element in the peculiar nature of Jewish jokes, which are recounted and popularized principally by the Jews themselves, by Jews who have partially broken away from their tradition ; cf. the recent contributions to this theme by E. Hitschmann, *Psychoanalytische Bewegung*, 1930, and Th. Reik, *Nachdenkliche Heiterkeit*, Vienna, 1933.

may be regarded as statistically proved. This fact specially merits our attention, for it brings mania, the great pathological parallel of the comic, into our field of view. We may regard it as the pathological correlate of the comic. We know that it is distinguished by the triumph of the ego, in whose favour the super-ego renounces its power, and we perceive that in it is revealed on an enlarged scale what the comic attempts in a small way, namely, the equalization of tensions which constitute a menace to existence.

Finally I would refer to ecstasy, at the opposite pole to mania ; it is a condition distinguished by the triumph of the super-ego ; the ego for the time being surrenders its independence, possibly in the interests of a ' tendency to unification ' (H. Deutsch) which controls the mental apparatus. This contrast between the two has a real significance beyond its purely formal implications. For if mania is to be regarded as the pathological correlate of the comic, we must look to the sublime for the experience which corresponds in normal life to ecstasy. But we know that the sublime is a ' psychic greatness.' And if the comic effects a reduction of mental energy, the sublime calls for a surplus expenditure of this. This aspect of the problem may throw light on another idea of Freud's, namely, the special position of humour,[25] the

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[25] It would be worth while to define this special position with greater accuracy. Here we will confine ourselves to two observations. The remark made by the criminal on his way to the gallows, ' Well, this is a good beginning to the week '—one of Freud's basic examples—can also be regarded as a form of self-irony. One is tempted to believe that humour too has a double-edged character, as when the irony implicit in the ' humour of the gallows ' dominates its effect. (In this sense only am I able to understand a remark of Jekels and Bergler, *Imago* XX, Bd. XIV, 1934 to the effect that humour serves the ego in its offensive tactics against the ego-ideal.) One would like to think that humour could also be distinguished from other allied forms by saying that it has no technique or formal medium of its own. It seems to accord well with this that we seldom meet with it in a pure form, but most often in an alloy, supplementing or colouring other varieties of comic expression. The history of the term and of the concept it denotes, which has been sketched by Benedetto Croce (' L'umorismo ', in *Problemi di Estetica e contribuiti alla storia dell' estetica Italiana*, 1923)—from the seventeenth century onwards the English use of the term proceeds step by step to determine its conceptual content—points the way in which this conception might be supported.

only phenomenon in the whole realm of the comic bordering on the sublime. This is not so much because it has passed beyond ambivalent levels (is post-ambivalent) and represents the super-ego's contribution to the comic, but first and foremost because it finds its fulfilment in relation to the subject himself and so has no need of others before it can offer an increased pleasure-gain. It belongs within the mental economy of a single individual, and this may account for its near relation to the sublime. It seems that this variety of the comic is latest in developing in the course of a man's life ; it passes as a sign of emotional maturity and is less dependent on restricted social and temporal norms than other forms of the comic. In this, too, it is more akin to the sublime.

The contrast between the comic and the sublime is an old ' topos ' of æsthetics. Their position at opposite poles of the mental economy seems to pave the way for a new approach to old problems ; indeed it may appear as premature to claim the comic as a subject for psychology, for it looks as if our own attitude to the problem would lead us once more to the gates of æsthetic theory. For the moment, we consider it better that they should remain closed.

We may, however, accept it as a favourable augury for closer relations in the future that our own findings accord well with those of the æsthetic tradition of the Greeks, the oldest that is known to us. We shall not allow ourselves to be misled by the contrast between the comic and the sublime into forgetting that they serve a common purpose : the mastery of an inner danger. Psycho-analysis soon came to recognize that ultimately Tragedy and Comedy,[26] the great twin Dioscuri of art, may be regarded as alternative attempts to relieve the ego of a burden—let us say, of an obligation.

Plato's Symposium ends by telling that it was already daybreak, the cocks were crowing and all the others asleep or gone except Agathon, Aristophanes and Socrates, who were still awake and drinking in turn out of a large bowl, ' and Socrates made the others agree that the qualities requisite for writing tragedy and comedy were the same.'

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[26] Cf. also L. Jekels, *Imago*, Bd. XII, 1926.

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE NEGATIVE THERAPEUTIC REACTION [1]

BY

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LONDON

In this contribution my aim is to draw attention to the important bearing recent theoretical conclusions have on the practical side of the problem of the negative therapeutic reaction. I mean the latest work of Melanie Klein and in particular her Lucerne Congress paper on the depressive position.[2]

To start with, it is necessary to define what is meant by the negative therapeutic reaction. Freud gave this title to something that he regarded as a specific manifestation among the variety of our case-material, though he says that in a lesser measure this factor has to be reckoned with in very many cases. When I referred to Freud's remarks on this point, I was interested to find that actually they are not exactly what they are generally remembered and represented as being. The negative therapeutic reaction, I should say, is generally understood as a condition which ultimately precludes analysis and makes it impossible; the phrase is constantly used as meaning unanalysable. Freud's remarks on the point are almost all in *The Ego and the Id*, the last eighteen pages of which deal with the problem of the unconscious sense of guilt. He says, 'Certain people cannot endure any praise or appreciation of progress in the treatment. Every partial solution that ought to result, and with others does result, in an improvement or temporary suspension of symptoms produces in them for the time being an exacerbation; they get worse instead of better'. This last sentence might imply that they are unanalysable; but he does not actually say so, and has just said the exacerbation is for *the time being*. He says the obstacle is 'extremely difficult to overcome'; 'often there is no counteracting force of similar intensity'; and that 'it must be honestly confessed that here is another limitation to the efficacy of analysis'—but he does not say a preventive. Clearly the point is merely one of degree, and he might concur in the general attitude taken up. He is not, however, actually

[1] Read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, October 1, 1935.

[2] Klein, 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States', This JOURNAL, Vol. XVI, Pt. 2.

as pessimistic about it as people incline to suppose ; and this interested me, because it is not intelligible why one reaction should be thought more unanalysable than another. The eighteen pages in *The Ego and the Id* are in fact part of his contribution towards analysing it ; and our understanding of it has now been very greatly advanced by Melanie Klein.

Freud's title for this reaction, however, is not actually very specific ; a negative therapeutic reaction would just as well describe the case of any patient who does not benefit by a treatment ; and it would describe those psychotic or ' narcissistic ' patients whom Freud still regards as inaccessible to psycho-analysis. It seems to me that this specific reaction against a cure described by him may not differ so very greatly in character from those more general cases of therapeutic failures I mentioned, and that the difficulty may be due to some extent to the analyst's failure to understand the material and to interpret it fully enough to the patient. The common assumption is that even when the analyst has fully understood and interpreted the material, the super-ego of certain patients is strong enough to defeat the effects of analysis. I shall try to show that other factors are at work in this severity of the super-ego that until recently have not been fully understood and therefore cannot have been sufficiently or fully interpreted to our patients.

It will be clear now that what I propose to talk about is in fact the analysis of specially refractory cases. I do not think I can go much further in defining the type of case to which my remarks refer, partly because any one analyst's experience is necessarily limited, even of refractory cases ; moreover, my expectation is that similar unconscious material may probably exist in other difficult cases of a kind I have not personally met with. I would say this, however, that the cases in which I have made the most use and had greatest advantage from the new understanding have been what we call difficult character-cases. The super-ego of the transference neurotic, it must be remembered, has always been placated by his sufferings from his sense of guilt, and by his symptoms, which are a real cause of inferiority and humiliation to him whatever epinosic gain he has from them ; the character-case has never placated his super-ego in these ways ; he has always maintained the projection that ' circumstances ' have been against him. After some analysis he may guess that he has punished others all his life and feel that what he now deserves is not ' cure ', but illness or punishment himself ; and he unconsciously fears that that is what

analysis may bring him if he submits to it. Of course we find these motives for or against co-operation in all cases ; I merely suggest that in character-cases they may have peculiar strength.

With reference to this matter of character-resistances I shall recall to your minds a paper of Abraham [3] in which he described and commented on a certain type of difficulty in analysis, that he virtually names the *narcissistic type* of character-resistance. He tells us that such analyses are very lengthy and that in no such case did he obtain complete cure of the neurosis, and we can see that the degree of negative therapeutic reaction in this type is what led him to distinguish it. The narcissistic features of this type are, shortly : that they show a chronic, not merely occasional, inability to associate freely, in that they keep up a steady flow of carefully selected and arranged material, calculated to deceive the analyst as to its ' free ' quality ; they volunteer nothing but good of themselves ; are highly sensitive and easily mortified ; accept nothing new, nothing that they have not already said themselves ; turn analysis into a pleasurable situation, develop no true positive transference, and oust the analyst from his position and claim to do his work better themselves. Under a mask of polite friendliness and rationalization they are very mean, self-satisfied and defiant. Abraham shews the relation of all these features to anal omnipotence, and he especially emphasizes the *mask of compliance,* which distinguishes this type of resistance from an open negative transference and renders it more difficult to handle than the latter. And ' These patients ', he says, ' *shut their eyes to the fact that the object of the treatment is to cure their neurosis* '. Incidentally, I do not suppose that Abraham was guilty of it, but I feel that analysts themselves are not always incapable of shutting their eyes to a fact too, namely, that when a patient does not do what he ought, the onus still remains with the analyst : to discover the cause of his reaction. In my opinion the patient was entirely in the right who said, ' Yes, doctor, when you have removed my inhibitions against telling you what is in my mind, I will then tell you what is in my mind ', and the situation is similar in regard to getting well.

This paper of Abraham's suggests what I take to be a generally valid proposition, that in specially long and difficult analyses the core

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[3] Abraham, ' A Particular Form of Neurotic Resistance Against the Psycho-Analytic Method ' (1919), *Selected Papers on Psycho-Analysis,* p. 303.

of the problem lies in the patient's narcissistic resistances. One surmises, further, that this narcissism may not be unconnected with the inaccessibility to treatment of the 'narcissistic neuroses', as Freud has called certain psychoses. There is nothing very new, or immediately helpful, in the idea that narcissism is the root of the problem—for what is narcissism? I will mention only two general points in this connection. One—the old one—is that any marked degree of narcissism presupposes a withdrawal of libido from external objects into the ego, and secondly, the newer point, that ego-libido can now be recognized, especially in the light of Melanie Klein's more recent work, to be an extremely complex thing. Freud speaks of the secondary narcissism derived from the ego's 'identifications', which most of us here now regard as including the ego's *internal objects*. And Melitta Schmideberg [4] suggests that love for the introjected objects is a part of narcissism. And now the significance of the ego's relations to its internalized objects shews clearly that this great field of object-relations within the ego, within the realm of narcissism itself, needs much further understanding; and it is my belief that more light in this direction will do much to explain such hitherto inexplicable analytic resistances as the narcissistic ones of Abraham and the super-ego one of Freud.

The concept of *objects* within the ego, as distinct from identifications, is hardly discussed in Freud's work; but it will be remembered that one important contribution of his to the psychology of insanity is built up almost entirely on this conception—I mean of course his essay on 'Mourning and Melancholia', dealing with the problems of *depressive* states. His discussion in *The Ego and the Id* of the unconscious sense of guilt, too, is closely interwoven with aspects of the melancholic condition. This brings me to my second point. Observations have led me to conclude that where narcissistic resistances are very pronounced, resulting in the characteristic lack of insight and absence of therapeutic results under discussion, these resistances are in fact part of a highly organized system of defence against a more or less unconscious depressive condition in the patient and are operating as a mask and disguise to conceal the latter.

My contribution to the understanding of especially refractory cases of a narcissistic type will therefore consist in the two proposals (*a*) that we should pay more attention to the analysis of the patient's

[4] 'Persecutory Ideas and Delusions', This JOURNAL, Vol. XII, 1931.

inner world of object-relations, which is an integral part of his narcissism, and (*b*) that we should not be deceived by the positive aspects of his narcissism but should look deeper, for the depression that will be found to underlie it. That these two recommendations are not unconnected might be guessed from Freud's paper, which links the two, and from Melanie Klein's view that the internal object-situation in this position is of supreme importance. The depressive position might be described as a miscarriage of introjection, she says ; and *this* is the unconscious anxiety-situation that our narcissistic patients are defending themselves against and that should be the true objective of analysis in such cases.

Now this particular anxiety-situation, the depressive, has its own special defence-mechanism, the manic reaction, of which Melanie Klein also gives a general outline. The essential feature of the manic attitude is omnipotence and the *omnipotent denial of psychical reality*, which of course leads to a distorted and defective sense of external reality. Helene Deutsch [5] has pointed out the inappropriate, impracticable and fantastic character of the manic relation to external reality.) The *denial* relates especially to the ego's object-relations and its *dependence on its objects*, as a result of which *contempt* and depreciation of the value of its objects is a marked feature, together with attempts at inordinate and tyrannical *control and mastery of its objects*. Much could be written about the manic defence, and I hope will be, for in my opinion the future of psycho-analytic research, and therefore of all psychology, now depends on our belated appreciation of the immense importance of this factor in mental life. It is true that we have known of many of its manifestations and even had a name which would have represented it, if we had known how to apply it—the word omnipotence —but our knowledge and understanding of the factor of omnipotence has never yet been organized, formulated and correlated into a really useful theoretical unit. Omnipotence has been a vague concept, loosely and confusedly bandied about, hazily interchanged with narcissism or with phantasy-life, its meaning and especially its functions not clearly established and placed. We ought now to study this omnipotence and particularly its special development and application in the manic defence against depressive anxieties.

It will not be difficult to see how characteristic the most conspicuous

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[5] ' Don Quichote und Donquichotismus ', *Imago*, Bd. XX, 1934.

feature of the manic attitude, omnipotent denial and control by the ego over all objects in all situations, is of our refractory patients with their narcissistic resistances. Their inaccessibility is one form of their *denial*; implicitly they deny the value of everything we say. They literally do not allow us to do anything with them, and in the sense of co-operation they do nothing with us. *They* control the analysis, whether or not they do it openly. If we are not quick enough to be aware of it, too, such patients often manage to exert quite a large measure of real control over the analyst—and can even do this when we are quite aware of it. So far, it seems to me, we have not known, or not known enough, exactly where to place this tendency or how to relate it to the rest of the analytic context and so—we have not been able to analyse it. We have tended to see it as a negative transference and as an expression of aggressive attitudes towards the analyst. We have understood these as defences against anxiety, but we have not realized that a *special* fear lay beneath this special way of attaining security. I think Abraham's whole description, with every detail of the 'narcissistic' resistances he describes, in fact presents an unmistakable picture of various expressions of the manic defence—the omnipotent control of the analyst and analytic situation by the patient —which yet, as he points out, is often enough extremely cleverly masked. The conscious or unconscious refusal of such patients to produce true 'free associations', their selection and arrangement of what they say, their implicit or explicit denials of anything discreditable to themselves, their refusal to accept any alternative point of view or any interpretation (except with lip-service), their defiance and obstinacy, and their claim to supersede the analyst and improve on his work all shew their determination to keep the upper hand and their anxiety of getting into the power of the analyst. Free association would expose them to the analyst's 'tender mercies'; love for the analyst, a positive transference, would do the same; and so would any admission of failings in themselves. Along with their self-satisfaction and megalomanic claims, their egotism is shewn in pronounced meanness, and often in an absence of the most everyday acknowledgements or generosity. Certain patients of this type especially withhold from us all 'evidence' of an indisputable character in support of our interpretations. They leave us with dreams, symbols, voice, manner, gesture; no statements, no admissions from themselves. So we can say what we like, nothing is proved—yet of course they accept the help they get, but refuse us all help and all acknowledgements.

Abraham interprets this trait as anal omnipotence. Beside this connection, it signifies especially their need to reserve and preserve everything of any value, all good things, to themselves, for various reasons, and especially for fear that others (the analyst) will gain in power by means of them. Above all, however, the trait of *deceptiveness*, the mask, which conceals this subtle reservation of all control under intellectual rationalizations, or under feigned compliance and superficial politeness, is characteristic of the manic defence. This mask owes its origin undoubtedly to the specialized dissimulation of the paranoiac ; but it is exploited in the manic position not as a defence in itself but as a cover for the defence of securing exclusive control. To this description of this type of patient I would here add an important further detail : they shew a quite special sensitiveness on the point of consciously feeling any anxiety ; it is quite apparent that they have to keep control so as not to be taken unawares by, and not to be exposed to, a moment's anxiety. Abraham comments on their lack of affect, and this in my view is to be taken first as a dread of *anxiety*-affect. But their complete incapacity for any feeling of guilt is equally astonishing and is of course one of their most psychotic traits in its lack of the sense of reality : they deal with guilt-situations entirely by projection, denial and rationalization.

Now it might be objected here that no analyst worth his salt has failed to interpret these manifestations in precisely this way time and again in his practice and this of course is true ; but in my view there is all the difference in the world between what may be called single isolated interpretations, however correct and however frequent they may be, and the understanding and interpretation of such detailed instances as part of a general *organized system of defence* and resistance, with all its links and ramifications spreading far and wide in the symptom-picture, in the formation of character and in the behaviour-patterns of the patient. Analysis has to concern itself with daily details because only the immediate detail of the moment has affect and significance for the patient, but the analyst has to be careful not to become too affectively interested in working out detailed interpretations : he has to be careful not to lose sight of the wood for the trees. He must aim, not merely at understanding each detail in itself but at knowing where to place it in the general scheme of the patient's mental make-up and in the continuous context of the analytic work. Of course, what have been called ' spot-analyses ' or snapshot interpretations have long been condemned, and Ella Sharpe, for instance,

once led a crusade against meaningless *ad hoc* symbol-interpretations which do not form part of a whole picture. What I am urging now is only a further application of this principle. I suggest that the common tendency we often see in patients to control the analysis and the analyst is even more widespread than we suppose, because it is largely masked and disguised by superficial compliance, and that it forms part of an extremely important general defensive attitude—the manic defence—which has to be understood as such.

Now what is the specific relation between this special line of defence and the negative therapeutic reaction ; why does the need to control everything express itself so particularly in not getting well ? There are certain obvious answers to this, all of which would shew that not getting well is an unavoidable indirect result of these resistances. For instance, I have just suggested that hitherto these tendencies in patients to usurp all control have been regarded as expressions of a negative transference and hostility to the analyst. This interpretation, so far as it goes, is certainly correct ; the patient is extremely hostile ; but that is not all. Things are not so simple. The very great importance of analysing aggressive tendencies has perhaps carried some analysts off their feet, and in some quarters is defeating its own ends and becoming in itself a resistance to further analytic understanding. Nothing will lead more surely to a negative therapeutic reaction in the patient than failure to recognize anything but the aggression in his material.

The question why the defence by omnipotent control leads so characteristically to the negative therapeutic reaction cannot be answered fully until we consider the anxiety-situation underlying this defence ; but I think there is one direct connection between the two which may be stated here. There actually is a kind of wish in the patient not to get well and this wish is itself partly in the nature of a defence. It comes from the desire to preserve a *status quo*, a condition of things which is proving bearable. It is built upon many compromises ; the patient does not finish the analysis, but neither does he break it off. He has found a certain equilibrium and does not intend it to be disturbed. To my mind, this is an important general explanation of the phenomenon Freud comments on. He says [6] ' A few words of praise or hope or even an interpretation bring about an unmistakable aggravation of their condition '. If the patient is changing, or is being

[6] *New Introductory Lectures.*

changed, he is losing control; the equilibrium he has established in his present relation with the analyst will be upset; so he has to reinstate his former condition, and regain his control of things. Actually, this anxiety-reaction to the idea of making progress often disappears on being itself interpreted; and of course not interpreted only in this general way, but the detailed connection of the immediate resistance to the immediate anxiety made clear. Incidentally, there are many ways in which this aspect of the defence by control (namely, that of prolonging and maintaining the *status quo*) verges on and merges into the obsessional technique of prolonging in time and preserving in space certain distances, always maintaining a relative, never an absolute or a final relation. But the connection between the manic and the obsessional forms of defence is not part of my subject here.

If the patient desires to preserve things as they are and even sacrifices his cure for that reason, it is not really because he does not wish to get well. The reason why he does not get well and tries to prevent any change is because, however he might wish for it, he has no faith in getting well. What he really expects unconsciously is not a change for the better but a change for the worse, and what is more, one that will not affect himself only, but the analyst as well. It is partly to save the analyst from the consequences of this that he refuses to move in any direction. Melitta Schmideberg said something of the same kind in the paper quoted already: 'Inaccessibility in patients is due to a fear of something "even worse" happening'. Now what is the still worse situation which the patient is averting by maintaining the *status quo*, by keeping control, by his omnipotent defences? It is the danger of the *depressive position* that he is guarding himself and us against; what he dreads is that that situation and those anxieties may prove to be a reality, that that psychical reality in his mind may become real to him through the analysis. The psychic truth behind his omnipotent denials is that the worst disasters have actually taken place; it is this truth that he will not allow the analysis to make real, will not allow to be 'realized' by him or us. He does not intend to get any 'better', to change, or to end the analysis, because he does not believe it possible that any change or any lessening of control on his part can bring about anything but the realization of disaster for all concerned. I may say at once that what this type of patient ultimately fears most of all—the kernel, so to speak, of all his other fears—is his own suicide or madness, the inevitable outcome, as he feels it uncon-

sciously, if his depressive anxieties come to life. He is keeping them still, if not dead, as it were, by his immobility. Patients I have analysed have felt this dread of losing the manic defence quite consciously during the analysis of it, have both threatened and implored me to leave it alone and not ' take it away ', and have foreseen that its removal would mean chaos, ruin to himself and me, impulses of murder and suicide : in other words, the depression that to some extent supervenes as the defence weakens. But I need hardly say the analyst has not this despair, for as the capacity to tolerate the depression and its anxieties gradually increases, very notable compensations accompany it and the capacity for love begins to be released as the manic stranglehold on the emotions relaxes.

The content of the depressive position (as Melanie Klein has shewn) is the situation in which all one's loved ones *within* are dead and destroyed, all goodness is dispersed, lost, in fragments, wasted and scattered to the winds ; nothing is left *within* but utter desolation. Love brings sorrow, and sorrow brings guilt ; the intolerable tension mounts, there is no escape, one is utterly alone, there is no one to share or help. Love must die because love is dead. Besides, there would be no one to feed one, and no one whom one could feed, and no food in the world. And more, there would still be magic power in the undying persecutors who can never be exterminated—the ghosts. Death would instantaneously ensue—and one would choose to die by one's own hand before such a position could be realized.

As analysis proceeds and the persecutory projection defences, which are always interwoven with the omnipotent control position, weaken along with the latter, the analyst begins to see the phantasies approximating to this nightmare of desolation assuming shape. But the shape they assume is that of the patient, so to speak ; the scene of the desolation is himself. External reality goes on its ordinary round : it is *within himself* that these horrors dwell. Nothing gives one such a clear picture of that inner world, in which every past or present relation either in thought or deed with any loved or hated person still exists and is still being carried on, as the state of a person in depression. His mind is completely and utterly preoccupied and turned inward ; except in so far as he can project something of this horror and desolation, he has no concern with anything outside him. To save his own life and avert the death of despair that confronts him, such energy as he has is all bent on averting the last fatalities within, and on restoring and reviving where and what he can, of any life and

life-giving objects that remain. It is these efforts, the frantic or feeble struggles to revive the others within him and *so* to survive, that are manifested ; the despair and hopelessness is never, of course, quite complete. The objects are never actually felt to be dead, for that would mean death to the ego ; the anxiety is so great because life hangs by a hair and at any moment the situation of full horror may be realized.

But struggle as he may and does under his unconscious guilt and anxiety to repair and restore, the patient has only a slenderest belief unconsciously in achieving anything of the kind ; the slightest failure in reality, the faintest breath of criticism and his belief sinks to zero again—death or madness, his own and others', is ever before the eyes of his unconscious mind. He cannot possibly regenerate and recreate all the losses and destruction he has caused and if he cannot pay this price his own death is the only alternative.

I think the patient's fear of being forced to death himself by the analysis is one of the major underlying factors in this type of case and that is why I put it first. Unless it is appreciated many interpretations will miss their mark. All his efforts to put things right never succeed *enough* ; he can only pacify his internal persecutors for a time, fob them off, feed them with sops, ' keep them going ' ; and so he ' keeps things going ', the *status quo*, keeps some belief that ' one day ' he will have done it all, and *postpones* the crash, the day of reckoning and judgement. One patient had woven this into a lifelong defensive pattern : his death would be exacted, yes, but he would see to it that this was postponed until his normal span had elapsed. He had reached a position of success and recognition in his own department of the world's work, so in old age his obituary notices would eventually serve him still as last and final denials and defences against his terrible anxieties and his own fundamental disbelief in any real capacity for good within himself.

I said before that understanding of these refractory cases lay on the one hand in our recognizing that the narcissistic and omnipotent resistances were masking a depressive position in these patients. This has been my own experience, but I might substantiate this theoretically in a simple way. The patient does not get well. The analysis has no effect on him (or not enough), because he resists it and its effect. Why ? Now analysis means unmasking and bringing to light what is in the depths of his mind ; and this is true in the sense both of external conscious reality and of internal psychic reality. What he is resisting, then, is precisely this : becoming aware con-

sciously of what is in the depths of his mind. But this is a truism; all of us and all patients do this, you will say. Of course that is true; only these patients do it *more* than the others, for the simple reason that in them the underlying unconscious reality is more unbearable and more horrible than in other cases. Not that their phantasies are more sadistic; Glover has often reminded us that the same phantasies are found in everybody. The difference is that the *depressive position* is relatively stronger in them; the sense of failure, of inability to remedy matters is so great, the belief in better things is so weak: despair is so near. And analysis means unmasking, that is, to the patient, displaying in all its reality, making real, 'realizing', this despair, disbelief and *sense of failure*, which then in its turn simply means death to the patient. It becomes quite comprehensible why he will have none of it. Yet, with what grains of hope he has, he knows that no one but an analyst ventures to approach even to the fringes of these problems of his; and so he clings to analysis, as a forlorn hope, in which at the same time he really has no faith.

The patient's inaccessible attitude is the expression, then, of his denials of all that the analyst shews him of the unconscious contents of his mind. His megalomania, lack of adaptation to real life and to the analysis are only superficially denials of external reality. What he is in truth concerned to deny is his own *internal reality*. Here we come to my second point: the internal object-relations which are an integral part of his narcissism.

When we come to close quarters with the importance of the internalized objects in this connection, one general aspect of the situation will at once become clear in view of what has already been said about the depressive position. The patient's conscious aim in coming for analysis is to get well himself: unconsciously this point is relatively secondary, for other needs come first. Unconsciously his aim is: (1) on the paranoid basis, underlying his depressive position, his task is something far more urgent than getting well; it is simply to avert the impending death and disintegration which is constantly menacing him. But more even than this (for the paranoid aspect of things is not the most unbearable), unconsciously his chief aim must be (2) to cure and make well and happy all his loved and hated objects (all those he has ever loved and hated) before he thinks of himself. And these objects now to him are within himself. All the injuries he ever did them in thought or deed arose from his 'selfishness', from being too greedy, and too envious of them, not generous and willing

enough to allow them what they had, whether of oral, anal or genital pleasure—from not loving *them* enough, in fact. In his mind every one of these acts and thoughts of selfishness and injury to others has to be reversed, to be made good, by sacrifices on his own part, before he can even be sure that his own life is secure—much less begin to think about being well and happy himself. Our offer of analysis to make him well and happy is unconsciously a direct seduction, as it were, a betrayal; it means to him an offer to help him to abandon his task of curing the others first, to conspire with him to put himself first again, to treat his loved objects as enemies, and neglect them, or even defeat and destroy them instead of helping them. On his paranoid level, this is all very well, and he wants nothing better; but there is always something more than the paranoid position; there is the only good thing he has, his buried core of love and his need to think of others before himself at last, to make things better for them and so to make himself better. And the analyst's offer to help him seems to him unconsciously a betrayal of them—of all those others who deserve help so much more than he. In addition, he does not for a moment believe that any good person really would be willing to help him before all the others who need it so greatly; so his suspicions of the analyst, and of his powers and intentions, are roused. One might suppose one could perhaps allay these suspicions by emphasizing how others will benefit by his cure; but on this point of technique I must here make an important digression. It will have struck you how incongruous and contradictory this picture of the patient's unconscious aim—one of them—(to make all his objects well and happy) is compared with his manifest egoistic behaviour. But its incongruity is of course no accident; the terrific contrast of extreme conscious egotism as against extreme unconscious altruism is one of the major features of the defence by denial. In order to disprove one underlying piece of reality, he parades its opposite extreme. So I have to remind you that his unconscious aims are really *unconscious* and that we cannot use them directly as a lever to help on the analysis. We cannot say ' What you really want is to cure and help other people, those you love, and not yourself ', because that thought is precisely the most terrible thought in all the world to him; it brings up at once all his despair and sense of failure—all his greatest anxieties. Any such imputation, if at all plainly and directly expressed, has the immediate effect of producing a paranoid resistance as a defence; because, when we see through his denials, the manic defence has failed him. We have to be as guarded

about directly imputing any altruistic motives to such patients as about imputing sadism or aggression to a hysteric. Nevertheless, when we know the unconscious situation, we know how to watch our steps ; and even if we cannot use this lever ourselves for a very long time at least, we know it is there and can bring into play any indications of it there are, in subtle, indirect and gradual ways which do not rouse instant and unmanageable resistances.

This difficulty—that the patient unconsciously feels himself utterly unworthy of analytic help and, moreover, feels he is betraying the only good side of himself in accepting analysis, the side which would devote his life to making his loved ones happy—can only be got over in one way, namely, through the possibility that analysis, by making him better, will in the end make him at last capable of achieving his task for others—his loved ones. His *true* aim is the other way round—to make *them* better first and so to become well and good himself ; but that is indeed impossible, both externally and internally, for his sadism is still unmanageable. The nearest hope is this reversal, again on the lines of a contradiction, or this compromise—to be cured himself in order then to cure others. It is only on this understanding, so to speak, unconsciously, and by placing all responsibility on the analyst, that such patients accept analysis at all ; and I think this hope, and this only, is the ultimate source of the endless time, suffering and expense that such patients will bring to continue analysis. We have to recognize that they do this much, even if they do not get well. Why they do it has not hitherto been fully understood. This single unconscious motive then, that he is to be cured in order at last to be capable of fulfilling his task to others, and not for his own ends, is the one slender positive thread on which the analysis hangs. But we can see at once how impotent this motive can remain, how it is weakened, obstructed and undermined by innumerable counteracting forces. For one thing the patient does not for a moment believe in it ; his fear of his own id and its uncontrollable desires and aggression is such that he feels no sort of security that he would eventually use any benefits obtained through analysis for the good of his objects ; he knows very well, one might say, he will merely repeat his crimes and now use up the analyst for his own gratification and add him to the list of those he has despoiled and ruined. One of his greatest unconscious anxieties is that the analyst will be deceived on this very point and will allow himself to be so misused. He warns us in a disguised way continually of his own dangerousness.

Further, over and above this anxiety of accepting analysis on false pretences and deceiving and betraying his good objects again by it, there is an even greater fear, one which concerns the ego's fear for itself again, and links up with the fear of death unconsciously so strong in his mind. This is the dread that if he were cured by analysis, faithfully and truly, and made at last able to compass the reparation needed by all those he loved and injured, that the magnitude of the task would then absorb his whole self with every atom of all its resources, his whole physical and mental powers as long as he lives, every breath, every heartbeat, drop of blood, every thought, every moment of time, every possession, all money, every vestige of any capacity he has—an extremity of slavery and self-immolation which passes conscious imagination. This is what cure means to him from his unconscious depressive standpoint, and his uncured *status quo* in an unending analysis is clearly preferable to such a conception of cure—however grandiose and magnificent in one sense its appeal may be.

I hope that while I have spoken of the patient's unconscious aim of making others well and happy before himself, you will have borne in mind that the others I refer to always are the loved ones *in his inner world ;* and these loved ones are also at the same moment the objects of all his hatred, vindictiveness and murderous impulses ! His egoistic self-seeking attitude corresponds accurately enough to one side of things in his unconscious mind—to the hatred, cruelty and callousness there ; and it represents his fears for his own ego if the love for his objects became too strong. We all fear the dependence of love to some extent.

I have spoken, too, of the contrast and incongruity of his love and need to save with his egoism, his tyranny, his lack of feeling for others. This egoism *is* his lack of a sense of reality. For his object-relations are not to real people, his object-relations are all within himself ; his inner world is *all* the world to him. Whatever he does for his objects he does for himself as well ; if only he could do it ! he thinks ; and in *mania* he thinks he *can*. So it is the overwhelming importance of the inner world of his emotional relations that makes him in real life so egocentric, asocial, self-seeking—so fantastic !

The unconscious attitude of love and anxiety for others in the patient is not identical with Freud's unconscious sense of guilt, though the feeling that the patient deserves no help till his loved ones have received full measure corresponds to it. This unworthiness finds atonement, as Freud says, in the illness, but only some atonement ;

the illness or the long analysis are compromises. To my mind it is *the love for his internal objects*, which lies behind and produces the unbearable guilt and pain, the need to sacrifice his life for theirs, and so the prospect of death, that makes this resistance so stubborn. And we can counter this resistance only by unearthing this love and so the guilt with it. To these patients if not to all, the analyst represents an internal object. So it is the positive transference in the patient that we must bring to realization ; and this is what they resist beyond all, although they know well how to parade a substitute ' friendliness ', which they declare to be normal and appropriate and claim ought to satisfy us as ' not neurotic '. They claim that their transference is resolved before it has been broached. We shall be deluded if we accept that. What is underneath is a *love* (a craving for absolute bliss in complete union with a perfect object for ever and ever), and this love is bound up with an uncontrollable and insupportable fury of disappointment, together with anxiety for other love-relations as well.

In Freud's remarks on the difficulties of the negative therapeutic reaction he has a footnote which in this connection is extremely interesting. He says that this unconscious sense of guilt is sometimes a ' borrowed ' one, adopted from some other person who had been a love-object and is now one of the ego's identifications. And, ' if one can unmask this former object-relation behind the unconscious sense of guilt, success is often brilliant '. This is the view I have just stated ; the love for the internal object must be found behind the guilt (only Freud regards the love as past and over). He adds a link, too, with the positive transference. ' Success may depend, too ', he says, ' on whether the personality of the analyst admits of his being put in the place of the ego-ideal '. But Freud's suggestion that the guilt is ' adopted ' from a now internal object shews us that the brilliant success rests on a *projection* (or localization) *of the guilt on to an object, though an internal one ;* and this is an extremely common feature of the manic defence (which may of course have been built up on some facts in experience). And his suggestion that the personality of the analyst determines whether or not he plays the part of ego-ideal indicates that consciousness and external circumstances are being allowed to blur the issue—exactly as the manic patient employs them to do if he can. The analyst *is* unconsciously the ego-ideal, or prototype of it, already to these patients ; if they can rationalize their overmastering love and idealize it, then they can to some extent

realize it without analysis ; and this is in part a reparation, of course. The true aggressive character of their love, and their unconscious guilt of that, is still denied. Freud admits that this is a ' trick method ' which the analyst cannot use. But the patient tries his utmost to trick us in this way. A great deal of our therapeutic success in former years in my opinion actually rested, and still may do, on this mechanism, without our having understood it. The patient exploits us in his own way instead of being fully analysed ; and his improvement is based on a manic defensive system. Nowadays I regard this possibility as a danger, even if it was not so formerly ; for the analysis of primitive aggression now rouses severe anxieties, while recognition and encouragement by the analyst of the patient's attempts at reparation (in real life) allay them merely by the omnipotent method of glossing over and denying the internal depressive reality—his feeling of failure. The result is that the patient may develop a manic defensive system—a denial of his illness and anxieties—instead of a cure, because the depressive situation of failure has never been opened up. In my experience the true analysis of the love and guilt of the depressive anxiety-situation, because they are so deeply buried, is far the hardest task we meet with ; and the instances of success Freud quotes seem to be last-minute evasions of it by the patients' chosen methods of projection and denial.

The most important feature to be emphasized in these cases is the degree of unconscious falseness and deceit in them. It is what Abraham comments on ; he, however, did not connect it with an unconscious sense of guilt. To us analysts both the full true positive and true negative transference are difficult to tolerate, but the *false* transference, when the patient's feelings for us are all insincere and are no feelings at all, when ego and id are allied in deceit against us, seems to be something the analyst can see through only with difficulty. A false and treacherous transference in our patients is such a blow to our narcissism, and so poisons and paralyses our instrument for good (our understanding of the patient's unconscious mind), that it tends to rouse strong depressive anxieties in ourselves. So the patient's falseness often enough meets with denial by us and remains unseen and unanalysed by us too.

EXHIBITIONISM AND EXHIBITIONISTS [1]

BY

H. CHRISTOFFEL

In this paper I really intended to give some account of the typical element common to all cases of male genital exhibitionism ; perhaps, however, it is premature to attempt such a study. But, it may be asked, is not the typical element the exhibitionism itself ? This question cannot be answered in the negative, but perhaps the affirmative answer is not so self-evident as it appears to certain authors. For it is not correct to say that that which we commonly call exhibitionism is immediately obvious in childhood and that, consequently, the adult exhibitionist is a man who has failed to relegate to its true place, and to modify, an exhibitionistic component of his whole sexuality and has suffered it, in defiance of law and order, to assert its separate existence. It is true that we might gather some such simple impression as this from Sadger's [2] case-histories. Even these, however, shew that constitutional factors are by no means the only fundamental ones in the question—if that were so, how could we imagine that exhibitionism could be treated by psychotherapeutic methods at all ?—but that the environmental factors may be of great importance. In the last few years I have had the opportunity of observing two groups of exhibitionists with three individuals in each. Of these only one in each group failed to come into conflict with our penal laws ! I must, however, admit that even here I am at present incapable of distinguishing between heredity and pseudo-heredity.

There is a second reservation which must be made in answering our question about the typical element in exhibitionism. It may seem almost superfluous to mention this point to those versed in psychoanalysis. But when we reflect how often the concept of ' transference ' is used in a one-sidedly positive sense, we feel bound to remark that genital exhibitionism is by no means exhibitionism *par excellence :* it is merely *one* form of the activity. Lasègue, in 1877, was the first to describe and name the phenomenon of exhibitionism. The very first patient of whom he gives a short account—in modern terminology it was a case of schizophrenia—is described by him as presenting himself

[1] Read before the Swiss Psycho-Analytical Society, March 21, 1936.

[2] J. Sadger : *Die Lehre von den Geschlechtsverirrungen* (*Psychopathia sexualis*) *auf psychoanalytischer Grundlage*, Deuticke, Leipzig und Wien, 1921.

mutely before the woman he loved, without betraying by expression or gesture his amorous feeling and his ideas of persecution : ' Il faisait montre de sa personne et n'allait pas au delà '. It is only subsequently that Lasègue speaks of genital exhibition ; Freud in his *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie* places exhibitionism under the heading of ' fixations on precursory sexual aims ', and so Lasègue writes as follows of the ' *sens génital* ' : ' Même à l'état normal il se complait dans les satisfactions incomplètes, aussi est-ce lui qui fournit le plus aux exhibitions '. [3] Let us keep this broader definition of the concept of exhibition steadily before us. Dorothy Tiffany Burlingham,[4] in the well-known work in which she describes many cases of anal exhibition in childhood, falls into the trap of giving the following somewhat misleading definition : ' Exhibitionism has for its aim the display of the person, his own body, his genitals '.

Again, we must not regard exhibitionism as an isolated entity. In the *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie* we read as follows : ' In analysis this perversion, like most others, reveals an unexpected multiplicity of motives and meanings '. With admirable conciseness Burlingham, like Reik [5], has stressed a peculiarity which we detect when we analyse the structure of exhibitionism, namely, that there may be conditioning factors, which make it not only *a compulsion* but *an instinctual urge*. Expressed in metapsychological terms this means that exhibitionism serves the purposes of both the erotic and the death-instinct.

This is another point on which a certain emphasis should be laid. For we are too ready to forget that a sexual is not identical with an erotic manifestation. As psychic maturity is reached, the synthetic function of the ego gains in power and, similarly, the synthesis attributable to Eros makes itself felt in the individual's sexuality, the various component tendencies combining under the primacy of genitality and Eros assuming active command of sex—a word which denotes that which is separated, being like *Säge* (= saw) and *Sichel* (= sickle) derived from *seco* = I cut, separate, divide. Thus, by

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[3] Ch. Lasègue : *Les Exhibitionnistes*, L'Union médicale, Nr. 50, 1 mai, 1877, Paris.

[4] Dorothy Tiffany Burlingham : ' Mitteilungsdrang und Geständniszwang ', *Imago*, 1934, Bd. XX, S. 129.

[5] Th. Reik : *Der unbekannte Mörder*, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Wien, 1932, S. 53.

exhibition we understand a manifestation which is sexual indeed but only partially erotic.

In Burlingham's suggestive work [6] exhibition is closely connected with the ' urge to communicate '. The author writes : ' The instinctual energy manifested in the child's urge to communicate is, precisely, exhibitionism '. Here we must guard against a misunderstanding : exhibition and communication can by no means be equated. Lasègue [7] relates that he sought in vain for an appropriate term in popular speech and apologizes for coining a new word. He based it not on ' communication ' but on ' exhibition ', and ' exhibition ' certainly does not mean communication but displaying, presenting to view—that is to say, an action in which, first, what is shewn remains in the possession of the person displaying it and in which, further, an effect is brought about by what he possesses and produces. From the point of view of erotic instinct the effect desired is the furtherance of his suit ; from that of the death-instinct it is to inspire terror. It is true that exhibition is an act which presupposes the presence of a second person, but it is essentially an act which has reference to the subject himself. The narcissistic, passive element prevails over that of active object-libido. Burlingham [8] is not quite clear about this passivity when she uses the word *urge*—urge to communicate—which is not the same thing as actual communication—but she specifically stresses the passive element in the part played by the death-instinct, when she describes the *compulsion* to confess as a form of exhibition : ' The compulsion to confess ', she says, ' arises under pressure of the sense of guilt and the need for punishment ; its purpose is on the one hand to relieve the conscience and, on the other, to obtain masochistic pleasure by accepting punishment '. If this writer's term : ' urge to communicate ' may be said to convey a somewhat too active idea of the erotic side of exhibitionism, the phrase : ' the compulsion to confess ' lays too strong an emphasis upon the passive part played by the death-instinct. At this point you will probably think of what Th. Reik [9] describes as ' the criminal's visiting-card ', the *grumus merdæ* left on the site of the crime. And contrary to Lasègue's statement fifty-five years ago, popular language contains all manner of terms for

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[6] *Loc. cit.*

[7] *Loc. cit.*

[8] *Loc. cit.*

[9] *Loc. cit.*

this aggressive anal exhibitionism. This heap of fæces is the ' watcher ', the ' sentry ', which consciously is designed to guard the criminal from pursuit, but in actual fact betrays him (compulsion to confess).

Ten years ago Laforgue [10] introduced the word *oblativity* into analytical discussion. He used this term to connote a full capacity for love, with renunciation of the assertion of power. With Codet he distinguishes between oblative and captative tendencies. In elucidating what we are to understand by exhibitionism it may help us to go back to the views of these two French authors. Whether the libido or the death-instinct predominates in exhibitionism, it is invariably characterized by a lack of oblativity and an excess of captativity. It is true that, especially in its early infantile form, it may imply a tendency to peculiarly plastic object-relations. The earliest instance which I have so far observed of its occurring in an entirely spontaneous jesting anal form was in a little boy of sixteen months, whose development was very well advanced. On one occasion his aunt, with whom he was very good friends, was feeding him with a spoon and he seemed to have had enough although his little plate was not yet empty. His aunt wanted to give him some more, but, quick as lightning, he turned round on the sofa, where they were sitting side by side, and shewed her his little back-view, saying : ' Fudi (= Hinterchen) esse ! ' (' Little behind eat it ! ') In this baby the captative element shewed very plainly in the fact that he gave up wetting himself when he was allowed to pull the plug in the water-closet after having passed urine properly. Similarly, at a rather later date, he gave up retaining his fæces or defecating in his pilch, if his aunt stayed with him when he was placed on the chamber and he was allowed to lean on her or was promised a walk to the railway as soon as he had finished. I can also think of a boy, now fourteen years old, of an equally independent and oblative character, who, at the age of five, was on one occasion saying good-night in tearing spirits and, instead of shaking hands as usual, sprang up laughing in his cot, pulled up his night-shirt and exhibited his little abdomen to his father with the words : ' Look, Daddy ! ' I once drew a distinction between these predominantly early-infantile and libidinal forms of exhibitionism and those forms in which a sense of guilt and aggression so clearly play a part, the activity being of the nature of an obsessional urge, while the subject's whole disposition is subdued and

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[10] R. Laforgue : ' Verdrängung und Skotomisation ', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XII, 1926, S. 54.

timid. The first type I called *exhibitionismus sollicitans* (soliciting) and the second, which is mainly post-pubertal, *exhibitionismus sollicitus* (troubled, disquieted, anxious). As I have said, there is nothing abnormal in the occurrence of exhibitionism in early childhood ; the degree in which it manifests itself varies greatly, but it is almost universal and actually indicates a special capacity for object-relations. Post-pubertal exhibitionism, on the other hand, plainly betokens an exaggerated captativity with some failure or abnormality in relations with the outside world—a defect which may be carried to the point of anti- and asocial character. Lasègue once wrote as follows : ' Étrangers au monde extérieur, ils lui empruntent peu et surtout ne lui rendent rien ', and further he describes such exhibitionists as mistrustful, suspicious and shy, ' défiants ou intimidés '. Kraepelin [11] went so far as to say that ' we should regard exhibitionism as a simple variety of onanism ', and authors like Moll and Naecke [12] have been struck by the sado-masochistic character of these later forms. By using the term *exhibitionismus sollicitus* I intended to emphasize the fact that special consideration must be devoted to the accompanying anxiety and its cause. To speak of ' castration anxiety ' is to contribute little to an explanation. The question we have to ask is : what part does that anxiety, which is certainly universal, play in our specific case ?

Now every genital exhibitionist is also an active scopophiliac. In the *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie* Freud speaks of repression of the normal sexual aim through scopophilia. The passage is as follows : ' This last is markedly the case in exhibitionists, who, if I may draw an inference from a single analysis, display their genitals in order to get a sight of the other person's genitals in return '. Here again we note the strong captative factor in exhibitionism. But in this anomaly—I am now speaking of *exhibitionismus sollicitus*—there must surely be some force, stronger than the instinct to possess the object, which opposes the attempt at union with that object—an attempt which is so strikingly inhibited. And when we recollect that, ontogenetically, the earliest and most vigorous contact with the outside world is oral in character, we shall easily assume that the exhibitionist's scopophiliac

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[11] E. Kraepelin : *Psychiatrie*, Bd. IV, S. 1918, Verlag J. A. Barth, Leipzig, 1915.

[12] Ch. Wolf : ' Die Kastration bei sexuellen Perversionen und Sittlichkeitsverbrechen des Mannes ', S. 158 (quoted by Naecke and Moll, *Triebrichtung*, S. 279), Verlag B. Schwabe und Co., Basel, 1934.

instinct, so generally observed, has an oral basis. And, further, we shall conclude that the unconscious factors in this orality enter into the subject's experience, transformed by projection. Thus the unconscious dread of the genital exhibitionist would be that of being devoured by his object. This cannibalistic anxiety is so great that it outweighs real fears and exposes such persons to arrest, imprisonment, etc. We know that they can hardly be permanently deterred from their activities. ' The direction of the instinct is not altered ; only its intensity is diminished ', is the kind of remark which one comes across in the recent statistics of castration.[13] At the present time, in our police and penal methods of dealing with such cases we are probably less advanced than old Lasègue when he expressed the view that exhibitionism was ' un scandal privé plutôt qu'un outrage public (scil. à la pudeur) '.

Exhibition is not simply one component of the polymorphous instinctual forces by which the exhibitionist's psychic life is governed : it is its very configuration (*Gestalt*), *compositum*, *μορφή*, and is made up of diametrically opposite tendencies—the oblative and the captative. The phrase used by Lou Andreas-Salome [14] in a similar connection is appropriate to exhibition. She speaks of a ' twofold fulfilment '.

Having devoted some time to the discussion of genital exhibitionism, I must now go back to a form of exhibition which I conceive of as the earliest. I refer not to the ' urge to communicate ', which Burlingham has described, but to those screaming-fits in infants which lead to so-called ' stoppage of breath ' (*Ausbleiben.*) In J. Trumpp's work *Säuglingspflege* [15] we read as follows : ' Some infants who are subject to screaming-fits expend an astonishing amount of lung-power and will not readily stop screaming once they have begun. In such cases excitement may reach the point of so-called ' stoppage of breath ', i.e. of fainting. The treatment prescribed by this author is analogous to our modern police-methods ; he recommends punishment with a view to deterrence. In his own words, ' A single attack can generally be quickly stopped by a few hard slaps on the child's buttocks or by sprinkling it with cold water '. But, if this loss of consciousness occurs frequently, the author advises that the infant's captative

[13] Ch. Wolf, *loc. cit.*

[14] Lou Andreas-Salome : ' Narzissmus als Doppelrichtung ', *Imago*, Bd. VII, 1921, S. 361.

[15] J. Trumpp : *Säuglingspflege*, Bücherei der Gesundheitspflege, Verlag E. H. Moritz, III Auflage, 1917.

tendency should be gratified and that a mother who is lacking in maternal qualities should be induced ' to surrender him to the care of a nurse who is reliable and calm '. The unmistakable aim of these screaming-fits is to obtain special attention. If it is not obtainable, or not sufficiently quickly and often, this fainting, or stoppage of breath, ensues. This symptom is interesting from two points of view: first, in relation to the famous, or even legendary, ' hospitalism ' to which infants succumb who have every possible hygienic advantage and appear to be physically sound, but who lack a mother's tenderness and caresses. Secondly, you may perhaps recall the state of depersonalization, briefly described by Bergler and Eidelberg [16] as resulting from repressed exhibition, particularly of the anal type. In this loss of consciousness we have, as it were, something half-way between aphanisis and alienation from the self! I was somewhat surprised to see that Bálint [17] recently referred with enthusiasm to a fact which I had taken to be a matter of course. He expressly mentions that, from the very beginning of life, human beings have libidinal object-relations, but that at first these are ' almost wholly passive in character '. But, when Bálint goes on to say that babies wish to be loved, I think he is not expressing himself strongly enough: they *must* be loved if they are to thrive. As I have said, we have evidence of this necessity in the phenomenon of ' hospitalism ' in which little children may die from the lack or the withdrawal of love and, further, in the fact that, after suffering from this complaint, they begin to flourish if the lack is supplied in time. Viewed in this connection Jones' aphanisis reveals itself as a libidinal phenomenon! Just as the new-born infant is inundated with maternal sexual hormones, and such hormones have to be artificially administered to prematurely born children, so babies are absolutely dependent on love in the widest sense of the term.

It readily occurs to us to name exhibitionism as one of the factors in the complex phenomenon of *stammering*. For, if speaking is communication *par excellence*, the stammerer does not so much communicate as make himself conspicuous, and in so doing he is a nuisance to himself and to those around him. The question of how far, in the course of development, these pregenital forms of exhibitionism are

[16] E. Bergler and L. Eidelberg: ' Der Mechanismus der Depersonalisation ', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XXI, 1935, S. 258.

[17] M. Bálint: ' Zur Kritik der Lehre von den prägenitalen Libidoorganisationen ', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XXI, 1935, S. 525.

connected with genital forms is one which requires further examination. But it is worth mentioning that Kraepelin [18] notes in his invariably exact descriptions that the genital exhibitionists whom he has had an opportunity of observing have often had a stammer earlier in life. Again, just as genital exhibitionism as a clinical phenomenon is almost exclusively confined to males, so stammering is predominantly a masculine symptom, its relative incidence in the two sexes being, according to Gutzmann's [19] statistics, nine men to one woman, and, four boys to one or one and half girls.

Fenichel [20] places stammering first on the list of pregenital conversion neuroses, i.e. neuroses, ' the symptoms of which, like those of conversion hysteria, represent a psychic conflict between infantile sexual wishes directed to an object, and the corresponding defence-tendencies ; though, in contradistinction to conversion hysteria, these sexual wishes are pregenital ',—oral and anal (to summarize them briefly) and mainly captative in character. In his study of narcissism Freud demonstrated that where there is no disturbance women may develop a higher degree of captativity than men. And, when we recollect the facts which he outlines, we are not the least surprised to find that it is the markedly captative man who is particularly prone to this form of neurotic disease, with shyness and low spirits on the one hand and, on the other, exhibitionistic outbreaks. These latter are characterized according to the phase of development in which they occur and to their whole structure, by every degree and combination of symptoms, from disturbances in the functioning of the ego (as in stammering and tics) to phenomena clearly sexual in character (such as obscene talking and provocative exposure). So, too, there may be an infinite variety in the quality and quantity of accompanying affect, from pain to indifference and from indifference to the well-known ' cannibalic ' voluptuousness of the ' five hundred hogs '. [21] All this could be expressed by grading the forms of exhibitionism into a series, from

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[18] *Loc. cit.*

[19] H. Gutzmann : *Sprachheilkunde,* Fischer, Berlin, 1912.

[20] O. Fenichel : *Perversionen, Psychosen, Charakterstörungen.* Psychoanalytische spezielle Neurosenlehre, Bd. II., Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Wien, 1931.

[21] Goethe's *Faust,* Part I, Sc. 5 (Auerbach's Cellar).

' As 'twere five hundred hogs we feel
So cannibalic jolly '.

(Tr. : Bayard Taylor.)

manifestations of the nature of ' symptoms ' to those of the nature of ' perversions'. Finally, the factor of time plays a part. Every possible degree of duration in time must be considered, from the explosive outbreak to the chronic habit of display. To put it more plainly : the exhibitionistic trend may be traced from the orgy of aggression and eroticism in a popular revolution like the French Revolution, through masquerade and carnival, popular oratory and processions, to the more or less permanent ' character-trait ' in individuals and groups. Some six years ago, W. Reich [22] pointed out that in the picture of individual ' character ', as on the stage, we have the two factors of disguise and display. He, indeed, laid more stress on concealment, the donning of a protective armour, rather than on exposure, on the self-restraint exercised rather than on the activity and free play allowed to psychic tendencies, on disguise rather on parade. And so, when in 1930 I was discussing Reich's work on character, I thought it apposite to refer to C. G. Jung's exposition in *Psychologische Typen*, published in 1921. Jung explains ' character ' not as a ' coat of mail ' or even a ' wall of defence ' but more flexibly as a ' mask ', which he calls the ' outward attitude ' (*Ausseneinstellung*), in contradistinction to the inner being the ' anima '. He calls the former the ' persona '. ' *Persona*, which was the word for the actor's mask in ancient times '.[23] I will not here deal with the many exhibitionistic features in costume, fashion and art. But it is legitimate to recall in this connection two things which I have found specially interesting from the clinical point of view.[24] The first is the ' Manneken-Pis ' in Brussels, whose exhibition of urination has been constantly celebrated in carnivals for more than two hundred years, i.e. from 1698 to the present time. About this we read as follows : ' Manneken-Pis continue d'exécuter des devoirs de Pisseur en tous temps et en tout circonstances '.[25] And a traveller's

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[22] W. Reich : ' Über kindliche Phobie und Charakterbildung ', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XVI, 1930, S. 353. Review by Christoffel in *Zentralblatt der gesamten Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, Bd. LX, S. 668, Springer, Berlin, 1931.

[23] *Loc. cit.*, S. 663.

[24] H. Christoffel : ' Zur Biologie der Enuresis ', *Zeitschrift für Kinderpsychiatrie*, 1934 ; ' Harntriebäusserungen, insbesondere Enuresis, Urophilie und Uropolemie', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XXI, 1935, S. 374.

[25] *Manneken-Pis. Son Histoire et son Origine.* Anonymous. Presses des Établissements de Phototypie, A. Domen, Bruxelles.

guide states that ' toutes les toilettes de la statuette peuvent êtres vues au Musée de la Maison du Roi '. A year ago I ventured to call attention to some, commonly disregarded, forms of exhibitionism in our dress and the manner in which we do our hair.[26] I summed up my observations as follows : ' We all give expression to our bisexuality in the way in which we dress and do our hair, and in this connection it would be correct to speak of an exhibitionism which is mainly unconscious '. The significance of these things first dawned on me in consequence of the exaggerated exhibitionism of a young woman whose femininity was giving rise to conflict. One day she pointed out to me that she had made ' progress ', for she had parted her hair on the right (the ' girl's side ') instead of on the left. I need scarcely say that, even then, this ' progress ' was attempted rather than achieved. Here is a second anecdote from the same paper in which I demonstrated that not only the hair-parting but also the position of button and buttonhole indicates the difference between the sexes and a possible inner rebellion against it. Zulliger, when I read my paper, mentioned that, when he was stationed on the frontier from 1914 to 1918, there was a notoriously homosexual company-commander who, one fine day, forced his whole company to fasten their double-breasted military greatcoats in the reverse way, i.e. in the same way that a woman's coat is buttoned. Shortly after this, I had occasion to procure Hirschfeld's *Geschlechtskunde*. As I was turning over pp. 710–11 in Volume IV, three photographs caught my eye. Subsequently I made the experiment of covering up the print underneath them and shewing them to various people. The photographs represent a middle-aged man, who looks like a German of the middle class, with his hair parted on the right. Nearly all the people with whom I experimented asked in a bewildered fashion : ' Surely that is Hitler ? ' The inscription under the photographs was, however, as follows : ' Fritz Haarman of Hanover, the mass-murderer, who killed at least twenty-five young lads (most of whom had escaped from institutions) by biting through the larynx while engaged in sexual intercourse with them '. This suggested to me a passage from E. Jones' work on the phallic phase.[27] It is as follows : ' Again and again I have found this hostile destructive

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[26] H. Christoffel : ' Über den Ausdruck menschlicher Bisexualität ', Communications made at a meeting of the Swiss Psycho-Analytical Society, November 17, 1934.

[27] ' The Phallic Phase ', this JOURNAL, Vol. XIV, p. 1, 1933.

tendency not only behind the manifest ambivalency of all masculine femininity but also behind the affectionate desire to please. . . . The ultimate aim of all this femininity is to take possession of and to destroy the dreaded object '. I may remind you here of the connection between cannibalism and exhibitionism, a point which Jones also mentions in passing and which other authors have remarked on.

Let us now return to the urge to communicate that is brought to a standstill in stammering and to the description of stammering as a pregenital conversion neurosis. In my opinion Fenichel's [28] conception is open to challenge when he states that the symptom of stammering represents the inhibition ' of an unconscious exhibitionistic tendency which seeks urgently to make itself felt '. It is not the exhibition which is inhibited but the pleasure derived from it. This comes out even more clearly in another pregenital conversion neurosis—bronchial asthma. Here we come back again to the conflict of which I have spoken between oblative and captative tendencies. As you know, in asthma respiration is inhibited in such a way that expiration is hindered until emphysema may actually ensue. I am not suggesting that we should regard asthma as exhibition ; the captative tendency is far too strong. The utmost one could say is that there is clearly an exhibitionist factor in the epinosic gain. But I think it will do no harm if we ignore the very uncertain boundaries of exhibitionism, when it will immediately become plain—and this is important in connection with stammering—that there really is no border-line between that which is commonly called ' psychogenic ' and that which is called ' somatogenic', and that we must conceive of the two as one. Noteworthy in this connection is the fact that in childhood a stammer sometimes follows on whooping-cough. As is well known, this infectious disease forces the child to such an excessive expulsion of breath in the coughing-fits that he suffers from a lack of air and turns blue. It is only in the momentary exhaustion after the fit of coughing that he can inspire again and take in enough air. As regards respiration one may say that the cough forces him to develop an exaggerated oblativity. As you know, this childish complaint clears up much more slowly in a neurotic, and it is not far-fetched to assume that a stammer succeeding on whooping-cough must also be regarded as a neurosis in which an attempt is made to compensate by increased captativity for the undue demands recently made on the patient's oblativity. According to this

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[28] *Loc. cit.*

view stammering represents an unsuccessful compensatory activity : a vain attempt is made to make up for that which is supposed to have been squandered during the whooping-cough.

To speak, as Fenichel does, of a conflict between the super-ego and sexuality [29] is not to go to the root of the problem of stammering, for, just as he demonstrates the pregenital character of the sexuality, so the primitive character of the ' super-ego ' must be described. Otherwise we shall have a false picture of a far too elaborately constructed psyche. A pregenital super-ego would be a contradiction in terms, if by the super-ego we meant simply the heir of the Œdipus complex. But we know that this definition is correct only for the more or less mature forms of the super-ego, not for its early forms. We may say briefly that a differentiation of the ego is possible only if at the same time there is a differentiation of the object. And in this process, that which we later call the super-ego expresses in some sense the subject's regard for the outside world. Hence the stammerer's conflict may be more simply and more convincingly described as a conflict between original and regressively reinforced captativity, in the form of oral sadism, and acquired oblativity, ultimately in the form of a primitive super-ego. In an adult stammerer it is easy to lay bare the imperfect ego-structure, and to reveal as it were an ego-super-ego in the rough. But to do this in detail is outside the scope of the present paper. I may say briefly, however, that I have met with the most prodigious captativity in such cases. For instance, in the worst case of stammering which I ever analysed, the patient, at the age of twenty-nine, weighed over 18 stone and could hardly have been forced to leave a meal before he had finished it, unless the house were actually on fire. It is an interesting fact that, some years ago, this stammerer made exhibition in the non-medical sense of the word his life-work, becoming a manager of commercial exhibitions. It was not, however, only his good appetite which made him a heavy-weight, for he suffered from inner secretory disturbances suggestive of eunuchism. At one period he had been successfully treated for obesity by means of hormones, but the stammer persisted. I now have the opportunity of making the interesting experiment of pure analytic treatment in a case in which the genital sub-function is manifested in the patient's physique with rare distinctness. The aim of this patient is to have everyone listening to and looking at him, and him only, and not to be able to manage without

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[29] *Loc. cit.*

him. He would rather do nothing unless he can excel. He would like to scatter death with his words as with a machine-gun. In the ancient world, Demosthenes is a good illustration of the strength of the exhibitionistic urge of the stammerer ; at the same time, however, he, as the consummate Greek popular orator, shews to what cultural heights the captative-oblative tendencies of exhibitionistic speech can attain, and it would be altogether incorrect to suggest that exhibition and sublimation are mutually incompatible. One of my cases reminded me somewhat of the ancient Greek. The patient, a scientist, expended much interest and aggression in politics, without prejudice to his professional work. When he came to me for analysis, he was engaged on a piece of industrial work. Although he spoke several languages with facility, his main reason for coming to me was that he was impeded by a stammer. Shortly after his analysis began, he was offered a professorship and, as I have hinted, he is now the Demosthenes of his university. How little stammering is connected with speaking as such and how fundamentally it is related to a conflict of childhood became clear to me in a consultation case. The patient was an elderly lady who spoke several languages and stammered only in her mother-tongue. She had probably found at least temporary gratification for her exhibitionistic impulses by marrying a well-known author. It would take us too far afield to do more than allude to the anal tendencies of the stammerer, the captative and destructive elements in those tendencies. As a practical piece of advice in the treatment of stammerers I would suggest that we should look for an underlying coprolalia. I know a boy aged fifteen, who is passing with difficulty through the phase of puberty and who, as a child of from four to six years old, had a stammer. In this case all that I could do as an analyst was to give advice in a general way, but it was successful—if one can call this success—in so far that there was no return of the stammer at puberty. On the other hand he has turned out decidedly boorish, although still by no means inaccessible to educational influences, and he not only has an unusually strong tendency to coprolalia but he gratifies his exhibitionistic impulses by actual oral and anal explosions. Finally, I would observe that it is precisely the anal element in the underlying captative significance of the word *stottern* (to stammer) which has passed into colloquial German, for, as you know, it is used to mean ' to pay by instalments ', or ' to buy on the instalment-system '.

This brings us to a problem of anal exhibition which Bergler and

Eidelberg [30] touched upon when they were dealing with depersonalization. When I was reading their work, I remembered how Wilhelm Busch had already represented pictorially the connections they describe, when he drew a man relieving himself beside a wooden paling, while, from the other side, a scavenger or gardener stretched his shovel through the hedge and drew it back laden with fæces. Busch wrote the following lines to describe the astonishment of the man defecating :

' He *feels* quite clearly what he is doing
And the relief does him good,
But he cannot *see* any result—
Oh, how surprised he is ! '

I may observe that I came across this coarse joke years ago in the analysis of a patient who actually suffered from depersonalization. Recently I was called to a consultation in the case of the technical director of a factory, a middle-aged man with a facial tic. I learnt then that suppressed resentment, with no opportunity of speaking out, had produced in the patient an acute condition : he fell into a systematized ' twilight state ', from which he did not awake till he was in a foreign country, after a journey of several days. There succeeded a state of depersonalization lasting several weeks, during which everything about himself seemed quite changed and struck him as strange, while at the same time he had a feeling of great physical weakness. Hitherto he had been of a masterful character, but during this period he was as helpless as a child, easily swayed and tearful. Of this twilight state he remembers dimly that his intention in taking the journey was to disappear abroad and commit suicide. He gave up this idea when he awoke from a sleep in a cold wood and the picture of his wife flashed into his mind. To sum up and to bring out the points in this history, we may construct the following sequence : suppressed coprolalia, a twilight state with suicidal intentions, depersonalization, spontaneous recovery. These connections seem to confirm my earlier statement about the transition from aphanisis to depersonalization.

Now let us briefly consider what Bergler and Eidelberg [31] call the ' specific mechanism of depersonalization '. We shall find that this process is based on the denial of predominantly anal exhibitionism. The result of the denial is a sense of unreality, a doubt amounting to despair, but at the same time a self-control which ' assumes gigantic

[30] *Loc. cit.*

[31] *Loc. cit.*

proportions ', exercised precisely in the warding-off and reversal of the exhibitionistic urge, and the transformation of this into an inner scopophilia. The authors speak of an ego-catastrophe and a running-riot of depraved super-ego-functions in the form of masochistic self-observation. You need not be afraid that I am going to inflict upon you any more of the somewhat obscure dissertation by Bergler and Eidelberg. The following sentence is not taken from these two authors but from a pamphlet of the Oxford Group [32]: ' People are for ever weighed down by a huge rubbish-heap of scepticism and resignation ' . . . The gist of what comes next is that ' we take ourselves too seriously ' and yet we have lost ourselves. In fact, in this little pamphlet by Theophil Spoerri and in other publications by the Group there is reference to that chronic or temporary depersonalization of mankind which, in its milder forms, is probably universal. Moreover, Bergler and Eidelberg recalled that in every neurosis slight states of depersonalization are of frequent, though of transitory, occurrence. It seems then that the Oxford Group confirms in the simplest way certain statements by the two Viennese analysts. For we cannot fail to recognize the contagious exhibitionism in the new religious movement and the effect of release brought about by these mutual public confessions—an effect which, as I have been told in connection with a congress held at Rheinfelden in 1935 resembled a slight intoxication. I do not know what fundamental differences there are between the Salvation Army and the Oxford Group. But one point strikes me about the latter which I think has partly to do with the fact that it operates in a different social stratum from that in which the Salvation Army work ; the latter are concerned with the poor, and the Oxford Group with the well-to-do. At all events the markedly anal character of Group exhibitionism is very striking. When I read Spoerri's pamphlet I thought of a term used by an anal patient of mine who spoke of defecation as ' paying tax '. Let me quote two passages from the pamphlet (S. 7 and S. 9/10) : ' For several days it was impossible to get a Bible at any of the bookshops in Oslo and ' (the italics are mine) ' *the payments of arrears of taxes amounted to hundreds of thousands* '. Again, in a section headed : ' How is the Group getting on in Geneva ? ' we read as follows : ' For many it has

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[32] Th. Spoerri, ' Revolution in Genf ? Zur Kampagne der Oxfordgruppe '. Reprinted from the *Neue Schweizer Rundschau*, October, 1935. Gebrüder Fretz, Zürich.

been the turning-point in their lives. At the meeting of professors, to which the Deans and the Rector of the University had personally invited their colleagues, one man spoke about the new life, who only a little time ago had been unable to believe in God. Amongst other things he said that the demand for absolute honesty had gone home to him and that he had felt obliged to pay up arrears of *taxes*'. (Not italicized in the original.) 'That very morning he had visited the Head of the Finance Department in order to put the matter right. This man, a well-known Socialist, had said to him that he was indebted to the Group not only in his official capacity. But there was one thing that he must say: The day after the Jêune Fédéral a total of six thousand payments of taxes had been recorded. This had never happened before in the financial history of the Republic and he put it down to the influence of the Group'. I will not presume to try to estimate here the value of the Oxford Group as a whole. All I intend to do is to point out the two irrational factors in it which seem to me fundamental. There is yet another very important aspect of the question, which, however, is outside the scope of this paper. You know that the present period of deflation—in this connection the word sounds like a pun—is very largely associated with the fact that the bulk of the money which exists is not being circulated but is lying idle. That even Spoerri, from quite another point of view than that of the Bank of England and the advocates of free money, unconsciously suspects some such basis for the 'discontents of civilization' is revealed from time to time in his mode of expressing himself, for instance, when he compares the Oxford Group with the 'wind of God'. You see that the compulsion to confess, characteristic of children and criminals and described by Burlingham [33] and Reik [34] as exhibitionism—that this problem of character has all sorts of relations with our present-day civilization. And on the whole it is true to say that genital exhibitionism, clinically the most striking form and the most familiar, if not in its genesis at least as a phenomenon, is, in comparison with the whole extent of the problem of exhibitionism, a private matter.

After what I have said, you will not fall into the error of underestimating the pregenital character of male genital exhibitionism. And perhaps I shall not encounter much opposition from you when I assert that the genital symptoms in this form of exhibitionism are for

[33] *Loc. cit.*

[34] *Loc. cit.*

the most part a misrepresentation of facts! In each and every case we find an uncertainty, an inhibition amounting to phobia, in the genital life of these patients. One need not go so far afield as to China in order to become acquainted with the annihilating castration anxiety of genital exhibitionists. But it may help us if we recall the phenomenon of *Koro* [35], i.e. a form of genital exhibitionism which no more looks like a perversion than does *exhibitionismus sollicitus* but is manifestly of the nature of a phobia. As you know, *Koro* is an acute anxiety that the penis will be retracted into the patient's body, whereupon death will inevitably ensue. All manner of mechanical devices, however, are kept permanently in readiness as a precaution against the fatal disappearance of the penis. During the attack itself the threatened organ is held fast for days at a time in the hand or the mouth, often with the help of a large number of people. Since, according to the Chinese belief, the *Yin*, or female, principle is too strong for the *Yang*, or male, principle in these patients, the Chinese physician prescribes for the sufferer a 'masculine medicine', e.g. gunpowder mixed with rice-toddy, to be taken by mouth. Not the remedy itself but the psychological view which prompts it is closely related to our analytical concepts, for we regard the patient as menaced by his own orality and hold that his femininity is largely spurious, the masking of an undischarged or aggressively reinforced oral sadism. I would refer you in this connection to the passage which I have quoted from Jones.[36]

Even non-analytical writers have often been struck by the orality of genital exhibitionists. It betrays itself in such speeches as that of Mario, of whose case I gave you a brief account at the Lucerne Congress: 'This (exhibitionistic) behaviour gave me the sort of pleasure and delight that an animal has in a piece of meat which saves it from starvation'. Another evidence of Mario's orality was the fact that genital excitation caused his mouth to water. Kraepelin [37] took quite a one-sided view of the matter when he stated that the abuse of

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[35] Notes on *Koro* by Dr. med. Otto, reproduced in M. Hirschfeld's work: *Die Weltreise eines Sexualforschers*, S. 96. Bözberg Verlag, Brugg (Schweiz), 1933. Cf. also P. M. Van Wuilfften-Palthe: 'Koro, eine merkwürdige Angsthysterie', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XXI, 1935, S. 249.

[36] *Loc. cit.*

[37] *Loc. cit.*

alcohol was one of the roots of exhibition. For technical reasons I found it necessary to suggest to Mario that, when the exhibitionistic urge made itself felt, he should sit down and write whatever came into his head. He made use of this expedient successfully, as long as it was necessary, but at the end of the first set of notes he wrote these words : ' It has not been easy ; I had to sacrifice a bottle of beer and about fifteen cigarettes '. Another genital exhibitionist found that, when the urge gave him a sense of uneasiness and danger, he could suppress it and, instead of exposing himself, drink one or two glasses of beer, which had the effect of making him feel completely calm again and master of himself.

Now in these cases the oral sadism is only in the smallest degree conscious. It is true that it would be quite easy to find that the patients manifested it in all sorts of ways similar to those described ; the same is true of the anal-sadistic symptoms. But it is quite another thing to discover how all these predominantly captative tendencies are connected with oblative tendencies. In such persons oblativity is certainly there but it is mainly connected with the death-instinct. As regards their anxiety I will merely say that it is tinged with claustrophobia, and that one of the most typical symptoms is erythrophobia, which overcomes them in exposed situations such as swimming-baths, at public meetings, in theatres, etc. Further, I must mention the well-known ' shamefacedness ' of genital exhibitionists in the presence of their own sex. In the paper which I read at the Lucerne Congress in 1934 I said that the active counterpart of this masculine shyness in the presence of males was the *inhibitionism* of the exhibitionist, his hostile attitude towards other exhibitionists. A further point is that the patient often breaks through his anxiety, particularly just before he gives way to an attack of genital exhibitionism, by putting his hardihood to the test in amateur theft or burglary or by some achievement in the way of sport. These are sometimes calculated to impress spectators, as for instance when a man leaps from a high bridge into the Rhine when the mid-day traffic is at its busiest or jumps stark naked into the sea-lions' pond at the Zoo during an evening festivity. Two of my patients took a delight in the physical skill and strength with which they made their escape after exhibitionistic acts. In general, as far as my own observation goes, exhibitionists are, above all, ambitious people whose ambition has not been gratified.

Now let us have done with details and turn directly to the question : how and why do these people become exhibitionists ? At the beginning

of this paper I suggested that it is impossible to explain male genital exhibitionism by the infantile scopophiliac practices, active and passive, which commonly occur side by side with all sorts of other sexual activities. This is true even when these infantile practices are actually carried over into adult life. I, at any rate, would not feel confident that I could distinguish such histories of infantile development from others in which genital exhibitionism never subsequently occurs. The majority of genital exhibitionists whom I have known had, I found, had a quite untrammelled sexual life in childhood in respect of relations with little girls of the same age. In the case of Mario I noticed further that there had been practically no latency-period worthy of the name.

As far as I have been able to observe, genital exhibitionism breaks out only when puberty is drawing to a close or manhood has just been attained. Jean Jacques Rousseau, at the beginning of the third volume of his Confessions, gives an account of his own genital exhibitionism. This volume covers the years 1728–31 and Rousseau was born in 1712. He must therefore have been in his sixteenth year when his exhibitionism broke out, but most of my patients were round about twenty. I think this is an important point which should be emphasized. It suggests that male genital exhibitionism is a *post-pubertal* catastrophe and the question arises: what is at the root of it, seeing that these people have often already attained to normal physical relationships with women? It is only in the course of these and as they are broken off that the anomaly occurs. We have then the remarkable fact that these men, so long as they were boys, not only experienced no inhibitions in relation to girls of their own age but on the contrary were very free from inhibition; when, however, the time comes when the natural partner would be an adult woman they recoil from coitus into the more remote relation of a simple exhibition of the penis. Hence male genital exhibition is a *regressive* post-pubertal phenomenon. As I have said, it is by no means necessary for exhibitionism to have been primarily prominent in the child's polymorphous instinctual activity: it is mobilized secondarily, at the time when, normally, mature genitality with its oblativity should be asserting itself. Secondary, too, is the hypertrophy of the infantile component instinct. The heterosexual object-relation is retained—at all events manifestly; phallicism is retained, but it becomes essentially passive, or, to use Jones' term,[38] *deuterophallicism* takes the stage. We

[38] *Loc. cit.*

could explain the situation the other way round and say that the achievement of phallic-heterosexual relations is a prerequisite of male genital exhibitionism. In discussing the urethral instinctual type [39] I pointed out that an early phallic phase might be conjectured to occur in the very earliest period of life. However that may be, we are familiar with the heterosexual object-relation in two particularly marked forms—the early oral and the adult genital forms: the babe sucking at the mother's breasts and the act of coitus. The one is active and the other passive, and they represent partial incorporation primarily *of* and ultimately *in* the object. There is nothing remarkable in the fact that, when children and adolescents have plenty of opportunity for sexual contact, actual union of the genitals either does not take place at all or takes place only by exception. But we should probably be right in holding that this instinctual licence, this asocial behaviour, is responsible for the fact that the subject's phallicism permanently retains considerable strength and that an initial form of phallic activity is retained.

Lasègue once compared the exhibitionist with a professor of mathematics, standing lost in thought in front of his blackboard; the comparison is perfect if one does not forget the phallic symbol of the piece of chalk in his hand. The marked phallicism of the exhibitionist can also be illustrated by a comparison with a phobia. You will remember that in Freud's 'History of an Infantile Neurosis' he describes a butterfly-chase in which the small pursuer was suddenly overcome with a dread of the butterfly when it came to rest, and took to his heels. If we change the scene somewhat, so that the little boy is not chasing the butterfly but standing spellbound before the object of the chase, with the net convulsively grasped in his hand, we have a good picture of an exhibitionist. For his act is at one and the same time an act of assault and a calling of halt! And we may also legitimately speak of genital exhibitionism as 'a breakdown on attaining success', namely, a breakdown in reference to successful mental and physical union with a woman, to falling in love and love itself, as well as to physical union. At the moment when the male is impelled by a twofold urge to such relations the catastrophe of exhibitionism occurs.

The essence of this catastrophe is that, in his relation to adult women, the exhibitionist reverts to the situation of the suckling—his

[39] H. Christoffel: 'Harntriebäusserungen, insbesondere Enuresis, Urophilie und Uropolemie', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XXI, 1935, S. 374.

relation to a woman in his earliest days. Stekel,[40] as early as 1912, suspected something of this state of affairs, for he described genital exhibitionists as the representatives of what he called ' the eternal suckling '. Now the matter is not quite so simple. The phallicism already attained presents obstacles to the reactivation of the mouth–nipple relation. I would recall here the circumstance to which I have already alluded, namely, that one of my exhibitionistic patients can substitute drinking for exhibition. It must be said, however, that in both cases the instinctual gratification which he experiences is tranquilizing rather than directly pleasurable, which indicates the part played by the death-instinct in this man, who is far the most aggressive of my exhibitionistic patients. I am speaking here of patients of the type which we should place in the psychoneurotic category, i.e. the majority of the cases which figure by hundreds in the police-statistics of our larger cities. On the other hand, where the cathexis of the patient's phallicism is weaker, the regression may reach even further back. We have an instance of this in a case of acute catatonia in a man aged twenty-four. He had just completed his professional training and was trying to make up his mind whether he should become engaged. He escaped from this decision by putting into action a birth-phantasy—locking himself in his room for several days, then lying naked at an open window for some hours during a January night and, finally, leaving the house early in the morning stark naked ' in order to begin a new life '. Even now, nearly fifteen years after his recovery from this psychosis, which lasted for several months, the patient feels that, in spite of all its painful associations, this episode had a beneficial effect upon him as a spiritual rebirth. His flight from women at the time was partly determined by the phantasy of a ' cripple girl '. Though his social adaptation is now perfectly satisfactory and he is engaged in work and is the father of two children, he has still not got rid of this phantasy, although—and this was what brought him to be analysed—it is so far transformed by a process of identification that he puts himself in the place of the woman, giving himself enemas with his wife's irrigation-apparatus until pollution occurs or is onanistically induced. And this brings us back again to our psycho-neurotic genital exhibitionists. The main feature which we observe in them is the activation of oral incorporation. Mario, it is true, suffers also from irritation of the rectum at night. But directly before

[40] W. Stekel : ' Zur Psychologie des Exhibitionismus ', *Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. I, 1912, S. 494.

and during the exhibitionistic act he is a chain-smoker. It seems, however, quite impossible to suppose that, when phallicism has once been permanently attained, the instinctual tendencies can find a predominantly oral discharge ; if that were so, such people would be breast-fetishists rather than exhibitionists. Well, genital exhibitionists are sometimes incidentally that as well ! Another element in their orality comes into play, by a process of displacement, in their scopophilia : the sexual object is, as it were, devoured with the eyes and, again, the exhibitionist's ' keen glance ' at his rival serves him as a weapon in his inhibitionism. Yet another part of his oral sadism, perhaps not the least considerable, is projected on to the woman, so that she takes on the significance of a being who incorporates by devouring. This dread of the female Moloch finds its rationalized expression in the fear of pregnancy and venereal disease. Syphilis, in particular, threatens to eat away the body, and a possible child is thought of as ' eating one up '. Mario quoted a saying in which the hairy female genital is represented as the fiercest of all wild beasts, lying in wait in a thicket and sucking up all the eggs which come its way. The dread of total incorporation leads to claustrophobia. When exhibitionists venture to marry, they feel themselves more or less in captivity. Similarly, the approximate reproduction of the intrauterine situation, which occurs in sleep every night, is in these patients characterized by restlessness. For years Mario used to throw himself about in bed in uneasy dreams and to talk in his sleep. Moreover, the act of exhibition must take place in the open air or at least with complete freedom of movement. (By the way, I have known no exhibitionist who exhibited himself in front of his wife, with the exception of Mario, who did so rarely and with his penis covered, i.e. simulating femininity, just as during coitus, which he would perform only in the dark, he preferred to lie on his back.) This brings us to the part played by homosexuality. In the history of such a patient's development we come across manifest expressions of homosexuality but—and this is another evidence of inhibitionism—not in the exhibitionistic phase itself. But, though repressed, it influences him, for in choosing a female partner he unconsciously seeks for a ' male ' woman. This hermaphroditic phantasy is universal in exhibitionists and can easily be demonstrated in many of the dreams which they relate, even in the manifest content. A turning away from mature women may be indicated by their directing their exhibition towards younger objects. In one of these cases the strong destructive element

was revealed in the patient's remorse for having corrupted children, while, on the other hand, he would temporarily conceive the intention of changing his profession for that of a children's physician. One of the principal occasions for a flight into exhibitionism seems to be the first encounter with menstruation. I think that this is a main basis of the idea, met with in phantasies and dreams, that an adult woman possesses a male genital which can be sucked. Here, by the creation of a figure analogous to the Egyptian phallic mother-goddess Muth, of whom we read in Freud's work on Leonardo da Vinci, an utterly insupportable mental image is cancelled by another which has its origin in a narcissistic projection as well as in the primary relation to the mother. She now becomes the true Alma Mater, the mother who supplies nourishment to all from not two only, but three, 'monstrances', to use a term borrowed from one of Mario's most horrible dreams, in which he was obliged to drink a bowl of steaming blood. We have already asked how it is that the mother-transference to the mature woman does not simply produce one of Stekel's 'eternal sucklings' but rather an exhibitionist. The next question is: why not a homosexual? The answer is that in all these exhibitionists an actively tender relation towards the mother is conspicuous both as an infantile and a permanent phenomenon. The father is held primarily responsible for the mother's deficiencies, and that the menstruation complex [41] plays a part here is shewn in many ways, as, for instance, in the idea that coitus during the monthly period causes abdominal cancer in the woman. The familiar phallic significance of the fetish was in Mario concentrated in white handkerchiefs. It appears that when, as a boy of twelve or thirteen, he found some bloodstained towels of his mother's in a clothes-basket, she said that her nose had been bleeding. He also remembers that a white handkerchief was used by a certain man to cover his genitals when he made advances to boys who were bathing in the river. Mario, who at that time was twenty-four, joined with his comrades in throwing him into the water as a punishment, with the result that he narrowly escaped drowning. (Mario himself had nearly been drowned at the age of ten, when he was fishing.)

Now what do we discover when we look more closely at the exhibitionist's orality? So far, I have found no evidence that constitutionally it is specially marked. From what I have been able to

[41] C. D. Daly: 'Der Kern des Œdipuskomplexes', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XXI, 1925, S. 389.

observe, the orality itself is not particularly strong, but its elaboration is peculiarly defective as a factor in ego-development. Without exception these exhibitionists are intelligent people whose thirst for knowledge and craving for recognition have never been fully satisfied. They feel bitterly that in their youth they had not enough help in their intellectual and professional training and that their interests and boyish achievements were never properly understood. It is above all the father whom they reproach for this. For instance, in Mario's analysis I realized that he was congratulating himself on his increasing intellectual freedom under treatment and his greater capacity for thinking ; but I only vaguely connected this with his previous defective training until he more than once thanked me for ' educating ' him and so put me on the right track. Thus, the reason why primitive orality has undergone an arrest in these patients is that their fathers failed to satisfy that captative tendency which is necessary for the development of ego and super-ego. This is as true of the man of the people as of the young man belonging to a wealthy family, to whom no other source of education has been denied. It is in accordance with this relation that all these people get into difficulties in their profession. None of them has succeeded in developing his capacities fully and harmoniously. There is always something many-sided and amateurish about them and they frequently change their calling. In sport and sexual affairs they sometimes excel. One of my exhibitionistic patients of a markedly narcissistic character who broke off his analysis after a few weeks, though without altogether losing contact with the analyst, succeeded in mastering his exhibitionistic urge in two ways : first, he obtained complete gratification of his narcissistic cravings from his wife and, secondly, he did no work at all, which left him free to play chess from morning to night and to become a champion in chess-tournaments.

In conclusion I would refer to certain historical facts which suggest that we should not overestimate the pleasure derived from the apotropæic factor in genital exhibitionism, although usually the former is manifest clinically and the latter more latent. Here I am speaking exclusively of male genital exhibitionism, which, I may say, is occasionally indirectly manifested in art. In the famous Chinese novel *Kin Ping Meh*,[42] which is laid in the period 1111–27 according to our reckoning, the following scene is described (p. 732) : Seven or eight girls fall on a young man and beat him with cudgels. As he lies

[42] *Kin Ping Meh*, or the Adventures of Hsi Men and his Six Wives. Translated from the Chinese by Franz Kuhn. Inselverlag, Leipzig.

in extremity on the ground, the happy idea occurs to him : ' Cudgel for cudgel '. Instantly he pulls down his trousers and displays his penis to the girls, whereupon they scatter. F. S. Krauss [43] in *Anthropophyteia* records certain South Slavonic traditions amongst which is the following : ' If a man wishes to express the deepest contempt, he flies into a passion and exposes his genitals . . .'. In the Middle Ages there was on the Rhine Gate of Basle, with its eleventh century fortifications, the figure of ' King Tongue ' [44] putting out his tongue and rolling his eyes at the worthy citizens, while on the Alban arch [45] there were about ten representations in stone of life-sized male genitals in the vaulting. In the seventies of last century this sculpture was broken off (1879 ?) and, at about the same date, a penal law was enacted in Basle (1872) in Section 98 of which it is laid down that exhibitionists may be punished by ' imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years '—a penalty which can still be inflicted. (Incidentally, I have reckoned out that the sum which Mario's treatment cost his insurance society was only a little more than the expense to which the State would have been put during the two months' imprisonment to which he was sentenced ; it is true that the sentence was conditional.) The changing significance of exhibition, how it takes its colour now from the erotic and now from the death-instinct, is illustrated in the figure of Priapus, who was not only a god of pleasure but whose statue used to be set up to keep off thieves and to scare away birds from the fields and gardens of ancient Rome, *furum aviumque maxima formido* (Horace).

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[43] F. S. Krauss : *Anthropophyteia.* Jahrbücher für folkloristische Erhebungen, Bd. I. Südslavische Volksüberlieferungen, die sich auf den Geschlechtsverkehr beziehen. Leipzig, Ethnologischer Verlag, 1904.

[44] *Lällenkönig. Lälle* is a dialect word for *tongue.*

[45] Karl Stehlin : Manuscript note in the Archiv. d. Histor. antiquar. Gesellsch. Basel, Signatur H2. Delegation für das alte Basel, Protokolle 1884. Deposited in the State Archives at Basle.

TRAINING- AND CONTROL-ANALYSIS

BY

VILMA KOVÁCS

BUDAPEST

In no school or university at the present day does psycho-analytical training form part of the curriculum, a circumstance which, despite certain disadvantages, has had this advantage: that individual analytical Societies have been free to experiment until, from the large body of experience amassed, our present system has been built up.

The reason why psycho-analysis has not yet found a place in the syllabus of any faculty is not merely that it has encountered resistance amongst leading scientific authorities. Analytical training presents difficulties which make it impossible to include it in the ordinary programme of scientific instruction as we have it to-day. No more than any other therapeutic method can psycho-analysis be learnt from books and lectures only. And there is a peculiar difficulty in the fact that it is impossible to make patients the object of a demonstration of the analytic method of treatment. For this reason analysis demands special sacrifices from its students. Students of medicine are under no obligation to test in their own persons the mechanisms of disease; they learn the structure of the body by examining the bodies of others. Only by being analysed himself, however, can the analyst discover the general laws by which the psyche is governed and the specific factors which influence its development in health or disease. Only by the investigation of his own personality can he arrive at the conviction that there is an unconscious mental life which influences the behaviour of all human beings, normal or abnormal.

This investigation of the mind is the most important part of analytical training. It was for this reason that Freud analysed his dreams, in order by so doing to become acquainted with his own unconscious. Those who have read his work on the interpretation of dreams, in which he describes but a part of these dream-analyses, will have realized the difficulties involved in such a self-analysis. Truly, only the enthusiasm of the scientific inquirer and the ardent desire, transcending all personal susceptibilities, to discover the truth could enable a man to carry through so difficult a task. Although this initial experiment in training indicated the line which should be followed and the results to be obtained, there was a temporary deviation from this path as the psycho-analytical movement developed. Even

Freud himself did not at the beginning perceive that this self-analysis was the indispensable prerequisite for acquiring the analytical technique. The actual conscious aim of this first self-analysis was to learn to know, not so much his own unconscious, as unconscious mental processes in general. The direct result of this work was the first formulation of analytical psychology in the theoretical chapters of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. At this time Freud still supposed that, in stating the theory of analysis, he was putting into the hands of all who grasped his principles the key to their own unconscious. Thus it came about that when, in 1902, a physician who had been analysed by him formed a group of persons who desired to study analysis, Freud became the centre of the group and discussed with its members at regular meetings such problems as presented themselves.[1] Already in this study-circle he noted certain disturbing factors which proved a great hindrance to harmonious co-operation, and he began to surmise that this disharmony was mainly due to the unresolved psychic conflicts of his fellow-workers.

The numbers of the group gradually grew, notably when the Zürich Clinic, founded by Bleuler, approached the Vienna Society in 1907 with a view to work in common. The result was the first International Congress, which was held at Salzburg in 1908 and was entirely private in character. Thus Zürich was the first place where psychoanalysis was officially taught and practised at a clinic. Physicians who took the course of study at the Zürich Clinic in those days have told me that the training consisted solely of the reading of existing analytical works and experiments in mental associations. They were taught how to use Wundt's association-tests in a modified form in accordance with psycho-analytical principles. In this way it was possible for an analyst to give practical demonstration to his students of facts about which he could otherwise only have instructed them by word of mouth. In 1910, two years after the first Salzburg Congress, a second Congress was held in Nürnberg. Here Freud and Ferenczi, with Jung, Abraham and Jones, determined to organize the psychoanalytical movement on scientific lines, and, since Freud at that time met with most support in Zürich, he made that city, instead of Vienna, the centre of research work and training. At Ferenczi's suggestion the International Psycho-Analytical Association was founded, the aim of which was declared to be : ' to foster and further the science of

[1] Freud, ' History of the Psycho-Analytical Movement ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. I.

psycho-analysis founded by Freud, both as a pure discipline of psychology and in its application to medicine and the mental sciences ; and to promote mutual support among the members in all endeavours to acquire and to spread psycho-analytical knowledge '.[2]

At the same time the private Societies in Vienna, Berlin and Zürich were transformed into local Branch Societies.

The Third Congress met in Weimar in 1911, and it was then possible to assert that, as Freud expressed it, ' analysts had learnt to tolerate a measure of truth '. These words indicate already the heavy demands which were being made on the analyst's personality. Unfortunately, at the very next Congress it became clear how far some analysts were from approximating in any degree to the standard required of them.

In 1911 the Munich, New York and the separate American Branch Societies were formed and, shortly afterwards, those of Budapest and London. Of course, apart from the Societies, there were students and other persons interested in psycho-analysis in other places.

When we trace the further progress of the movement we see that the ' tolerance of truth ', to which Freud alluded, was not an easy matter. In spite of the development of psycho-analytical theory and its application in therapeutic practice, personal conflicts manifested themselves in practising analysts more and more, to the detriment of their co-operation and their work as scientists.

This became glaringly evident for the first time at the Fourth Congress, held at Munich : there was no longer even a trace of the sincerity and friendly co-operation which is to be looked for amongst colleagues. Instead, there was strife, arising from unconscious passions and leading to regrettable divisions which, at the cost of grievous disappointment, brought home to Freud the momentous fact that analysts, no less than their patients, are subject to resistance to disagreeable truths. He found it no matter for surprise that a patient, even after attaining to a certain degree of understanding, should, when confronted with new and painful discoveries, relinquish such insight as he had acquired : Freud's great disappointment sprang rather from the fact that he was forced to observe the same phenomenon in analysts. For many otherwise conspicuously gifted scientists stopped short of probing their own unconscious mental life when it meant recognizing facts that were intolerable for subjective reasons and, by altering to suit their individual views what they had

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[2] Freud, *loc. cit.*

learnt from previous experience, endeavoured to arrive at a result in other ways.

There was far-seeing wisdom in certain words spoken by Freud at the Nürnberg Congress in 1910, words of the utmost importance for psycho-analytical training: 'It seems', he said, 'that the prerequisite for a successful application of psycho-analytical technique is that the physician should begin his analytical training by being analysed himself'.[3]

We see then that it is important for the practising analyst to acquire as thorough a knowledge as possible of unconscious mental processes and, above all, of his own unconscious, for only with the help of such knowledge can he recognize in his patient's communications the utterances of the unconscious. Further modifications of his technique and improvements in it are thus directly related to the analyst's personality. It is inadmissible that the patient should become the object of a transference of his affects; his duty is, on the contrary, constantly to observe the manifestations of his counter-transference, by which we mean his negative and positive affective attitude towards the patient. He must constantly bring this attitude into his own consciousness. Hence it is essential for the success of psycho-analytical therapy that the analyst should analyse himself continuously. This constant stocktaking of his own impulses was the method by which Freud made himself able to practise analysis.

At the Berlin Congress in 1922 it was finally agreed that, from that time on, only those persons should be authorized to practise psycho-analysis who, as well as taking a theoretical course of training, had submitted to a training-analysis conducted by an analyst approved by the Society at the time. A Training Committee was set up within each Society for the purpose of organizing a system of training. Henceforth no analyst was to embark on training analysts at his own discretion, and the Training Committee reserved to itself the right to accept or reject candidates. Even this great advance in the matter of training proved, however, insufficient. It was thought that the training-analysis declared to be obligatory at the Berlin Congress of 1922 need not be so searching as a therapeutic analysis. The idea was that it should familiarize the candidate with the mechanism of the unconscious, through the analysis of his dreams, and should reveal his individual Œdipus complex, but care was to be taken not to

[3] 'Report of the Nürnberg Congress', by Otto Rank, *Jahrbuch für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. II, 1910.

impinge upon his personality or his character. It was perhaps Ferenczi who contributed most to the gradual change which took place in the aims of the training-analysis, although he never explicitly dealt with the problems of training. In his book, *Entwicklungsziele der Psychoanalyse*,[4] written in collaboration with Rank, stress is laid on the fact that a psycho-analysis is essentially an *experience*. This book was of considerable importance; in it attention was drawn more emphatically than ever before to the fact that analysis represents an onerous emotional task not only for the patient but also for the analyst. At first this work met with great opposition, owing to its courageous note and its insistence on the analytic situation; but it forced people to study more profoundly the problem of training-analyses. At the Innsbruck Congress in 1927 the International Training Commission put forward a new desideratum, namely, that analysts should be more fully analysed than their patients. This standard was subsequently generally adopted, with a marked result both on the therapeutic success attained and the analyst's capacity for shouldering his task. In various articles published since then ('Die Elastizität der psychoanalytischen Technik', 1928; 'Kinderanalysen mit Erwachsenen', 1931; 'Sprachverwirrungen zwischen dem Erwachsenen und dem Kind', 1935 [5]) Ferenczi repeatedly called attention to the significance in practice of this theoretical demand for a really penetrating analysis.

I have now briefly shewn the way in which our present system of training has developed and the experience upon which it is based. There are, however, particular problems which have been solved in various ways by the different Branch Societies. One of the most important of these problems is, I think, that of control-analysis. The actual purpose of control-analysis is instruction and the control of practical work. The candidate begins to analyse one or two patients and reports progress to an experienced colleague. He thus learns what is the right attitude towards his patients; in fact, he acquires the technique of psycho-analysis. If we content ourselves with this superficial type of control-analysis, we can understand the argument that it should be conducted by various training-analysts, since the candidate can thus learn their different methods. If, as the work goes on, it turns out that his own conflicts are preventing a right understanding of his patient's, the analyst in control advises him to continue his own analysis for a time. In my view, on the other hand, the more

[4] *Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag*, 1924.

[5] All published in the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*.

correct procedure is for the control-analysis to be conducted throughout by the candidate's own training-analyst ; for it may transpire, when the former has begun to treat patients, that the time has not yet come to terminate his own analysis.

The point at which an analysis should be brought to a conclusion is more easily determined when treating a patient than when training a candidate. When the symptoms of the former disappear and he has acquired the capacity for adaptation to reality, he may be said to have obtained everything which he did and could desire from analysis. And we for our part need have no qualms in letting him go once this result has been achieved. But it would not qualify him to analyse other people, even if intellectually he were able to do so. The object of training-analysis is, by bringing into the candidate's consciousness his hitherto repressed libidinal tendencies and so acquainting him with the structure of his character, to reveal to him the original and fundamental nature of his personality and also that which is not fundamental but has assumed importance as a kind of adaptation to the outside world, while only too often it conceals his true personality under a rigid mask. Analysis has to loosen his cramped humanity, grown stiff through habit and automatic behaviour, and to shew him the many potentialities which lie dormant within him. This alone can give him a greater elasticity, enabling him to have insight into the difficulties of those patients whose character is wholly opposed to his own.

The extent to which we can realize this ideal can best be discovered when we entrust our candidate with his first patients. I believe that the time is not ripe for this until his analysis has reached the point where his interest is no longer focussed on himself but genuinely on the outside world. That is to say, when the transference has been so far discovered and traced to its infantile sources that his desire to be normal signifies no longer identification with the training-analyst, but a sublimated activity independent of the analyst. If the candidate continues his own analysis when he begins to analyse patients, the two parallel pieces of work bring to light those sides of his personality which have hitherto received too little attention or none at all, or at least could not manifest themselves in so expressive a fashion. All his good and bad qualities, and also his weaknesses, are revealed ; for example, his incapacity for objectivity ; his impatience ; his vanity ; his inability to bear criticism ; the tendency to observe only what is in his favour and the failure to note the serious accusations which the

patient is bringing against him but dares not express except in a disguised form ; the tactlessness which ministers to those sadistic or masochistic instincts in himself which he has failed to master ; his callousness or, on the other hand, his exaggerated fellow-feeling and excessive tolerance. All this provides an opportunity for shewing the student the right way to handle the counter-transference, which is one of the most important factors in analytic work.

The patient's transference-relation naturally evokes in the analyst a response, of which he must constantly take stock. He must never lose sight of the fact that the same human affects are at work within him as within his patient and that he reacts to what is agreeable with a sense of pleasure and to what is disagreeable with pain. He must bear in mind that the difference between him and his patient is that he himself is always aware that his unconscious infallibly reacts in such and such a way and that this consciousness helps him always to keep a check on his feelings and so invariably to maintain an objective attitude. The perpetual repression of affects is just as injurious for the analyst's mental balance and indeed for his health as for that of his patient and, in time, may become no less fateful. As early as 1928, Ferenczi recommended that a special hygienic régime should be devised to guard against this overburdening of the analyst. To avoid misunderstandings I would say emphatically that the bringing of unconscious tendencies into consciousness no more means putting them into practice in real life in the analyst's case than in that of his patient. If we realize that during our work positive and negative affective forces are also in action within us, we shall work in a more advantageous way than if we waste our energy in repression, seeking to maintain a cold and, if possible, impassive attitude or one of pure humanitarianism. Our general education aims at enabling us to *ignore* those wishes that we ought not to gratify. This educational principle may perhaps be a practical solution in other callings and need not necessarily disturb psychic harmony, but the analyst must always *take cognizance* of those desires which are rooted in his instincts, for only so can he be sure of not translating any of them into reality, to the injury of his patients. Having this consciousness, he will always be a human being in the best sense of the word, one who feels that he has affinity with and understanding of every manifestation of humanity.

Having spoken of the recognition of affects in the counter-transference, I have, I think, touched on everything that I believe to be essential from the point of view of training. I am sure that it is right

to hold that this insight can be successfully maintained only if the candidate is analysed himself whilst working at his control-analyses. I have been brought to this conviction by the control-analyses which I have conducted with candidates who have terminated their own analyses. Although I was able to obtain an insight into the psychological capacities and the individual character of such students, I found it a difficult task fully to understand and follow them in their work without the help of the analytic situation. It is true that during his training-analysis I had obtained an impression of the extent to which a candidate was able to adapt himself to his environment ; but the situation becomes entirely different when he is dealing with patients. Of course it is even more difficult when he has been analysed by someone else. When I had to conduct a control-analysis in such a case, I was always obliged to confess that I was at a loss. I could not orientate myself in the pathological material, however correctly it was presented to me, for I did not know the candidate's character and his modes of reaction, and so I could not say from what point of view he was judging the various situations he encountered. In the end all that I could do to help was to draw conclusions from the dream-analyses which he reported as to how far he was penetrating into his patient's unconscious. The difficulties of this work are out of all proportion to any results which may be attained. It was satisfactory neither for me nor for the candidate ; in the end either we both admitted its superficiality and discontinued it, or else he decided to go on being analysed by the analyst who controlled his work. I need hardly say that the second method led more directly to the goal.

I have already referred to the point at which it is right to entrust patients to a candidate. Whether he should have several patients at once or not and what type of patient we should send to him are matters for individual decision. Cases of hysteria and obsessional neurosis are the most suitable for beginners, because in such cases the transference-relation develops more quickly and so is more easily studied. The analysis of obsessional characters and, indeed, of character-neuroses in general is to be recommended rather for those who are more experienced.

In my opinion our present system of training, which has been evolved from experiments and experience over a period of ten years, satisfies the standards required of practising analysts by our modern technique and the pathological material with which we now have to deal. The development of psycho-analysis up to now has shewn

that the analyst's therapeutic ability has kept pace with the changes in the type of patients whom he is called upon to treat. The cases which we are required to analyse are increasingly difficult. First we had hysteria and the anxiety-neuroses; next, obsessional neuroses and innumerable cases of sexual disturbance; now we have to deal with neurotic characters, which present even greater difficulties for our technique. There are signs that the next group will consist of neurotic criminals, psychotics and morphine or alcohol addicts. Analysts must be prepared for ever-increasing difficulties in their therapeutic task, and this may possibly involve a further modification in our system of training. But I do not think that there will be any fundamental change, for the only secure basis of analytical training is the thorough, penetrating analysis of the candidate which is now universally recognized as obligatory.

SHORT COMMUNICATION

THE ACTIVATION OF A REPRESSED IMPULSE UNDER APPARENTLY PARADOXICAL CIRCUMSTANCES

According to the current conception of the mechanism of repression, a wish or impulse unacceptable to the ego is, under certain conditions, repressed and banished from the sphere of conscious ideation. The repressed impulse, instead of meekly accepting its fate, strives constantly to re-assert itself, and there is thus a never-ending conflict between the impulse and the force which seeks to repress it. In some instances the repression is apparently complete and permanent. In others it is incomplete, the forbidden impulse succeeding in asserting itself in the form of symptomatic acts, dreams, neurotic symptoms, and even in conscious drives. This activation of the repressed impulse occurs when circumstances render either the impulse unusually strong or the repressing forces unusually weak.

In the case herein reported, a repressed impulse succeeded in re-asserting itself under apparently paradoxical circumstances : that is, under circumstances which might have been expected to strengthen, rather than weaken, the repressing forces.

The patient, a moderately successful business man of thirty-five, a Jew, requested advice because of mild periodic depressive mood-swings existing since the age of thirty. He was an intelligent man of pyknic physique, with a predominantly syntonic personality. He was the oldest of three children, all sons. The father, a quiet man, had never been an outstanding success and four years previously had lost practically everything of what little he had. The mother had always been the dominant member of the family. The patient bore a strong facial resemblance to the father.

Ambivalent feelings toward the parents became evident early in the patient's life. Thus, at the age of five be began to rebel against their orthodox Jewish customs. At the age of eight or nine he was conscious of a fear that when he grew up he would fall in love with a Gentile girl, the fear being ' What would it do to my parents, especially Mother ? '

An event significant in determining the external course of his life occurred when the patient was sixteen. He became acquainted with a girl of twenty-two, extremely stupid but otherwise attractive, and coming from a family socially much superior to his own. To the patient

she represented merely a convenient opportunity to enjoy for the first time the pleasures of coitus. To his parents, however, and especially to his mother, the girl represented an opportunity to become united with a socially superior family. With great eagerness his parents encouraged the friendship of the young couple, and they took every opportunity to render their son attractive to the girl's father—for example, by overstating his earnings.

The patient at this time knew little of sex. He knew that babies come from coitus, but he was not sufficiently sophisticated to know that those who practise extramarital coitus must give some thought to the matter of contraception. Accordingly, when the girl's uncle one day informed him that she was seven months pregnant, the news came as a rude awakening. He immediately informed his parents, who advised him to marry the girl, partly because they were only too delighted with the match and partly because they conceived this to be the only decent thing a boy under the circumstances could do. The next day, therefore, the patient was married to a girl who by reason of her grossly defective intelligence was unfitted to accompany him in the career which lay before him. Her intelligence may be gauged from the fact that until the patient taught her to do so she was unable to tell time. Her conversation, behaviour, handwriting, etc. made her stupidity apparent at a glance, and the patient was acutely sensitive over her defect, especially as time went on and all his boyhood chums, now successful merchants and professional men, married intellectually competent women. His marriage was so unsuccessful that one year before he saw me he had instituted proceedings for divorce.

As the patient grew up and awoke to the full realization of how life had trapped him, in addition to severely blaming himself he became deeply resentful of his parents, chiefly because of two considerations: (1) Had his parents taken the proper interest in seeing that he learned everything about sex that a young man needs to know, he would in all probability have avoided yielding blindly to his sex impulse; he would have either deferred coitus or given due attention to the necessity of contraception. (2) Had his parents been swayed less by prospects of social advancement and more by considerations of their son's welfare, they would not have looked forward so eagerly to a match between their son and the defective girl. Upon receipt of the news of her pregnancy, they would have properly investigated the matter, particularly in view of the circumstance that her relatives did not make

known the pregnancy until the seventh month. Had his parents made this investigation they might have learned (as the patient himself eventually learned, when it was already too late) that the girl had some years previously had an abortion and that the imputation of injured innocence was in her case absurd. Without necessarily disregarding the principles of justice, they would (in view of the previous abortion) have probably been able to arrange some sort of settlement on the girl, avoiding the needless sacrifice of their son.

These considerations kept gnawing at the feeling of devotion which the patient had for his parents—particularly as the years went by and he found himself increasingly unhappy in his marital adjustment. Nevertheless, for some years he maintained an outward air of devotion, struggling to give his mother a weekly allowance so that she need not suffer hardship from her husband's business failures.

Events in more recent years, however, served to bring his resentment to a focus. In 1923 (six years before the patient consulted me) a younger brother became engaged. He was an irresponsible young man, unable to keep a job and afflicted with gonorrhœa. The patient and his father thought that in fairness to the fiancée these matters should be brought to her attention, but the mother, whose word was law, refused to permit this, saying frankly that the question of honesty was subordinate to the necessity of getting rid of a worthless son. The selfishness of the mother and the powerlessness of the father shocked the patient, and his resentment reached a degree it had not before known.

In 1924 another younger brother contemplated marriage at the age of eighteen. Again the patient and his father opposed the match, in view of the brother's youth and immaturity, and again the mother insisted, telling the others to ' keep out of it '. She of course had her way. This railroading of a mere boy into marriage reminded the patient of his own unpleasant experience. Furthermore, the patient began to appreciate as never before the unreasoning dominance of his mother. ' I saw what a price I paid for peace, and I began to realize that Father must have paid that price many, many times. I began to feel kindlier, more sympathetic toward him '. Also, ' I began to see that she has a way of talking to Father that makes one feel he's inferior '. In still other ways the attitudes of the patient and his mother clashed. For example, the mother wanted the father (who was idle) to take a job paying a small salary ; the patient, however, thought that with such a salary his father would be partially dependent (on the patient) indefinitely, and was therefore of the opinion that the

father should remain idle until he found an opportunity to go back into business, where his chances of earning would be greater. The mother resented the obvious tendency of the patient to ally himself more and more with his father.

The patient's attitude toward his mother began to be openly unfriendly in 1923 and was very much more so in 1924 and in the years following. It is therefore noteworthy that in 1926 he had the following dream: 'My father was away on a trip and I was in bed with Mother and had intercourse with her'. Significant also is his reaction on awakening from the dream: 'I was disgusted. It was such an unconventional thing—why the very thought of it would make a fellow feel ashamed of himself'. At no other time—either before or since—did he dream of coitus with his mother.

In considering how the solitary dream of mother-coitus could occur precisely at a time when the patient's attitude toward his mother was increasingly hostile, two explanations suggest themselves. (1) It is possible that through circumstances unknown the libidinal strivings toward the mother had gradually become intensified, necessitating more and more energetic repressive measures in the form of a strong conscious hostility for which the patient readily found rationalizing explanations. (2) It is possible—and perhaps even probable—that the hostility toward the mother, instead of being compensatory, was indeed engendered by the circumstances to which the patient ascribed it, and that (paradoxical as it may seem) it was precisely this hostility which activated the repressed incest-impulse, allowing it to appear in an undisguised dream of coitus.

In the state of equilibrium that ordinarily exists between the ego and a given forbidden impulse, the latter is submerged to a point where it is no longer capable of overwhelming and disorganizing the personality. When the ego has been strengthened by forces operating counter to the forbidden impulse, may it not be that the impulse is then given further leeway, the ego being, as it were, secure in the knowledge that the increase in its defensive forces is sufficient to counteract the harm that might otherwise result from the greater freedom enjoyed by the impulse? That this may be true is suggested by the case here recorded, in which the desire for mother-coitus was allowed to appear in a dream at a time when the patient's conscious attitude toward his mother was one of decided hostility, i.e. an attitude which might be expected to exert a strong negative influence on that particular desire.

A homely analogy suggests itself. People who tolerate alcohol poorly will hesitate to drink just before they will have occasion to drive an automobile, but when they are at home and consequently protected they may be less averse to gratifying their appetite. Somewhat similarly, in our patient, when external circumstances engendered an attitude of mother-hostility which gave him added protection against his incestuous impulses, the ego, as it were, taking advantage of this added security, granted these impulses a wider sphere of expression.

When one considers the nature of the instincts and the ego, it no longer strikes one as paradoxical that an incest-wish should express itself at a time when the patient is hostile toward his mother. The proper adjustment of the individual involves not a complete annihilation of forbidden instinctual cravings but rather an opportunity for instinctual expression subject only to the one condition that it be compatible with the requirements of the ego. Under ordinary circumstances, then, a libidinal impulse arrogates to itself as much freedom as it can enjoy without jeopardizing the ego-strivings of the personality. When the defensive forces of the ego have been increased, the libidinal impulse may safely be given wider expression.

Max Levin.
(Philadelphia.)

ABSTRACTS

General

Gustav Hans Graber. ' Primal Scene, Play, and Destiny.' *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1935, Vol. IV, No. 3, pp. 467–475.

This analysis of a thirty-year-old woman presenting a mixture of hysterical and compulsive symptoms traces her neurosis and her asocial behaviour to the trauma of the primal scene. Excluded from a mysterious parental play in which she wished to join she became a spoil-sport, compulsively interfering with other children's play, domineering in every situation when possible, and where she could not dominate secluding herself or acting masochistically. With advancing years her aggression was turned more upon herself, with the development of severe anxieties and hypochondriacal symptoms, but continuing to destroy companionship and affection. Symptoms and asocial behaviour disappeared under analysis.

Lucile Dooley.

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Paul Schilder. ' Psychoanalysis and Conditioned Reflexes.' *Imago* 1935, Bd. XXI, pp. 51–66.

Pavlov's psycho-physiology assumes a mosaic-like structure of the organism and the psyche. Schilder's criticism is mainly directed against Pavlov's terms such as excitation, inhibition, irradiation, etc. The concepts which Pavlov attaches to these words are not the same as those used in physiology. The same is true of the conception of the conditioned reflex. ' It is a complicated reaction, a behaviour, in which the personality of the animal, according to Pavlov's own statement, plays an important rôle. . . . The expression reflex loses, in this connection, its specific meaning and only conveys then that one is not interested in the subjective side of the reactions of the animal, but in their objective manifestations.' Schilder shews several examples of holistic reactions in Pavlov's experiments which are an experimental proof of the fundamental facts of the Gestalt-theory. The author's aim is a psycho-analytical understanding of Pavlov's experimental work: He shewed where transference and symbolic thinking were essential conditions in these experiments. But regarding Pavlov's theory this is what he says: ' we have to give up either the concepts of the personality as a whole, and of entities and of configurations in general or Pavlov's theory of the mosaic of excitation and inhibition. The results of Pavlov's experiments are valuable and interesting. His physiology, however, is a pseudo-physiology, a popular mosaic psychology, using a physiological terminology '.

H. A. Thorner.

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Siegfried Bernfeld. ' Über die Einteilung der Triebe.' *Imago*, 1935, Bd. XXI, H. 2, pp. 125–142.

Psycho-analysis has always put forward a dualistic theory of instinct. Originally a distinction was drawn between sexual and ego instincts; more recently, however, we have been accustomed to oppose life and death instincts, Eros and Destruction, or sexuality and aggression. The author here considers whether there has not been a corresponding change in our principle or ' criterion ' of classification and answers this question in the affirmative.

If a classification is to be fruitful, preliminary scientific work is necessary before the material to be classified can be made ripe for it. A study of Freud's *Three Contributions* reveals that the earlier classification was based on the results obtained by the use of the psycho-analytic method. The criterion was a *psycho-analytic* one. In time it was seen that the sexual group had enriched itself at the expense of the ego group to such an extent that the dualistic hypothesis could only be maintained (other than nominally) by introducing a fresh principle of classification. The distinction between ego-libido and object-libido was not derived from any such principle. It marked a transitional phase whose formula might be expressed as follows: ' We wish to maintain a twofold classification of instincts, but the psycho-analytic criterion is inadequate for the purpose '.

The later division of the instincts (erotic and destructive, etc.), however, *is* built up on the basis of a fresh criterion. It is not quite correct to say that the only new element in this classification is the death instinct, that the sexual instincts have simply been rechristened Eros. According to the genetic criterion of the first phase, the psycho-analytic one, sadism would have belonged to the sexual group. The qualities of instinctual manifestations (including, of course, their unifying or disintegrating features) were a matter of indifference. But it is just these qualities which are of the essence of the more recent classification.

It is less easy to state the nature of the fresh criterion. We observe that it covers a far wider field than its predecessor, embracing as it does all living matter. The basis of classification is really similarity of feature. Specific manifestations make a certain impression on us, they have their peculiar *physiognomy*. The science involved here must be topology, the criterion a *topological* one.

H. Mayor.

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Clinical

Leon J. Saul. ' A Note on the Psychogenesis of Organic Symptoms. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1935, Vol. IV, No. 3, pp. 476–483.

The material and case reports presented illustrate the point previously observed that while psychogenic organic symptoms may be symbolizations

of emotional conflicts they need not necessarily be so ' but only incidental results of appropriate and readily comprehensible emotional expressions '. An example is development of a sore throat during sleep from oral breathing while the patient is dreaming of being fed. The oral breathing is a symbolization, the sore throat incidental.

Lucile Dooley.

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Henry Alden Bunker. ' Three Brief Notations relative to the Castration Complex.' *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1935, Vol. IV, No. 2, pp. 341–343.

A passage from Shakespeare's *Richard III* beginning ' I, that am curtailed of this fair proportion ' is applied to herself by a female patient who suffers from castration inferiority. The quotation might serve every woman as an expression of her conviction of being castrated. The Greek myth of Kaineus, who, originally a maid, was permitted to become a man after being raped, and who worshipped only his own spear thereafter, and a dream of a male patient which faithfully though unwittingly reproduced the Crucifixion of Christ are the other two illustrations, from folk literature, of the universal castration complex.

Lucile Dooley.

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P. Noel Hardcastle. ' A Suggested Approach to the Problems of Neuro-Psychiatry.' *Journal of Mental Science*, April, 1935, Vol. LXXXI, p. 317.

This paper is written to shew that ' Behaviourism ' and psychiatric concepts have a relationship to neurology. Previous writers are criticized for not stressing the significance of the post-natal development of the neo-pallium.

The development of the nervous system is described, shewing how the neo-pallium is laid upon and integrated with the paleëncephalon and afferent and efferent fibres develop in advance of the association centres. The ancestral reflex patterns which are present at birth are integrated into more complex ones as the nervous system develops. The laying down of new structure and the integration of the old into the new is a continuous process which goes on until maturity, if integration is not possible at any phase of development, the neural patterns are not annihilated but repressed, the patterns themselves remaining unchanged.

Consciousness is the result of activity at the highest functioning level and two types will be present, one in association with the primary cortical projection areas, and the other at the level of the afferent and efferent tracts at which the association centres have myelinated, which is the highest functioning arc. In the former stimuli will produce a consciousness of sensation only, which will be meaningless and for which there will be no outlet for discharge ; in the latter these sensations will be capable of

integration and a motor response can be affected through the association tracts.

The inter-relationship between these two types of consciousness is discussed. Those cells which are responsible for consciousness also control neural activity at lower levels. As growth proceeds, so the type of control will change in accordance with the neurological structure predominating at that time ; in the later stages when the cortex is assuming major control, then repression and secondary elaboration will be of paramount importance, while projection and introjection *viâ* the primary projection fibres will characterize earlier defence mechanisms.

The capacity for eiditic imagery is also the result of this inter-relationship and is closely related to Freud's conception of hallucinatory thinking. In accordance with Pavlov's findings, that anxiety results from attempts to differentiate stimuli whose difference is subliminal, so anxiety may arise in the infant as a result of his inability to distinguish the real from the eiditic image.

Unconscious mental processes result from activity in those ' neural patterns ' which were not directly integrated to a higher level, but that they effect consciousness by their collateral associations.

The whole concept of treatment is based on the ' unconditioning of reflexes ', but these are not surface ones, but are in association with the neural patterns which were not integrated and were buried deeply in the neurological structure. They are (1) those in association with mental content and (2) those in association with the control which prevented integration. These latter will be in the nature of the relationship which the child had to those in charge of him ; in treatment there must first be a reconditioning of this relationship in regard to the therapist and by this, a working through to the deeper levels.

Author's Abstract.

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CHILDREN

Arthur Ramos. ' O Educador e a Psicanalise.' *Arquivos de Medicina Legal e Identificação,* Rio de Janeiro, 1934, Ano IV, N. 9, pp. 123–128.

The author points out once more how desirable it is that teachers should have satisfactorily resolved their unconscious conflicts, in view of the influence which they exercise in the formation of the child's super-ego, second only in importance to that of the parents themselves.

H. Mayor.

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Melitta Schmideberg. ' The Psychological Care of the Baby.' *Mother and Child,* 1935, Vol. VI, No. 8, pp. 304–308.

The article first discusses the difficulties with which a mother has to contend during pregnancy and after. Unfortunately the fact of her

pregnancy is specially liable to stimulate unconscious hostility and anxiety in those who are in touch with her. One should avoid doing anything calculated to arouse her guilt and reassure her as to her anxieties. The correct psychological care of the mother is a pre-condition for the correct psychological care of the baby.

The evidence at our disposal suggests that the baby's mind is a highly complicated affair. His instincts can never be gratified in full and this gives rise to a state of painful tension. Anxiety results, too, from the existence of conflicting and incompatible instinctual drives.

In the light of this conception of the baby's mind the author proceeds to discuss psychological aspects of feeding, weaning, training in cleanliness, pain and illness, and the desirability or otherwise of various measures adopted in practice. The practical advice given throughout should be very welcome to parents and others confronted with the difficult problems of upbringing.

H. Mayor.

Editha Sterba. ' Aus der Analyse eines Zweijährigen.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, 1934, Jahrg. VIII, No. 1/2, pp. 37–72.

An account of the analysis of a two-year-old boy whose main symptom was chronic constipation. His training in cleanliness had been left to a nursemaid who apparently believed in violence. The processes of excretion were certainly a paramount preoccupation with Georg, who ' at the beginning of the treatment was at the anal stage '. One game played an especially important part in the analysis. Although suggested by the boy's play, it was essentially initiated and exploited by the analyst. It consisted in the analyst performing symbolic acts of defecation (shaking wooden beads out of her sleeve). By questioning his ability to do likewise, she challenged his (excessive) narcissism and his ambition so that these now became concentrated on expulsion. The author attributes the rapid disappearance of the symptom to this device which, she considers, may prove a valuable aid in many cases if properly applied. Inasmuch as Georg was still ' at the anal stage ' when the treatment ended, the author refuses to speculate on his chances of dealing successfully with genital Œdipus conflicts.

H. Mayor.

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Karl A. Menninger. ' A Psychoanalytic Study of the Significance of Self-Mutilations.' *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1935, Vol. IV, No. 3, pp. 408–466.

Self-mutilation, whether in neurotic conditions, in religious rites, in psychotic behaviour as occurring in organic diseases, or in normal customs, represents a surrender of the active rôle by the removal or injury of a part

of the body. It may at the same time satisfy erotic and aggressive cravings and fulfil the need for punishment. The aggressive element may be both active and passive; erotic gratification may be obtained primarily by the attainment of the passive rôle and secondarily by eroticizing the destructive act. The underlying cause of self-mutilation is the conflict between the aggressive destructive impulses and the will to live.

Lucile Dooley.

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APPLIED

Milton H. Erickson. 'A Study of an Experimental Neurosis hypnotically induced in a Case of Ejaculatio Præcox.' *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1935, Vol. XV, pp. 34–50.

The technique of this experiment was suggested by the fact that recovery from an illness or conflict frequently results in the favourable resolution of a second concurrent illness or conflict (e.g. malaria in O.P.I.). The idea was to induce hypnotically a neurosis symbolizing or paralleling the original difficulty. When the patient was forced to abreact the conflict of the induced neurosis, there might occur a transference of the abreactive process to the original difficulty.

The subject of the experiment, an assistant of the author who suffered from ejaculatio præcox, was asked to co-operate in some hypnotic experiments, without knowing of any therapeutic intention. He was deeply hypnotized and then told a story which he was to accept as a real past experience of his own. The story concerned an attractive girl whose beautiful glass ash-tray he had broken by dropping a lighted cigarette into it. He was told that when he woke up he would forget the story, but it would be on his mind and would govern his speech and actions. This in fact occurred—every train of thought was dominated by the implanted complex, there were disturbances in the form of his stream of speech, and he showed phobia-like obsessive behaviour towards ash-trays. He was then re-hypnotized and instructed to remember everything. When awakened, he told the story as an actual experience, then realized it was a hypnotic suggestion. He described his subjective experiences. The result was almost complete cure of his ejaculatio præcox, and the cure has lasted more than a year.

The ultimate soundness of the therapeutic result is questioned, but it is suggested that such hypnotic procedures might be used experimentally in the analysis of personality disturbances, and certain specific problems for future research are outlined.

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W. H. Gillespie.

Desiderius Mosonyi. 'Die Irrationalen Grundlagen der Musik.' *Imago*, 1935, Bd. XXI, S. 205–226.

The author considers that music is implicit in the first cries of the

child ; when such cries are cathected with libido the foundation of music is laid. Rhythm, as a part of music, is to be traced back to the beginnings of walking rather than to the heart beat. Music, itself, begins not with rhythm but with melody, which is a form of the peep-bo game, which has its joy in the return of the known and desired object. Harmony has to do with mass psychology. Like dreams, musical creation is based on the wish.

* I. F. Grant Duff.

Johanna Heimann. ' Die Heilung der Elizabeth Browning in ihren Sonetten.' *Imago*, 1935, Bd. XXI, S. 227–254.

The question which the authoress discusses in this paper is : does Elizabeth Barrett-Browning, in *The Sonnets from the Portuguese*, record the steps of a healing process or was the production of the sonnets in itself therapeutic ?

* I. F. Grant Duff.

Ludwig Pfandl. ' Der Narcissbegriff. Versuch einer neuen Deutung.' *Imago*, 1935, Bd. XXI, h. 3, pp. 279–310.

The author summarizes his own paper in the form of five questions and answers (Rückblick und Zusammenschau, p. 308).

(1) What is the original form of the Narcissus-myth, prior to its poetic elaboration ? The archaic belief in shadow-souls and the danger of encountering them mirrored in water. The fundamental meaning, underlying later elaborations, is that men and women exist who cannot establish natural love relations because they are unhappily fated to love themselves.

(2) What has psycho-analysis contributed to our knowledge of this myth ?

Freud has demonstrated that narcissism is a universal human potentiality and also shewn the relationship of those emanations from the unconscious, myth, fairy-tale, dream and neruosis.

(3) What is the single correct interpretation of the myth ? It is a perfect example of its kind and is nothing but the symbolically disguised æsthetically beautified but clear representation of the neurotic narcissus-complex.

(4) Are alternative interpretations of the myth (as nature-myth, etc.) also valuable ? No. The intimate relation between neurosis and myth allows only the one valid interpretation.

(5) Are alternative interpretations valuable in estimating poems about Narcissus ? It is not the myth but the author who is represented in such poems. We have to enquire here not into the intention of the myth but the reason why the fate of Narcissus appealed to the poet. Only we must not leave out of account the distinction between a subjective (psychoneurotic) and an objective attitude of the poet to the myth.

M. Brierley.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Riddle of the Sphinx. By Géza Róheim. Authorized translation from the German by R. Money-Kyrle. With a Preface by Ernest Jones, M.D. (International Psycho-Analytical Library, London, 1934. Pp. 302. Price 18*s.*)

By no means every work of major importance in anthropology, or even in psycho-analysis, brings such pleasurable excitement to the reader as this volume. The pleasure is in part directly communicated from the author's own zest in his pursuit of a solution to the Riddle, a zest which an excellent translation carries over undiluted. In part it springs from the reader's sense of mental movement in the author, and his so greatly enhanced mastery of his material.

The ease and depth and comprehensiveness of understanding which characterize this book are the outcome of two new inspirations—Róheim's own direct experience of savages, and his use of Melanie Klein's researches in the direct analysis of young children. Together these have led to a far juster appreciation of even the external aspects of man's social history than many non-analytic students display, as well as to a deepened awareness of its inner dynamics. In this picture, savages become human and individual—as human and individual as we who read and write about them. As Róheim himself says, ' My first impression during my field work was that savages were not nearly so savage as the anthropologists ; or in other words, that they are not nearly so mysterious as one would think from reading Tyler, Frazer, Levy-Bruhl, or even Róheim ' (p. 238). And the author's new ability to see people where before he knew only ' totemism ', ' animism ', etc., is paralleled by the way in which he now brings *the child* into the centre of the human psychological drama. He insists that there are ' three actors in the great play : the father, the brothers and the children ' ; and must always have been these three. To the understanding which Freud gave us by shewing us the primal horde of adult sons *vis à vis* the primal father, we must now add the further appreciation of the impact of their struggle upon immature observers, the children. Róheim's use of Melanie Klein's contributions has brought the problem of human origins closer than it was to psychological realities as we know them in the everyday work of analysis.

The book is mainly theoretical in its structure, being Róheim's reflections upon his field work of 1929–31. Its major topics are the primal religion, Central Australian Totemism, the ontogenetic interpretation of culture, and the problem of human origins ; with a series of addenda on general points, which contain some of the most illuminating reflections. A wealth of significant fact, and not a little new material, is, however, woven into the theoretical texture, and constitutes at least half its value

and charm. This being the first occasion on which a trained analyst has had the opportunity for first-hand observations in the field, it was bound to yield not merely fruitful theories but new and significant data. Here was an observer who was not only free to notice and record those details of ritual, myth and custom, and nuances of expression in social relations, which fall upon the blind spots of non-analytic students, and to pursue questions which do not even exist for these others, but who was able to get into a deeper emotional rapport with his savage friends, and obtain not only their dreams, but their free associations and comments. In this way he could draw upon pre-conscious mental data inaccessible to ordinary observers, and, above all, could interpret unconscious feelings and phantasies. Finally, he could watch with full appreciation the play of savage children, and win new data from his talks with them. How fruitful these resources were is already known to readers of *The Róheim Australasian Research Number* of this JOURNAL,[1] in which the bulk of the new facts and perspectives was published; but plenty more are offered here, incidentally to theoretical analysis.

The detailed material is far too rich and varied to lend itself either to summary or to quotation, but at every point one has the sense that Róheim's views keep close to the immediate data.

Róheim points out how much not merely implicit interpretation but witting or unwitting selection of descriptive fact there has always been in anthropological records. Strehlow, for instance, does not realize that action and song in the various totemic cults are determined not only by the totem animal but also by the place. Spencer and Gillen nowhere mention that totemic ceremony is the dramatization of a myth. Spencer in fact missed the connection between song, myth and ritual because he could not translate the songs, and therefore simply maintained that they were unintelligible to the aborigines themselves.

Psycho-analysts, again, taking their facts either from other arm-chair anthropologists or from inadequately equipped field workers, are liable to build elaborate theories upon false or too meagre data. Laforgue, for example, supposes that ' what we call orgasm is often only achieved under quite special conditions, e.g. group dances and ecstasies, or during coitus as a religious ceremonial ',[2] a supposition which contradicts all the facts. Neither Róheim nor Malinowski found psycho-sexual impotence or female frigidity and perversions among the savage or half-savage people of his acquaintance. Again, Laforgue uses the supposed greater conservatism of savages to support his view that they have more anxiety than civilized races. Róheim shows that the supposed fact is itself extremely doubtful.

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[1] *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, Vol. XIII, Pts. 1 and 2.

[2] R. Laforgue, *Libido, Augst und Zivilisation*, 1932, p. 32.

Taking ' The Riddle of the Sphinx ' as his starting point, although here and there making an excursion to Indo-European phenomena, and making use, amongst a wealth of other material, of Ernest Jones' studies *On the Nightmare*,[3] Róheim concerns himself mainly with the peoples of Central Australia. He shows that whilst totemism in its classical home of Central Australia, with its myths of ancestors, puberty rites, ceremonies of multiplication and *Tjurunga*, is the esoteric official religion of the adult and initiated males during the tribal assemblies of the rainy season, another religion of sphinx-like demons, with the medicine-man as its exponent, a mythology of folk tales, rites to cure or to make ill, pointing bones and magical stones as cult objects, predominates at other seasons, when the people wander in small family groups ; and is at all times the religion of the women and children. The demons, in contrast to the well-formed ancestors of the totemic world, appear as every sort of misshapen monster, and above all are characterized by enormous genitals and cannibalistic habits. Whatever form of magical activity we investigate in Central Australia, whether to heal or destroy—we always find the people doing something that involves their belief in demons. And ' all forms of aggressive magic may be reduced to the same formula : something is taken out of the sorcerer's body and shot into that of the sick person ' (p. 63). Whether this something which is ' sung ' in the magical songs be bone or stick, snake or stone, it reveals the same unconscious content. ' The sorcerer really does one of two things : either he uses the symbolic penis to have intercourse with his victim, or he sucks out the sickness ' (p. 64). And he can use his magical weapons in defence of the common good, throwing his stones and other projectiles at the devil and so killing or at least frightening him away. Yet he is but a helpful version of the devil himself. The devil who eats his way into people and the devil with the giant penis illustrate the enormous importance of projection in infantile phantasy, since they reflect the primary impulses of the child who wishes to bite or bore his way into the mother with his teeth or penis. The sorcerer, who sucks out the evil from his patients, behaves like the devil ; he regresses to the oral stage and identifies his patient's body with the mother's breast. The psychological sources of the pre-totemic demon cult thus lie in the earliest anxieties of the child, associated with sexual tension. ' The anxiety associated with the parental *imagines* originates mainly in the primal scene, but it is also partly conditioned by the oral aggression of the infant and the unsatisfied impulses of the boy or girl. Because the boy wishes to castrate his father in the primal scene, he fears the castrating father in the person of the cannibalistic being on to whom he projects his own aggressive impulses. But a wish is concealed behind

[3] E. Jones : *On the Nightmare*. Hogarth Press, 1931.

the fear, namely the wish of the negative Œdipus complex to be turned into a woman by the great penis of the demon father. A further complication is introduced by the fact that the desired coitus may itself be represented by the idea of having the penis eaten, the feared object being here the cannibalistic mother with the giant vagina. Primitive forerunners of the true super-ego also play a part, the authority which punishes the Œdipus wishes being usually a female cannibalistic demon to the girl and a male demon to the boy ' (pp. 40–41).

' In aggressive magic we find a phantasy reaction of the boy, who on witnessing the primal scene has an erection and desires to kill the father ; whereas in healing magic we have the identification of the sick body with the mother and the sucking out of something which symbolizes milk or the father's penis. But strictly speaking, the primal scene is involved in the second procedure also. The boy tries to undo what has been done and to remove the father's penis from the mother ' (p. 68)—a conclusion which Róheim is able to confirm by the dreams of a celebrated Pitchentara sorcerer. The Pitchentara initiation for sorcerers has the same relation to other Central Australian initiations as a comparatively open representation of a given theme has to the more symbolic and disguised version. ' The sorcerer adopts a feminine and masochistic attitude towards the father in order that he may more readily adopt a masculine and sadistic attitude towards other men. The stones of sickness are put into him and he becomes a sorcerer : he shoots the same stones into others and they become ill. His soul is eaten, he eats the souls of children. But the demon remains at the centre of the picture ; since the sorcerer has been initiated by the phallic devil, he is himself half a devil ' (p. 81).

Róheim then proceeds to re-examine the latent meaning of Central Australian totemism, and its relation to the demons of this area. His field observations emphasize the important conclusion that the ceremonies are the acting out of the myths of the ancestors, and the accompanying songs are expositions of the story ; song, myth and ritual being exactly co-ordinated. The idea of the totemic rites is to represent the whole of the ancestral wanderings from the departure to the metamorphosis into *Tjurunga*. But this representation has to be accommodated to varying real circumstances : as much is acted out as time and circumstances, weather, food, material allow. As carried out, they thus constitute a compromise between the ideal and the real. The whole apparatus of totemic culture seems to be much more plastic than had hitherto been realized, this being another respect in which Róheim brings the savage nearer to ourselves. Moreover, the multiplicity of rites and myths, with their endless variety of detail, can be readily reduced, for theoretical purposes, to certain recurrent themes of a major pattern, and one which yields insight into their unconscious significance.

Certain changes in emphasis of the total pattern of the totemic rites result from Róheim's first-hand observations. Most significant is the fact that he now holds that the ceremonial trembling or *alknantama* is not a mere side issue, but absolutely central to the whole ceremony. It recurs in all imitative rites. The Arunda use *erooma* as a synonym or explanation of *alknantama*, and *erooma* means ' to tremble ', and definitely to tremble from erotic excitement. This represents the central mystery, namely, parental intercourse. When one of Róheim's friends, in giving free associations to a dream, was asked whether he had witnessed parental intercourse, he answered, ' I have seen my father at a ceremony '. The parents of the Pindupi infant forbid only two things to their children : to see parental coitus and to take part in totemic rites. ' Leliltukutu's dream proves, however, that the children do observe the sexual act. The fear of the father represses this experience, together with the incestuous impulse associated with it ; but the totemic ritual offers a substitute and a sublimated form of gratification. What was forbidden is now raised into the sphere of the super-ego and has thus become compulsory and socially valuable. Great was the danger of a conflict between the performers in the sexual play and the audience, between the father and the son. But this is all over, for both act together. On the stage an older man trembles with sexual excitement and the youths encourage him : " Do it well ! Tremble ! " But they can also terminate the scene. One of the group of observers comes forward and lays his hands on the trembling figure. . . .

' In the rite the end pleasure is not represented. The ritual offers another form of gratification to the son, that of interrupting his father in the sexual act. He is no longer excluded ; he is initiated into the sexual mystery. This indeed is the " official ", that is, the conscious, meaning of the initiation rite, which introduces the sons into the hitherto forbidden realm of sex ' (pp. 115–116).

Róheim then goes on to emphasize the fact that the connection between totemism and initiation is much closer than has so far appeared. ' On the one hand, only the initiated can take part in the totemic cult. On the other, the initiation is strictly totemic and consists in a series of cult actions, circumcision and subincision, resting, like the other rites, on totemic myths and being accompanied by totemic ritual songs. The fact that the totemic cult (i.e. coitus) is a privilege of adults is also stressed by other dreams ' (p. 116). In some cults *intichiuma* ceremonies terminate initiation rites. This theme is then developed still further. ' A study of the puberty rites helps us to formulate the transition from demon belief to totemism more precisely. The initiation ceremonies separate the exoteric belief in demons from the esoteric totemic doctrine. The women and children are told that a demon, *Tuanyiraka*, converts the youths into

men, but the initiates are told that there is no *Tuanyiraka*, only ancestors and the *tjurungas* which incorporate them ' (p. 148).

' But what is the real meaning, the significance and structure of totemic mythology ? It is clear from an analysis of the songs that the recurrent elements are either borrowed from each other, or—and this is probably the most important development—that the migration sagas have been made up by combining a number of originally short songs and rites. Indeed there is really only one rite, the *alknantama*, which is carried out for different places. The corresponding element in the myth is either the ancestral *alknantama* (which produced the germs of children) or the metamorphosis into *tjurungas*. The whole wandering is only an introduction to this event, and it is probable that in the original rite only the metamorphosis into *tjurungas*, that is, the coitus of the ancestors, was represented (*alknantama*). The present complicated structure is formed by adding the migration theme, the latent meaning of which is again the sexual act. On the one hand, actual historic wanderings have been introduced into the myth, and on the other, names of places which, owing to some local peculiarity, determine the content and the amalgamation of the various saga themes ' (p. 138).

' We can at last understand the essential difference between the two forms of Central Australian religion. The belief in devils begins with the anxiety reaction to the primal scene. The child sees the copulating parents ; but in the projected version of this memory, in the version which denies the original content, those who copulate are not the parents but non-human devils. The anxiety is, however, fixed on real beings, chiefly animals, since the observation of animal coitus serves as a cover-memory for the primal scene. In the place of the devils we find the phallic wild-cat ancestors and the double *tjurungas* with whom the men identify themselves and whose coitus they imitate in the ritual performance. The flying dream is an erection dream ; and for this reason the sorcerer dreams he is an eagle-hawk, and the performers in the ritual decorate themselves with eagle-down. After the initiation the youth again sees the primal scene, but this time in a sublimated super-ego-syntonic form. Humanity first tries to dispose of the disturbing content (primal scene) by projection (devils) ; but introjection follows the failure of this attempt. The boy is first told stories of the devil Tuanyiraka, then he is told that he himself or his double, the *tjurunga*, is a *tuanyiraka*. . . .

' . . . The re-introjection of these beings occurs only after the initiation ceremony. Then they are changed from anthropophagous and phallic demons into protecting ancestors who are removed from all contact with women ; anxiety gives way to reverence, love and identification ' (pp. 156–157).

Róheim now takes up the problem of the ontogenetic interpretation

of culture, reviewing some of his work already published in this JOURNAL,[4] regarding the Duau and Central Australian people. It will be remembered that he holds that the specific character of both these peoples and their social organization may be derived from an infantile trauma and explained as a defence reaction to specific infantile experiences. He goes on: 'If analysis discloses the connection between infantile experience and the fate of individuals, it is self-evident that the insight gained can be applied to the fate of peoples. But, so far, words have seduced us into treating peoples as super-individuals and hunting for traumata in their early history. Thus we saw events analogous to infantile traumata in the conflict between peoples or in catastrophes of the external world' (p. 166). He claims that with the discovery that certain peoples have certain habits in their treatment of their children which produce traumata analogous to those discovered in analysis, we are provided with a *vera causa*, since the manner in which such infantile traumata influence the super-ego and the character is well known from clinical analysis. 'In our relations with our children we live again our own childhood and satisfy the libidinal impulses that have not been otherwise fulfilled' (p. 169). He admits that the first part of this proposition is only an expression of a vicious circle from a typical trauma to a typical super-ego structure and back again to a repetition of the same trauma; but thinks that a way out of the circle is suggested by its second part: 'In our relations with our children we satisfy the libidinal impulses that have not been otherwise fulfilled'.

'A problem of greater importance arises from the ontogenetic interpretation of specific human cultures. If we assume that differences in the treatment of children determine differences in culture, we must also suppose that the origin of culture in general, that is, the emergence of mankind, was itself determined by traumata of ontogenesis to be found in the parent-child relation among the anthropoids or pre-human beings from whom we are descended. Analysis teaches us that super-ego and character, the moral attitudes that are independent of reality, of the current situation, result from infantile experience. The possession of these moral attitudes is specifically human; it separates man from his pre-human forebears' (p. 171). What is the relation between the ontogenetic conception of culture and the primal horde theory? Here Róheim enters upon what, to the reviewer's mind, is the most interesting and significant part of the book, viz. the problem of human origins. 'If we attempt to derive the specific traits of individual cultures from the infantile experience of the individuals who live in these cultures, we must admit the possibility of describing the origin of culture in general in ontogenetic

[4] *Róheim Australasian Research Number.*

terms, that is, of deriving it from a specifically human form of childhood, from a permanent, universal, and at the same time historic, cause.

' There remain, however, certain elements that cannot easily be derived from the Œdipus complex as it is played out in the individual family. I refer to the myths. . . . They describe the conflicts between the one and the many, between the super-man and humanity. Moreover, they are often concerned with some event in the primeval history of man, with some decisive change, such as the origin of civilization or of a particular culture, that is associated with their tragedy ' (pp. 173–174).

Róheim then considers in detail a series of what he calls *primal horde myths*, in which the fundamental element is that of a super-man opposed to the rest of mankind—a super-man who swallows and eats up the younger members of the tribe. There are many variants of these myths, but they agree in general structure and in some secondary details.

' In the first place, a whole series of mythical traits identify the cannibalistic monster, whether he appears in human or animal form, as a parent of the growing hero. In a few variants the monster is a female being, or there are two monsters, man and wife. Usually, however, he is a single being, half-way between a man and a boar, whose masculinity is especially stressed by his tusks. In the dreams I have analysed in Duau the wild pig is indeed the father, and we may observe without irrelevance that the aborigines always castrate the boars in their villages.

' Why does the father become a cannibalistic monster who eats up all the people and is finally killed by his son ?

' . . . the son wishes to have intercourse with his mother, and for this reason the father who possesses her becomes a monster to be destroyed. Another outstanding feature of the myth is that it refers to a primeval event, and that the giant father threatens to destroy the whole of mankind and not only the one son. The son appears to accomplish the heroic deed alone, or with the assistance of one brother, but actually he is the " hero ", in Rank's sense of the word, that is, a representative of the brother horde. The myth does not expressly say " The brothers at last united and threw their spears (or better, stones) at the monster ", but " The hero performed the deed with many spears ". Other traces of the horde are to be found in the helping animals, and in the duality of the brothers. Even to-day the Central Australians only count four by saying two and two, and anything above this number is simply " many ". But there must have been a time in human history when unity and plurality were the only arithmetical concepts. Then " two brothers " meant " many brothers ". The conclusion of the Kai saga betrays the collective murder in a very characteristic manner. The brothers, who had killed their father and thus put themselves in his place, were *killed by everyone united together* ' (pp. 188–190).

'The possibility of interpreting a myth at two different layers (ontogenetic and phylogenetic) can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, the phylogenetic material derives an ontogenetic force from each succeeding generation. But we may also suppose that the ontogenetic factor was already operative in primeval times; the primal father's power was not only real (i.e. muscular) but also ideal (i.e. a derivative of traumatic experiences in the childhood of his sons)' (pp. 190–191).

Róheim now turns to the striking material offered to the psychologist by Zuckerman's studies of the baboons and higher apes, material of which he makes admirable use. Readers of this JOURNAL are doubtless familiar with Zuckerman's book,[5] but may be reminded of certain essential points. Amongst the higher apes in the wild it would appear that solitary males, harems and family groups may all be found. As regards the baboons on Monkey Hill, there is reason to believe that the socio-sexual responses are much the same as in the wild, except that aggression becomes intensified since there is no means of escape from the open fight. A great deal of aggression occurs, mostly sexual in origin, and in these protracted and savage fights the females almost invariably get killed. There is no simple promiscuity but definite family groups of one overlord and one or more females, with unmated bachelors attached to the family groups watching their chance. Amongst the group as a whole certain males are dominant, in the sense that they obtain a larger number of females, a greater amount of food and are feared although challenged by the other males. The sexual impulses are diffuse and independent of the reproductive cycle, homosexual as well as heterosexual activities occurring. Sexual attraction is made use of in social relations—e.g. as a bribe to older or stronger males, in order to get more food or to get help in a fight. One male offers himself homosexually to a second in order to win him as an ally against a third; to pacify the anger of a dominant male for making an attempt upon his wife; to turn away the wrath of an enemy; or, most interestingly of all, to trap a male into a position in which he can be attacked. Fights occurring between any two males usually draw in other members of the group, sometimes all the members of the colony, but they never start as an attack of all the unmated males. If for any reason a dominant overlord begins to lose his power one or more unmated bachelors may attack and overcome him. There is a readiness for mutual attack bound up with this relation of dominance, although when the group as a whole is attacked by an outsider or a human being the members will fly to each others' aid.

Certain similarities with human beings can be seen. The sexual cycle is not chained to reproduction; mating can occur at any time, although

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[5] S. Zuckerman: *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes*. Kegan Paul, 1932.

desire is more active in the female in certain physical states. The sexual impulse is diffuse, homosexual as well as heterosexual, and is highly socialized. It is used in the service of personal and individual ends which are themselves non-sexual. There is a permanent sexual association both in man and in other primates. The nucleus of the societies of monkeys and apes is a family party, of the overlord and his harem held together by the interest of the male in his females and by their interest in their young. The harem forms the nucleus when several family parties unite to form a herd ; but the herd never appears to be so stable and united as a family, which never loses its identity within the larger group. Róheim emphasizes the fact that in the community of monkeys and apes ' the death of any single individual upsets the state of balance, and fighting commonly breaks out before a new equilibrium is reached ' (p. 194).

' We will now try to follow the road through the almost impenetrable thicket that separates the anthropoid apes from the first forms of human culture. For some reason or other the period of infancy was prolonged in a certain group of anthropoids ; the libidinal ties between parents and children became narrower, and the infantile ego was burdened with a form of sexuality to which it was not yet grown. Defence mechanisms were developed and the unhappy apes acquired two remarkable faculties : *They could treat and enjoy the past as if it were the present* (*the primal scene as an endopsychic element*), *and could deny the reality of the present* (*the parental coitus*). The capacity to *retain the past* caused the transition from the " dominance " of the ape horde to the " gerontocracy " of the Australian. In the ape horde, the old man keeps everything for himself, but only so long as his strength lasts. In the human horde, his power is prolonged ; he has the best bits even when he is weak with age and his son is a strong and full-grown man. We can understand the exact mechanism of this privilege. Eating symbolizes sexual intercourse, the wife and the mother. The child was not strong enough to snatch the mother from the father, and the man, although he is no longer deprived of women, must dispense with certain kinds of food. Such food is charged with the *arunkulta* (magic power) of the old men, and this magic power is sexual potency ; it is derived from the great penis that impressed the boy in the primal scene. The old men are given special gifts of food (*tjaurilja*) in payment for their ceremonies. Their power consists in that they perform these rites, and so repeat the primal scene. Thus the psychologically retained past is a falsification of reality, or better, a compromise with reality. The real present is fused with the ideal past. The old men are still the stronger, the power belongs to them, but they do not keep everything for themselves, regulation has taken the place of dominance.

' A second essential difference between men and animals is the greater

importance of aim-inhibited impulses. " Lousing " is the chief activity in all descriptions of the lives of apes—though this is not really lousing, or at least not exclusively, but a mutual examination of the fur to remove all projecting bits of skin, thorns, or parasites. As Watson writes: " Flea catching . . . is the most fundamental and basal form of social intercourse between Rhesus monkeys. . . ." [6] According to Zuckerman: " The performance seems to have sexual significance not only because of its gentle stimulation of numerous cutaneous end organs, but also because it is sometimes accompanied by direct sexual activity. For this reason and because of its frequent expression it is perhaps legitimate to regard the picking reaction and the stimulus of hair as factors involved in the maintenance of a social group of sub-human primates ".[7]

' We are concerned with an impulse for the erotic stimulation of the skin, that is, with a fore-pleasure activity. Since undeveloped individuals are incapable of end-pleasure in the full meaning of the word, we must regard fore-pleasure activities as the forms of sexual gratification adequate to the period of infancy. The prolongation of this period must therefore cause a permanent fixation to such behaviour and so provide a wide basis for the development of social impulses. Fore-pleasure without end-pleasure involves a permanence of love without discharge ' (pp. 228–230).

' The prolongation of infancy thus produces two characteristics, both derivatives of Eros, that form the basis of humanity. The psychological fixation on the past and the aim-inhibited impulses derived from fore-pleasure activities are equivalent to what in common language are known as *tradition* and *society*. If the first years of life retain their pleasure value permanently it is understandable that man should try " to follow in the footsteps of his ancestors " (*mbatjalkatiuma*) and to re-live the past in the persons of his own children. Hence fixation gives rise to mythology, the cult of ancestors, and history. Aim-inhibited impulses, on the other hand, involve the capacity to retain affects at a constant tension, and thus new possibilities were offered to the integrating, all-embracing tendency of Eros. . . .

' Aggressive impulses also are characterized by the absence of adequate discharge. The modifications which the inhibiting super-ego produces in them are likewise closely associated with the family situation, that is, with the Œdipus complex and the primal scene. The father, who prohibits the fulfilment of the boy's wishes, becomes a part of the boy's own personality. The jealous old man becomes a jealous god who sees to it that we are not happy ' (pp. 230–231).

' *Primus in orbo deos fecit timor*—the *primum movens* is first the anxiety

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[6] J. B. Watson: *Imitation in Monkeys, Psych. Bull.*, v. 169–178.

[7] Zuckerman, *op. cit.* 58.

which leads to repression, and then the repression which leads to the formation of substitutes. Behind the anxiety we find the infantile primal scene and the reaction of the child to what is not yet an adequate form of pleasure to him. Human morality is really an infantile morality; end-pleasure is condemned, fore-pleasure permitted. The retention of the infantile pleasure-situation involves an elimination of end-pleasure and a permanent fixation on the fore-pleasure, that is, the piling up of tension without discharge. This holds both for libidinal and for aggressive impulses, as Freud saw long ago when he pointed out that the restriction of ego aggressiveness always increased that of the super-ego' . . .

'Thus cultural progress is correlated with a growth in the strength of the super-ego at the expense of genital impulses. Fictional authorities gain the upper hand and they are harder to deal with than real ones. At the Australian level we observe how the unconscious retention of the primal scene preserves strength to the old and childhood to the young' (p. 232).

Róheim now takes up the disputed problem of the 'group mind'.

'Our first difficulty concerns the survival of all those myths which we recognize as reflections of the primal battles. Verbal communication is the only vehicle of traditional continuity we know of; but *ex hypothesi*, the primal horde epoch must have been over before the development of speech. We have already outlined the escape from this difficulty. There are play battles, excluding the tragic outcome, as well as real battles in the ape horde. The dramatic rites may have developed from these and so have represented the battle and the defeat of the one against the mass. If so, a text and a myth gradually arose out of the emotional noises that first accompanied the action at a time when *homo alalus* was a past stage of development and man had already learnt the rudiments of speech. This text must have been first expressed in the present tense, like many Australian songs, for it accompanied the dramatic action in which the great father fell and the sons triumphed.

'What did this dramatic performance mean to the growing generation? It was a sublimation, sanctioned by the group, of their own ontogenetically developed Œdipus complexes, wherein the stronger the tendency to retain the infantile primal scene in the unconscious, the smaller the probability of an actual revolt, the wider the gap between dream and reality, and the greater the social rôle of the ritual drama. The actors knew that they were acting, and that the text referred to the past. Indeed a remarkable feature of the Central Australian tradition seems to prove the text to be later than the ritual. The myths tell of the rites performed by the primal ancestors, the present performances being treated not as repetitions of primal events but as weak echoes of primal representations. The action has become fictive before the tradition, in the full sense of the

word, arose. Such fictive group actions were the first cultural possessions of mankind, the first collective sublimations to be handed down in a finished state ' (pp. 234–235).

It is interesting to find Arnold Toynbee, in his book *A Study of History*,[8] expressing much the same view : ' The entire spiritual development of Man presupposes the existence of group-associations with definite limits. First and foremost, it is impossible that Man's most important tool, speech—the first thing that makes him human and the first thing that created the conditions for building up our formulated thinking—can have been fashioned in the single human being or in the relation of parents to children. Speech grows out of the need for communication between equals who are bound together by common interests and by a regulated system of intercourse.' [9]

In the most significant of his various addenda, Róheim discusses the biological principle of retardation, which has been elaborated by Bolk among others. In man this principle expresses itself in a constant slowing down of the speed of individual development and a constant increase in the age of maturity. Róheim considers that ' Everything in the organism that tends to retain stimuli at a certain tension, everything that opposes libido, end-pleasure, and also the relief of death, all defence mechanisms (repression, regression) must be conceived as differentiated forms of the retardation process. The ever-increasing difficulty, for the individual, of becoming independent, that is, adult, and the fact that savages strongly oppose the sexual impulse only in their puberty rites, while civilization tries to suppress infantile sexuality as well, can be explained as a special case of the ever-growing tendency to retardation ' (p. 253). And he quotes with approval the studies of G. Bally, who applies the same principles to the development of the ego and the function of play. Róheim says, ' The make-believe of young animals becomes a life-long, socialized, and serious attitude of primitive man, and finally in its endless ramifications gives rise to our own civilization ' (p. 265).

Finally, we may allow Róheim himself to sum up the essential elements in his present view of human origins :

' The way has been long, and now that we are at our goal it will not be superfluous once again to glance back at our starting-point. If instead of thinking of " savages " in the mass we remember living people we have known, like old Yirramba or Ramoramo, we shall seek to explain the peculiarities of their behaviour from their lives, rather than from a hypothetical primal age. The first step we made on this new road was the discovery that Central Australian totemism (ancestral cult) has a fore-

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[8] A. Toynbee : *A Study of History*, 3 vols., 1934.

[9] Vol. I., p. 174.

runner in the belief in demons which are projections of the copulating and therefore, to the child, terrifying parents. The totemic cult is a second endeavour to master these impressions, this time by introjection, by means of a social and dramatic representation of the primal scene.

' I discovered also that individual civilizations could be derived from typical traumata of infancy, and that their structure represents a defence against and sublimated repetition of these traumata. According to the ontogenetic theory, the character of a civilization is perpetuated by a vicious circle, the specific form of the infantile trauma in any group being itself conditioned by unsatisfied components of the normal sexual lives of the adults in this group. We may suppose, though we cannot prove, that constitutional factors provide the minimal differentiations on which are built up the specific libidinal habits of adults in dealing with their children. The differential features of individual civilizations are ontogenetic. On the one hand, the same traditional content, the same sublimation forms of the infantile traumata, are handed down ; and on the other, the same traumata are repeated. Thus arises the stability of a culture and the psychological effectiveness of its traditional institutions. The assumption of a collective psychology becomes either unnecessary or comprehensible.

' We then raised the question of the extent to which the primal-horde hypothesis is still essential. If the fate of individuals and of individual cultures can be explained ontogenetically in terms of their infantile experience, it is natural to look for a similar explanation of the development of what is common to men, namely, culture in the widest sense of the word. If we can fully explain the rites and ideas of living savages ontogenetically, the primal-horde hypothesis seems to be superfluous. Against this view we may cite those myths which seem incomprehensible without the primal battle, as well as reliable data on the lives of higher apes having a social organization strongly reminiscent of Freud's hypothetical primal horde. But if, following Freud, we assume that man or pre-man once lived in a primal horde, there remains the difficult problem of the transition from this stage to the stage of genuine human society. The inadequate satisfaction of the victors and the postponed obedience to the slain father, the two motives suggested by Freud, seem insufficient to account for so great a change. The primal-horde state must have lasted very long and it is difficult to see how the lack of satisfaction could have accumulated with time. If this cause was insufficient in the first generation, why should it be so in the hundredth ? Moreover, the motive of post-mortal obedience, which we know in clinical practice, is not such a general phenomenon as could appear as an individual parallel to phylogenetic development. There are two actors on the stage in the Freudian drama, the primal father and the brother horde. The great change occurs in the minds

of the brothers. But this contradicts experience. To-day real changes occur only in the minds of children, and this must have been so always. If our hypothesis is correct there were three actors in the great play; the father, the brothers, and the children, that is, the undeveloped members of the horde, the observers. Thus the primal battle becomes a very comprehensible trauma; for, among higher apes, the child clings to the mother in its terror and is often squashed in the fight. According to Zuckerman's description, primal fight and primal scene immediately succeed each other. The young in the ape horde are treated as sexual objects from the beginning. There is no shortage of traumatic experiences, both real and libidinal. We have assumed that the change had occurred in the observers by the repression of the infantile experiences. This repression was followed by a return of the repressed in the form of substitute actions (play battles), which gradually tended to replace the real fights. But when did the repression begin? Why is there no civilization among animals? We can answer this question when we know that progress in the animal world coincides with a prolongation of the infancy period. Man develops more slowly than all other animals, so that his unripe ego is more influenced by the traumatic experiences of infancy. In the polygamous primal horde the unsatisfied libido of the many wives flows towards their children, who are therefore especially fixed on their mothers and susceptible to the experiences of the Œdipus situation. . . .

'We may make the following suppositions concerning the development of ape society, based on the principle of dominance, into human forms of organization. The difference between a gerontocratic primal society and the society of the higher apes is to be found in the permanence of the infantile situation. Apes are ruled by actual force, but in human society the old man always remains the powerful father of the first period of infancy, who in the rites re-acts the primal scene in a sublimated form. In the infantile situation we acquire the capacity to inhibit our aggressiveness; and because this inhibition spreads over other spheres, it exerts a decisive influence on the development of culture. . . . The severity of the super-ego grows with the damming of aggression; *we do not eat every other child, but we " educate " them all instead. . . .*' (pp. 280–284).

It would seem ungracious to attempt any criticism of a book which gives so generous a harvest of understanding and so rich a stimulus to further investigation: and indeed few criticisms seem called for. One could perhaps point out that Róheim might go further in his use of the important concepts yielded by Melanie Klein's investigations into the psychic life of very young children, and the brilliant suggestions offered in the paper[10] by Melitta Schmideberg on psychotic mechanisms in

[10] Melitta Schmideberg: 'The Rôle of Psychiotic Mechanisms in Cultural Development', this JOURNAL, Vol. XI, Pt. 4, pp. 387–418.

cultural development. His grasp of the manifold diversity of the child's feelings and phantasies is not perhaps precise enough or bold enough. For instance, much of the material connected with the function and technique of the sorcerer, and with the diverse meanings of the *waninga* and the Milky Way, would be clarified if greater use were made of the phantasies of the 'good' and 'bad' internalized objects, the 'good' and 'bad' mother, the 'good' and the 'bad' internalized penis, and all the complicated interplay between the diverse aspects of these primal *imagines*. One could put this another way, and say that Róheim over-emphasizes the child's feelings about the 'bad', dangerous, sexual parents, whether external or internal, and underestimates in his total picture both the significance of the good *imagines* and of the child's own wish to preserve the 'good' penis and the 'good' mother, as the sources upon which life itself depends, of everything that is good, whether milk, potency or love. Here and there in his material there are hints of this, as, for example, in his description of the helping and healing functions of the sorcerer. But neither with regard to the sorcerer nor the Milky Way myths is this positive side brought out with sufficient emphasis. The internal drama of the child's mental life is thus both somewhat toned down and slightly distorted. As the recent work of Melanie Klein, Joan Riviere and others has shown, the deepest conflict for the child arises not so much from the simpler problem of the sexual tension aroused by the sexuality of the parents, as from his own impulses of love and hate. Even the sexual parents are good to him in their aspects of potency and fertility.

One may wish, therefore, that Róheim might write a further addendum in which his material was worked over once again, in the light of this still deeper understanding of primordial psychological issues.

Susan Isaacs.

*

Psychology and Health. By H. Banister. (Cambridge University Press, London, 1935. Pp. 256. Price 7*s.* 6*d.* net.)

The author, who has no medical qualification, sets out to give an account of the pathological connection between the mind and body. The book is one of a large number that has appeared in the last few years. Chapters are given on The Problem Child, Infantile Sexuality (in order to deny its existence), The Effects of Ill Health, Anxiety States (neurasthenia), Janet's Theories, Freud's Theories, Jung's Theories, Adler's Theories, etc. Psycho-analysis is extensively considered, but the passages dealing with it are riddled with gross misunderstandings and misstatements. A more energetic reviewer than the present one would perhaps work through all these seriatim, and supply the necessary corrections. Such a task, however, would be boring to both the writer and the reader. Nor is it necessary, because the author has not produced any original misunderstandings of his own. The only puzzling thing about this class of book is that the

author does not think it worth while to consult, before publishing it, someone who has studied the subject. E. J.

✶

Ett Sexual-problem. By Alfhild Tamm. (Tidens Förlag, Stockholm, 1930. Pp. 119. Price 2.25 *Kr.*)

A statement of psycho-analytical views on the nature of the sexual instincts, with particular reference to infantile sexuality. The author pleads for a more tolerant attitude towards the manifestations of the latter. J. C. F.

✶

Sacrifice to Attis. By William A. Brend. (William Heinemann Ltd., London, Toronto, 1936. Pp. 350. Price 10*s.* 6*d.* net.)

In this book Dr. Brend traces, with admirable lucidity, the development of the Christian attitude to sex. The characteristic asceticism is not derived from the Old Testament or from Christ; but from St. Paul and the early Fathers, who, being themselves neurotic, evolved a religion that gave 'those who suffer from morbid emotions towards their parents an opportunity of relieving their sense of guilt'.[1] In course of time, the repressive morality, which originated in this way, permeated the whole structure of law and education. Thus the Church ended by fostering the very anxieties it was created to relieve.

So far so good: but all this 'psycho-historical' survey is subsidiary to Dr. Brend's main and most surprising thesis, namely, that of all the consequences of repressive morality the most pernicious is the depression of the birth-rate. A lower birth-rate may, or may not, be a rational object of alarm. But its cause would seem to be a decreased, rather than an increased, asceticism, passion without procreation being no longer regarded as a sin. Roger Money-Kyrle.

✶

A Marriage Manual. By Hannah and Abraham Stone. (Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1936. Pp. 352. Price 7*s.* 6*d.* net.)

This book is cast in the form of answers to inquiries made by a hypothetical couple seeking information before marriage. Undeterred by lengthy medical disquisitions on the complications of venereal disease, the patient couple persist with their questions and are rewarded to the extent of 320 pages. The answers contain practically all the information any married couple would wish to have on the subject of normal sexuality, imparted in a common-sense but decidedly prosaic fashion. Unfortunately the authors' knowledge seems limited to the physical side of the topic and this gives their advice and attitude a very distorted perspective. The only psychological authors they appear to have consulted at all extensively are Havelock Ellis and Stekel. Sexual impotence is generally to be treated by physical measures, such as the administration of certain

[1] Quoted from the cover.

hormones, local treatment of the genital tract and electro-therapeutic measures. The authors admit, however, that ' in many cases these measures are ineffective, when recourse must be had to psycho-therapy '. No hint is given throughout the book of the highly complex development of the instincts and emotional attitudes concerned, which are far more important for marital harmony than a blunt knowledge of anatomy and physiology alone.

E. J.

The Natural History of Mind. By A. D. Ritchie. (Longmans, London. Pp. viii + 286. Price 15*s*.)

Mr. Ritchie's study is pre-eminently naturalistic : ' using the physical and biological sciences as far as they will go and then if they do not go far enough in themselves using whatever methods are possible, still within the sphere of natural knowledge '. He rejects theories according to which philosophy ' begins as the theory of knowledge and finishes up as a revised version of the first chapter of Genesis ', and counters them by the view ' that mind is a product of the natural world and is still redolent of the pit out of which it was digged '. Before pursuing this theme, Mr. Ritchie puts forward some cogent remarks on Causation. His main contention is that however we dispense with the conception in science, the notion of *pushing* brought about by a human agent is always presupposed, and that no view of the mind which overlooks this can be sound.

Three chapters are devoted to physiology and biology, mainly to clear the ground : ' psychology and physiology are haunted still by a theory of reflexes derived from Descartes. . . . In effect Descartes conceived the animal organism as a very complicated mechanical doll—you press the button and the figure moves. He was obliged to allow for mind, at least in man ; so the mind was a *homunculus* who sat in the brain and pulled the strings from inside '. Mr. Ritchie has a pithy style.

It would be a mistake to infer that Mr. Ritchie is a Behaviourist. He considers that Behaviourism is a narrower theory than is warranted by the natural sciences, that it is based, in fact, on an entirely inadequate physiology—as well as being blind to the *human* side of behaviour. In order to pursue this matter Mr. Ritchie turns to Freud. The section which follows is far from the best in the book. Mr. Ritchie no longer maintains the high standard in just remarks which he set himself. Tribute is indeed paid to the psycho-analysts, and they are even rated above academic psychologists. ' It must be accounted to the psycho-analysts for righteousness that they have not been afraid to make fools of themselves. The academic psychologists have been so anxious to be respectable and to be treated as real scientists that they have never dared let themselves go. The result has been that they have produced dull myths instead of exciting ones, but they have been myths all the same.' Most of the

comments here amount to misstatement of fact unsupported by evidence or reasons. Thus ' patients always supply the data the analyst wants to find '. The Œdipus complex is a ' picturesque myth '. Freud is fond of ' the sacred number three ' (at least a more original remark than the usual comment on his tenacious dualism).

Having surveyed the trend from physiology to psycho-analysis, Mr. Ritchie comes to the conclusion that there is not a radical distinction between physiology and psychology. The difference lies not in the kind of things observed so much as in the concepts used in ordering them : physiology studies the part, psychology the whole. This view is based on an important distinction, which the author stresses, between *structure* and *function*. Indeed the whole book may be taken as an attempt to get away from the conception of psychology as a science concerned with the structural rather than the functional. It is to be regretted, however, that Mr. Ritchie's many suggestions here are not more fully elaborated or followed up.

The two concluding chapters contain contributions of a more positive character. Of these, the one devoted to Sensation, Perception and Cognition is much the better. Though it is of the Stout-MacDougall tradition, it is rather fresher. Mr. Ritchie claims that no experience can be reduced to a mere sensing. Over and above there is a ' symbolic ' element. This important notion requires more careful definition, however, than Mr. Ritchie gives it, since it is not connected at all closely with either the psycho-analytical or ordinary English usages of the word. Discussing the way in which the *I* is differentiated from the rest of the universe, Mr. Ritchie points out that the I is sometimes less than the body (as when a man says ' I have a toothache '), sometimes identified with the body (as in ' I opened the door '), and sometimes more than the body (as in ' I rang the bell '—the I being extended over the body and the bell apparatus). ' As far as I am active it [the body] is part of me, as far as I am passive it is part of the external world.' Perception and Cognition are not sufficiently distinguished, though cognition is cleverly likened to a map. Thus the cognition of a house includes not only the visual sense-datum but also images of what the house would look like from other angles, etc., in somewhat the same way as one uses a map to supply what cannot be perceived.

The point of the other chapter, on Emotion and Thought, is not very clear. Mr. Ritchie protests against regarding these as different in kind. They are interwoven and both expressed by symbols. Presumably in the totality of which thought and emotion are aspects, it is the purpose of thought to increase opportunity for emotion. For ' the function of thought is above all this process of extending the environment beyond the immediate '.

J. O. Wisdom.

For Stutterers. By Smiley Blanton and Margaret Gray Blanton, with an Introduction by J. Ramsay Hunt. (D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., New York and London, 1936. Pp. xi + 191. Price $2.00.)

In his Introduction Dr. Hunt emphasizes what psycho-analytic investigations had already disclosed, that stuttering is pre-eminently a psychoneurosis of which the speech disorder is a monosymptomatic manifestation. The volume is written in a clear, simple and direct style. As is necessary for the audience of stutterers, parents and teachers to whom this book is addressed, the psycho-analytic principles on which the work of the authors is based are expressed without any overloading of technical terms.

It is admitted that the beginnings of speech are manifested in chewing and suckling and that in learning to talk there is a suppression of all these infantile non-speech movements. This statement and a few other hints scattered throughout the volume are practically the only references to the important part played by the oral libido mechanisms in stammering. No attempt is made to elaborate on these dynamic mechanisms beyond a brief discussion of the manner in which too early socializing of the excretory functions has produced an increase of stuttering. This is a tacit admission by the authors of the important part played by the oral-anal mechanisms, but there is only a brief reference to the anal components themselves.

The chief feature of the volume is its insistence that stammering is a psychoneurosis whose origins are deeply imbedded in the unconscious emotional life. Consequently any treatment by speech and phonetic drill is not only superficial but likewise useless; a sound psychological therapy must have as its aim the elimination of these unconscious emotional difficulties. In the discussion of theories, the authors severely and justly criticize the theory that a conflict of languages or a handedness dominance can produce stuttering.

The best approach to the treatment of stuttering is the psychological one; for adults, either psycho-analysis or individual guidance work, for children, a special nursery school. However, the authors maintain that psycho-analysis is not necessary for all stutterers. The method most suitable to the largest number is what is termed 'individual guidance', which, according to the description of the technique given, seems to be a modified and attenuated analysis. Other methods of treatment, such as retraining of the hand, relaxation and group therapy with individual guidance, are also discussed. Phonetic training is wisely discarded as being not only superficial, but possibly detrimental in that it may reinforce the oral gratification which is so prominent a gain in stutterers. Suggestion, too, has its limitations, as it fails to reach or relieve the underlying emotional difficulty.

The final chapters of the book are devoted to the attitude which should

be adopted by teachers, parents and the stutterer himself towards the speech difficulty, its associated anxiety and the compulsive tendency to stammering in specific situations. These chapters contain some o the best material of the book, as the advice given is psycho-analytically sound. Unfortunately, the volume lacks bibliographical references to previous psycho-analytical publications on stammering which would be a necessary adjunct to an elementary book of this kind if the reader wished to amplify his knowledge.

Isador H. Coriat.

✱

Crime and Sexual Development. By A. N. Foxe, M.D. (The Monograph Editions, New York, 1936. Pp. 91. Price $2.75.)

The analyst who confidently believes that the analytic treatment of criminals holds vast possibilities both of a practical and scientific order, and yet for reasons of necessity is unable to handle more than a few such cases, can only envy Dr. Foxe his opportunities, as psychiatrist to Great Meadow Prison, for research into.the psychology of crime.

His book is based upon three years of study, the examination of 1,500 inmates of the prison and some 1,500 psycho-analytic hours with those inmates. It is an ambitious book. Dr. Foxe's aim has been no less than to explain and to classify almost every conceivable form of crime. He introduces the new terms ' criminosis ' and ' criminotic ' and classifies crimes under headings such as ' criminosis in action ' (e.g. burglary), ' criminosis in reaction ' (e.g. forgery), ' border criminosis ' (receiving), ' primal criminosis ' (patricide), ' criminosis in perversion ' (sodomy).

The attempt is made to relate particular crimes to different phases of libidinal development, simply by translating the symbolism involved and for the most part ignoring completely the patient's phantasy life : thus burglary belongs to the late oral phase, burglary with a gun to the anal phase, etc. The author quotes 93 case histories which, however, are rarely more than a record of the subject's crimes and convictions. No account is given of his childhood history or his phantasy-life, no reference is made to any neurotic features that may have been present, and the connection between his life and his crimes is brought out only in the most superficial way, if at all.

My chief objection to Dr. Foxe's book is its lack of a dynamic conception. One does not explain a particular manifestation simply by ascribing it to a certain phase of libidinal development. Among other things, it is necessary to shew why the libido has found the particular outlet in question and no other and to assess its dynamic significance (e.g. as a defence against anxiety) ; the history of a symptom and its antecedents should be followed up and the compromise between instinctual expression and defence in the symptom described.

In objecting, however, to the main trend of the book, I should certainly not wish to leave unnoticed the many interesting isolated observations contained in it, e.g. that ideas of kidnapping were associated in one case with a rescue phantasy. One has the impression that Dr. Foxe may have omitted some interesting details for the sake of generalizations. If so, one can only regret it. It is reasonable to suppose that if Dr. Foxe had been less ambitious in his aims, he would have achieved greater results.

Melitta Schmideberg.

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY
EDWARD GLOVER, GENERAL SECRETARY

REPORTS OF PROCEEDINGS OF SOCIETIES

BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1936

January 15, 1936. Miss Searl: 'Some Queries on Principles of Technique'.

February 5, 1936. Dr. Melitta Schmideberg: 'The Assessment of Environmental Factors'.

February 19, 1936. Short Communications: (1) Dr. Eder: 'A Note on Exogamy and Endogamy under Civilization'. (2) Dr. Fairbairn: 'The Effect of the King's Death upon Patients under Analysis'.

March 3, 1936. Symposium: 'Criteria of Success in Treatment'. Dr. Jones, Miss Sharpe, Dr. Brierley, Dr. Glover.

March 18, 1936. Short Communications: (1) Professor. Flugel: 'Anal Erotism and Stage Fright'. (2) Miss Grant Duff: 'A Political Incident'.

Edward Glover,
Secretary.

CHICAGO PSYCHO-ANALYTIC SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1936

January 11, 1936. Dr. Thomas M. French: 'Clinical Aspects of Learning in the Study of a Psycho-analytic Treatment'.

January 25, 1936. (1) *Business Meeting.* (2) Dr. Leon Saul: 'Psychogenic Factors in the Etiology of the Common Cold and Other Related Symptoms'.

February 8, 1936. (1) *Business Meeting.* Drs. Franz Alexander, Thomas M. French, N. Lionel Blitzsten were elected as delegates of the Council on Professional Training. Dr. N. Lionel Blitzsten was elected Executive Councillor. (2) Dr. George W. Wilson: 'The Transition from Organ-Neurosis to Conversion Hysteria: a Case Report'.

February 22, 1936. Dr. Gregory Zilboorg: 'Hypothesis of the Genesis of Suicide'.

March 7, 1936. Dr. Harry Levey: 'The Pregenital Tendencies of a Patient with Gastro-Intestinal Complaints'.

March 21, 1936. (1) *Business Meeting.* Election of Dr. Harry Levey as Associate Member; transfer of Dr. Jacob Kasanin from Boston Psychoanalytic Society to Associate Membership. (2) Dr. Robert Knight: 'Dynamics and Treatment of Alcohol Addiction'.

DUTCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1936

January 18, 1936. (Amsterdam.) (1) *Annual Meeting.* The Reports of the Secretary and Treasurer were adopted.

Election of Council. President, Dr. S. J. R. de Monchy ; *Vice-President*, Dr. F. P. Muller ; *Treasurer*, P. H. Versteeg ; *Secretary*, A. Endtz ; *Training Committee :* Dr. S. J. R. de Monchy (President), A. Endtz (Secretary), Dr. F. P. Muller, Dr. H. G. van der Waals, Dr. A. J. Westerman Holstijn.

(2) Dr. S. Weyl : ' Charlie Chaplin in Private Life and on the Film '.

February 29, 1936. (The Hague.) Dr. Th. Reik : ' Finale of the Second Symphony in C minor '.

A. Endtz,
Secretary.

FRENCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Fourth Quarter, 1935

October 15, 1935. Chairman, Dr. E. Pichon.

Dr. Madeleine Violet, 19 rue Monsieur, Paris VII, was elected Associate Member.

M. l'abbé Paul Jury : ' Descartes as a Psycho-analyst without the title '. Among other points, Descartes had recognized and stated the fact that a symptom can replace the memory of an experience in childhood connected with intense excitation.

November 19, 1935. Chairman, Mme. Marie Bonaparte.

(1) A resolution, proposed by Mme. Marie Bonaparte, was passed that a Fund should be established to facilitate the training of eligible but impecunious candidates. The sum available to candidates to be in the nature of a loan and to be recouped to the Fund on repayment. This Fund will be established by a foundation from Mme. Marie Bonaparte ; and will be supplemented by contributions of 100 fr. each from the Members of the Society, as a token of the Society's appreciation of her generous proposal.

(2) Dr. J. Leuba : ' A Critical Study on Psychic Intersexuality, followed by some subversive Reflections concerning the Instincts '.

December 19, 1935. Chairman, Mme. Marie Bonaparte.

(1) Dr. Cénac brought up again for discussion the matter of the organization of the analyses of non-paying patients. The matter is to be discussed further in January and the regulations will then be drawn up, on the principles laid down by the Psycho-Analytical Institute, under which such cases will be apportioned. One member will be responsible for keeping records of the cases for the purpose of the Annual Report.

(2) Dr. Ch. Odier : ' A Catamnestic Document in a Case of Impotence '.

Dr. J. Leuba,
Secretary.

HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1936

January 17, 1936. *General Meeting.*

Presentation of Reports by the Officers.

Election of the Council and Training Committee. President, Dr. I. Hollós; *Vice-President*, Dr. I. Hermann; *Secretary*, Dr. Z. Pfeifer; *Treasurer*, Dr. G. Dukes; *Librarian*, Dr. E. Almásy; *Director of the Policlinic*, Dr. M. Bálint; *Assistant Director of the Policlinic*, Dr. L. Révész. *Training Committee:* Dr. I. Hermann (Chairman), Drs. M. Bálint, Hollós, Révész, Róheim, Frau Kovács, Frau K. Lévy.

February 3, 1936. (1) Dr. E. Peto (guest of the Society): 'The Development of the Sense of Smell'. (2) Dr. I. Hermann: 'A Special Instance of Recognition and Working over of the Danger of Castration and its Effects on Character Formation'.

February 17, 1936. (1) Frau Dr. Dubovitz and Frau Dr. K. Lévy: Report of the Hungarian Child-analysts on their attendance at the Vienna Seminar for child-analysts. (2) Frau Dr. L. Hajdu-Gimes: 'Report on a Case of Schizophrenia under Treatment'.

March 26, 1936. Dr. L. Révész: 'On Trance-states occurring during the Analytic Session'.

April 17, 1936. Dr. R. Bak (guest of the Society). Review of Reik's *Der überraschte Psychologe*, followed by discussion.

Dr. Z. Pfeifer,
Secretary.

THE WASHINGTON-BALTIMORE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC SOCIETY

First Quarter, 1936

January, 1936. (1) Dr. David Levy (New York) (by invitation): 'Experiments in Sibling Rivalry'.

(2) *Business Meeting.* Report by Dr. Hadley on the acceptance of the new constitution by the American Psycho-analytic Association. Appointment of Dr. Ross McClure Chapman as representative to the Executive Council of the American Psycho-analytic Association. *Election of Officers: President*, Dr. Lewis B. Hill; *Vice-President*, Dr. Joseph O. Chassell; *Secretary-Treasurer*, Dr. Amanda L. Stoughton, 1835 Eye Street, N.W. Washington, D.C.

February 8, 1936. Dr. Ralph Kaufman (Boston) (guest of the Society): 'The Use of Psycho-analytic Technique in Late-Life Depressions'.

March 14, 1936. (1) Dr. Frieda Fromm-Reichmann: 'Remarks on Female Psycho-sexuality'. (2) *Business Meeting.* Election of Dr. Douglas Noble as student-in-training. Resignation from membership of Dr. Clara Thompson to join the New York Society.

Amanda L. Stoughton,
Secretary-Treasurer.

VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Fourth Quarter, 1935

October 2, 1935. Dr. Otto Fenichel (Prague, guest of the Society): 'The Symbolic Equation of Penis and Girl'.

October 16, 1935. *General Meeting.* (1) Report of the Council (Federn). (2) Treasurer's Report (E. Bibring). (3) Librarian's Report (R. Sterba). (4) Report of the Clinic (Hitschmann.) Report of the Clinic for Psychotics (E. Bibring). (5) Report of the Training Committee (Anna Freud). (6) Report of the Child Guidance Department (Aichhorn). (7) Report of the *Verlag* (M. Freud). (8) Retirement of officers. (9) Elections: The Council, the Training Committee and the Director of the Child Guidance Department were re-elected precisely as in the previous year. *Council: President*, Professor Freud; *Vice-Presidents*, Dr. Paul Federn, Anna Freud; *Secretaries*, Dr. Robert Wälder, Dr. Heinz Hartmann; *Treasurer*, Dr. Edward Bibring; *Librarian*, Dr. Richard Sterba. *Training Committee: Chairman*, Dr. Helene Deutsch; *Vice-Chairman*, Anna Freud; *Secretary*, Dr. Edward Bibring; *Committee Members:* August Aichhorn, Dr. Grete Bibring, Dr. Paul Federn, Dr. Eduard Hitschmann. A change took place in the Officers of the Clinic, in that the Treasurer, of many years' standing, Dr. Edmund Bergler, asked to be relieved of office. Dr. Hans Lampl was elected in his place, and Dr. Bergler was thanked for his long and arduous services. The other Officers of the Clinic were re-elected: Director, Dr. Eduard Hitschmann; Assistant Director, Dr. Otto Isakower.

(10) Membership subscription for the year 1936. The subscription was fixed provisionally at the same rate as in the previous year, but the Council was empowered to raise it from Sch. 25 (up to Sch. 150) in case of necessity. (11) Other business. Dr. Robert Wälder reported that in accordance with the arrangement for Exchange Lectures between London and Vienna, he had been invited by the British Psycho-Analytical Society to address them in November on the subject of the main divergencies between the scientific work of the British and Viennese analysts. He gave an outline of his proposed lecture.

October 30, 1935. Dr. Richard Sterba: 'On the Theory of Transference'.

November 13, 1935. Dr. Annie Reich (Prague): 'A Clinical Contribution towards the understanding of the Paranoid Personality'.

November 27, 1935. Dr. Jeanne Lampl-de-Groot: 'Inhibitions and Narcissism'.

December 11, 1935. (1) Dr. Erwin Stengel: 'Primitive Identifications in Brain Disorder'. (2) Dr. Robert Wälder: Report of the discussions following his lecture to the British Psycho-Analytical Society on November 21, 1935. (3) *Business Meeting.* Co-opted to the Training Committee: Dr. Heinz Hartmann and Dr. Robert Wälder; and as an extension to the

Training Committee: Dr. Ruth Mack Brunswick, Dr. Wilhelm Hoffer, Dr. Otto Isakower, Dr. Jeanne Lampl-de-Groot, Dr. Richard Sterba.

First Quarter, 1936

January 15, 1936. Dr. Paul Federn: 'On the Differentiation between normal and morbid Narcissism': Part I.

January 29, 1936. Dr. Paul Federn: 'On the Differentiation between normal and morbid Narcissism': Part II.

February 12, 1936. Dr. Ludwig Eidelberg: 'On the Genesis of Agoraphobia and Writers' Cramp'.

March 11, 1936. (1) Dr. Ludwig Eidelberg: 'A study of slips of the tongue'. (2) Dr. Paul Federn: 'A technical expedient'. (3) Dr. Paul Federn: 'Snake symbolism'.

March 25, 1936. (1) Dr. Robert Wälder: 'On the possibility of prediction in psychological matters'. (2) Dr. Jeanne Lampl-de-Groot: 'On the turning inward of aggression'. (3) *Election of Associate Member:* Dr. Heinrich Winnik, Budapest. *Change of Address:* Dr. Emilio Servadio, via Tagliamento 76, Rome.

Dr. Robert Wälder,
Secretary.